disclosure requirement in Ohio

1990Broadcasting Co., v. Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 526 N.E.2d 786 , the Supreme Court held that a governmental body refusing to release records has the burden of proving that the records are expected from disclosure by R.C. 149.43, and stated that the exceptions to the disclosure requirement are to be strictly construed against the custodian of the records.

1990Broadcasting Co., v. Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 526 N.E.2d 786 , the Supreme Court held that a governmental body refusing to release records has the burden of proving that the records are expected from disclosure by R.C. 149.43, and stated that the exceptions to the disclosure requirement are to be strictly construed against the custodian of the records.

2024Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81 , 2008- Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206 , ¶ 10, nothing in the majority opinion suggests that the members of the majority have adhered to that standard. {¶ 54} “Security record” means any of the following: (1) Any record that contains information directly used for protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, or sabotage; (2) Any record assembled, prepared, or maintained by a public office or public body to prevent, mitigate, or respond to acts of terrorism, including any of the following: (a) Those port

2024Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81 , 2008- Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206 , ¶ 10, nothing in the majority opinion suggests that the members of the majority have adhered to that standard. {¶ 54} “Security record” means any of the following: 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (1) Any record that contains information directly used for protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, or sabotage; (2) Any record assembled, prepared, or maintained by a public office or public body to prevent, mitigate, or respond to acts of terrorism, including any of the

2010No. 77654, 2002-Ohio-3539 , quoting Pearson v. Easy Living, Inc. (S.D.Ohio 1981), 534 F.Supp. 884, 890 .

2002In fact, the failure to disclose does not even have to result in the consumer being deceived: "[i]t is not sufficient for a lender to comply with the spirit of TILA; strict compliance with the disclosure requirement is necessary." Id.

2008The disclosure requirement serves to help deter circulation fraud and abuse by encouraging petition circulators to be truthful and self-disciplined." Id.

2003Buckley, 525 U.S. at 224 , 119 S.Ct. 636 , 142 L.Ed.2d 599 If a voter knows whether and how much a particular circulator is being paid, the voter will be better able to evaluate the sincerity of the circulator’s statements about the initiative proposal.

1998Although the fact that Lewis was Costanzo’s supervisor was not discussed, that single fact is not so significant that it outweighs the remaining disclosure and waiver. {¶ 46} “In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant * * * must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” (Emphasis added.) Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-347 .

1998Although the fact that Lewis was Costanzo’s supervisor was not discussed, that single fact is not so significant that it outweighs the remaining disclosure and waiver. {¶ 46} “In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant * * * must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” (Emphasis added.) Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-347 .

1993Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), 435 U.S. 765 , 98 S.Ct. 1407 , 55 L.Ed.2d 707 , the United States Supreme Court, while concluding that a state statute prohibiting corporate expenditures opposing or supporting ballot issues was violative of the First Amendment, nevertheless acknowledged that requirements such as the one at issue in the case herein were permissible.

1993Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), 435 U.S. 765 , 98 S.Ct. 1407 , 55 L.Ed.2d 707 , the United States Supreme Court, while concluding that a state statute prohibiting corporate expenditures opposing or supporting ballot issues was violative of the First Amendment, nevertheless acknowledged that requirements such as the one at issue in the case herein were permissible.

2026In Ashmus v. Coughlin, 2025-Ohio-2412 , the Ohio Supreme Court recently analyzed the disclosure requirement of R.C. 5302.30.

2025Inst., Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-4688 .] Mandamus—Public-records requests—Respondent failed to show that an exemption from the Public Records Act’s disclosure requirement applies— Writ granted and relator’s request for statutory damages denied.

2024(No. 2023-0580—Submitted December 13, 2023—Decided November 21, 2024.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA2022-10-057, 2023-Ohio-874. _______________________ DONNELLY, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and BRUNNER and DETERS, JJ., joined.

2024(No. 2023-0580—Submitted December 13, 2023—Decided November 21, 2024.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA2022-10-057, 2023-Ohio-874 . _______________________ DONNELLY, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and BRUNNER and DETERS, JJ., joined.

