Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Reedgreen1 sentence2023The Court more recently described this “exacting scrutiny” standard as requiring “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021) (“AFPF”) (quoting Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010)). 9 But that more recent decision in AFPF did not suggest that all government subpoenas are doomed under the exacting scrutiny standard, regardless of the nature of the information sought. | 1 | 1 |
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bontagreen1 sentence2023The Court more recently described this “exacting scrutiny” standard as requiring “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021) (“AFPF”) (quoting Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010)). 9 But that more recent decision in AFPF did not suggest that all government subpoenas are doomed under the exacting scrutiny standard, regardless of the nature of the information sought. | 1 | 1 |
Ferguson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013The purpose of this disclosure rule is to " 'minimize surprise that often results from unexpected expert testimony, [to] reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merits of the expert's testimony through focused cross-examination.' ” Ferguson v. United States, 866 A.2d 54, 63 (D.C.2005) (quoting Fed. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stephen B. Comleygreen1 sentence2009"To establish such a violation, the target of a subpoena must make a prima facie showing of a first amendment infringement — typically, that enforcement of the disclosure requirement will result in harassment of current members, a decline in new members, or other chilling of associational rights.” United States v. Comley, 890 F.2d 539, 544 (1st Cir.1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2012The state is "held to a disclosure standard based on what all State officers at the time knew.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 n. 11, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (internal quotations omitted). . 2012The state is "held to a disclosure standard based on what all State officers at the time knew.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 n. 11, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (internal quotations omitted). . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Estate of Reed
green
1 sentence1980Since the standard in Del Vecchio has been supplanted by § 732.702, In re Reed, 354 So.2d 864 (Fla.1978), says appellant, the change automatically flows through to govern in the alimony context. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.