disclosure requirement in New York

2022To withstand this scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights" ( Doe v Reed , 561 US 186, 196 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2022To withstand this scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights" ( Doe v Reed , 561 US 186, 196 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2019Such an interpretation violates the rule of construction that “words must be “harmonize[d]” and read together to avoid surplusage” (Andryeyeva v New York Health Care, Inc., —NY3d—, —, 2019 WL 1333030 at *8 [2019]; Kimmel v State, 29 NY3d 386, 393 [2017] [“a statute should be construed to avoid rendering any of its provisions 9 Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, we do no more than interpret the Insurance Law as written and as required under our rules of statutory construction.

2019Such an interpretation violates the rule of construction that “words must be “harmonize[d]” and read together to avoid surplusage” (Andryeyeva v New York Health Care, Inc., —NY3d—, —, 2019 WL 1333030 at *8 [2019]; Kimmel v State, 29 NY3d 386, 393 [2017] [“a statute should be construed to avoid rendering any of its provisions 9 Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, we do no more than interpret the Insurance Law as written and as required under our rules of statutory construction.

2007The plaintiffs refusal or delay in signing the transcript of her examination before trial in another action was not a disclosure violation and did not prejudice the defendants since, after the 60-day statutory period, the transcript may have been used as if it were signed (see CPLR 3116 [a]; Moak v Raynor, 28 AD3d 900, 904 [2006]; Ireland v GEICO Corp., 2 AD3d 917, 918 [2003]).

2006Defendant’s refusal or delay in signing or returning his deposition transcript was not a disclosure violation and did not prejudice plaintiff as there is statutory direction for use of such a transcript as if it were signed (see CPLR 3116 [a]; Ireland v GEICO Corp., 2 AD3d 917, 918 [2003]).

2008Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]), and the documents sought by plaintiff, including, inter alia, the operating budget of the building in which plaintiffs minor daughter was attacked and the contract that the building had with a prior security company, are neither material nor necessary to this action.

1979Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 .) The scope of interrogatories, as defined by CPLR 3131, incorporates the liberal disclosure requirement of CPLR 3101 (Allen v Crowell-Collier Pub.

1988In 1976, the Court of Appeals in Matter of Kelvin D. ( 40 NY2d 895, 896 [1976]) made the disclosure rule in People v Rosario (supra) applicable to Family Court juvenile delinquency proceedings, such as the instant case.

1985Our court discontinued that practice in favor of a broader disclosure rule because it was “persuaded that a right sense of justice entitles the defense to examine a witness’ prior statement, whether or not it varies from his testimony on the stand” (People v Rosario, supra, at p 289 ).

2026Corp. , 288 AD2d 33, 35 ). "[T]rial courts are accorded wide discretion in making evidentiary rulings and those rulings should not be disturbed on appeal absent an improvident exercise of discretion or a showing of prejudice to a substantial right pursuant to CPLR 2002" ( Dyszkiewicz v City of New York , 218 AD3d 546, 550 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Traca v Catapano Engg. & Architecture, P.C. , 237 AD3d 1134 , 1135; 6 Harbor Park Dr., LLC v Town of N. Hempstead , 230 AD3d 721 , 723).

2007Corp., 288 AD2d 33, 35 [2001]).

1987(Ferraro v Koncal Assocs., 97 AD2d 429 [2d Dept 1983].) Extreme conduct is required before imposition of the ultimate penalty — striking the answer in this instance.

1986"Although a showing that it is impossible to make the particular disclosure will bar the imposition of a sanction under CPLR 3126, a contrary rule prevails where the disobedient party is responsible for making a previously possible disclosure impossible” (Ferraro v Koncal Assoc., supra, p 429).

2026Defendants' contention that the court abused its discretion by imposing a sanction that was disproportionate to the disclosure violation is raised for the first time in defendants' reply brief and thus is not properly before this Court ( see Brooks v City of Buffalo , 209 AD3d 1270, 1272 [4th Dept 2022]).

2026Corp. , 288 AD2d 33, 35 ). "[T]rial courts are accorded wide discretion in making evidentiary rulings and those rulings should not be disturbed on appeal absent an improvident exercise of discretion or a showing of prejudice to a substantial right pursuant to CPLR 2002" ( Dyszkiewicz v City of New York , 218 AD3d 546, 550 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Traca v Catapano Engg. & Architecture, P.C. , 237 AD3d 1134 , 1135; 6 Harbor Park Dr., LLC v Town of N. Hempstead , 230 AD3d 721 , 723).

2024For public policy reasons, the statutory exemptions from the disclosure requirement are "to be narrowly construed, with the burden resting on the agency to demonstrate that the requested material indeed qualifies for exemption." Gould v New York City Police Department, 89 NY2d 267,275 [1996].

2018Petitioner's request for discovery on the issue of numerosity is governed by "the broad disclosure standard articulated in CPLR 3101 (a) encompassing 'all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action', balanced by the court's ability to issue a protective order to prevent abuse" ( Casey v Prudential Sec. , 268 AD2d 833, 834 [2000, Graffeo, J.], quoting CPLR 3103 [a]).

2015Plaintiff urges that he does not need to allege pecuniary damages regarding defendant’s failure to advise of a potential defamation action because that potential action involved statements that tended to impugn his professional ability (see Schindler v Mejias, 100 AD3d 1315, 1316 [2012]).

2007The plaintiffs refusal or delay in signing the transcript of her examination before trial in another action was not a disclosure violation and did not prejudice the defendants since, after the 60-day statutory period, the transcript may have been used as if it were signed (see CPLR 3116 [a]; Moak v Raynor, 28 AD3d 900, 904 [2006]; Ireland v GEICO Corp., 2 AD3d 917, 918 [2003]).

2006Requested information regarding timeshares was not in defendant’s possession; he had no obligation to provide information in the possession of a third party and plaintiff never asked for a release or issued a subpoena to obtain these documents on her own (see CPLR 3120 [1] [i]; DeGourney v Mulzac, 287 AD2d 680, 680 [2001]; Castillo v Henry Schein, Inc., 259 AD2d 651, 652 [1999]).

2006Requested information regarding timeshares was not in defendant’s possession; he had no obligation to provide information in the possession of a third party and plaintiff never asked for a release or issued a subpoena to obtain these documents on her own (see CPLR 3120 [1] [i]; DeGourney v Mulzac, 287 AD2d 680, 680 [2001]; Castillo v Henry Schein, Inc., 259 AD2d 651, 652 [1999]).

2000Given the lack of viability of the cause of action for lack of informed consent against defendants, plaintiff has no basis for withholding the identity of her medical expert from them based on the exception to the disclosure requirement (see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; Travis v Wormer [appeal No. 1], 136 AD2d 933 ; see also, Rivera v City of New York, 150 Misc 2d 566, 569 ).