2024Bd. of Trustees, 2024-Ohio-5449.] Public-records requests—R.C. 149.011(G)—Township-newsletter distribution lists come under the jurisdiction of the township and document the organization, functions, procedures, or other activities of the office and are therefore subject to the disclosure requirement of the Public Records Act—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded.

2024Bd. of Trustees, 2024-Ohio-5449 .] Public-records requests—R.C. 149.011(G)—Township-newsletter distribution lists come under the jurisdiction of the township and document the organization, functions, procedures, or other activities of the office and are therefore subject to the disclosure requirement of the Public Records Act—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded.

2020Johnson v. Johnson, 134 Ohio App.3d 579, 583 , 731 N.E.2d 1144 (3d Dist.1999).

2020Johnson v. Johnson, 134 Ohio App.3d 579, 583 , 731 N.E.2d 1144 (3d Dist.1999).

2017Previously in Gross, the court had remarked that the elements of the disclosure requirement “would be satisfied either by the exhibiting of the attachment to the antenuptial agreement of a listing of the assets of the parties to the agreement, or alternatively a showing that there had been a full disclosure by other means.” Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d at 105 , 464 N.E.2d 500 . {¶ 29} In the case before us, there was no disclosure of the relevant assets by any of the methods outlined in Gross.

2017Previously in Gross, the court had remarked that the elements of the disclosure requirement “would be satisfied either by the exhibiting of the attachment to the antenuptial agreement of a listing of the assets of the parties to the agreement, or alternatively a showing that there had been a full disclosure by other means.” Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d at 105 , 464 N.E.2d 500 . {¶ 29} In the case before us, there was no disclosure of the relevant assets by any of the methods outlined in Gross.

2010Similarly, R.C. 2933.63(A) provides that an “aggrieved person” may request that the court “suppress the contents or evidence derived from the contents of a * * * electronic communication * * * unlawfully intercepted.” See State v. Davies (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 630 , 763 N.E.2d 1222 (9th Distict) (suppression of evidence under R.C. 2933.62 and 2933.63); State v. French, Summit App. No. 24252, 2009-Ohio-2342 , 2009 WL 1396797 (suppression under R.C. 2933.62(A)). {¶ 18} In State v. Bell, 142 Ohio Misc.2d 72 , 2007-Ohio-2629 , 870 N.E.2d 1256 (Clermont County), the court addressed some of the iss

2010Similarly, R.C. 2933.63(A) provides that an “aggrieved person” may request that the court “suppress the contents or evidence derived from the contents of a * * * electronic communication * * * unlawfully intercepted.” See State v. Davies (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 630 , 763 N.E.2d 1222 (9th Distict) (suppression of evidence under R.C. 2933.62 and 2933.63); State v. French, Summit App. No. 24252, 2009-Ohio-2342 , 2009 WL 1396797 (suppression under R.C. 2933.62(A)). {¶ 18} In State v. Bell, 142 Ohio Misc.2d 72 , 2007-Ohio-2629 , 870 N.E.2d 1256 (Clermont County), the court addressed some of the iss

2010Similarly, R.C. 2933.63(A) provides that an “aggrieved person” may request that the court “suppress the contents or evidence derived from the contents of a * * * electronic communication * * * unlawfully intercepted.” See State v. Davies (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 630 , 763 N.E.2d 1222 (9th Distict) (suppression of evidence under R.C. 2933.62 and 2933.63); State v. French, Summit App. No. 24252, 2009-Ohio-2342 , 2009 WL 1396797 (suppression under R.C. 2933.62(A)). {¶ 18} In State v. Bell, 142 Ohio Misc.2d 72 , 2007-Ohio-2629 , 870 N.E.2d 1256 (Clermont County), the court addressed some of the iss

2005The disclosure requirement of TMC 795.22(a)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague, as it is neither “so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule at all,” nor is it “substantially incomprehensible.” See Chavez, 973 F.2d at 1249 .

2005There is, however, no conflict with state law. {¶ 67} For all of the foregoing reasons, the city’s first assignment of error is found well taken to the extent allowed in this decision and judgment entry. *497 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 68} The city contends in its second assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding that the city’s predatory-lending ordinances were not severable if only certain provisions were invalid. {¶ 69} As indicated above, we found two areas in which the municipal law impermissibly conflicted with state law: (1) in the area of penalties for improper paymen

2005There is, however, no conflict with state law. {¶ 67} For all of the foregoing reasons, the city’s first assignment of error is found well taken to the extent allowed in this decision and judgment entry. *497 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 68} The city contends in its second assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding that the city’s predatory-lending ordinances were not severable if only certain provisions were invalid. {¶ 69} As indicated above, we found two areas in which the municipal law impermissibly conflicted with state law: (1) in the area of penalties for improper paymen

2005There is, however, no conflict with state law. {¶ 67} For all of the foregoing reasons, the city’s first assignment of error is found well taken to the extent allowed in this decision and judgment entry. *497 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 68} The city contends in its second assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding that the city’s predatory-lending ordinances were not severable if only certain provisions were invalid. {¶ 69} As indicated above, we found two areas in which the municipal law impermissibly conflicted with state law: (1) in the area of penalties for improper paymen

2005There is, however, no conflict with state law. {¶ 67} For all of the foregoing reasons, the city’s first assignment of error is found well taken to the extent allowed in this decision and judgment entry. *497 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 68} The city contends in its second assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding that the city’s predatory-lending ordinances were not severable if only certain provisions were invalid. {¶ 69} As indicated above, we found two areas in which the municipal law impermissibly conflicted with state law: (1) in the area of penalties for improper paymen

2005There is, however, no conflict with state law. {¶ 67} For all of the foregoing reasons, the city’s first assignment of error is found well taken to the extent allowed in this decision and judgment entry. *497 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 68} The city contends in its second assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding that the city’s predatory-lending ordinances were not severable if only certain provisions were invalid. {¶ 69} As indicated above, we found two areas in which the municipal law impermissibly conflicted with state law: (1) in the area of penalties for improper paymen

2005There is, however, no conflict with state law. {¶ 67} For all of the foregoing reasons, the city’s first assignment of error is found well taken to the extent allowed in this decision and judgment entry. *497 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶ 68} The city contends in its second assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding that the city’s predatory-lending ordinances were not severable if only certain provisions were invalid. {¶ 69} As indicated above, we found two areas in which the municipal law impermissibly conflicted with state law: (1) in the area of penalties for improper paymen

2004Friends Social Club v. Secy. of Labor (E.D.Mich.1991), 763 F.Supp. 1386, 1394 , citing Buckley, supra, 424 U.S. at 71-72 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 . {¶ 29} In Friends Social Club , the Department of Labor (“DOL”) was investigating several groups’ connection to a union regional election.

2004Friends Social Club v. Secy. of Labor (E.D.Mich.1991), 763 F.Supp. 1386, 1394 , citing Buckley, supra, 424 U.S. at 71-72 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 . {¶ 29} In Friends Social Club , the Department of Labor (“DOL”) was investigating several groups’ connection to a union regional election.

2004Friends Social Club v. Secy. of Labor (E.D.Mich.1991), 763 F.Supp. 1386, 1394 , citing Buckley, supra, 424 U.S. at 71-72 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 . {¶ 29} In Friends Social Club , the Department of Labor (“DOL”) was investigating several groups’ connection to a union regional election.

1990Hook, supra. The referee cited extensive testimony of plaintiff upon which he relied at the hearing below to arrive at the conclusion that plaintiff was an independent individual, an avid reader, well read and competent who voluntarily signed the antenuptial agreement which disclosed the assets each brought to the marriage. 5 In addition, the referee's factual findings indicated and included a notarized agreement made on July 11, 1987.

1990The State claims favor of State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 442 , 453 N.E. 2d 689 .

1990The State claims favor of State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 442 , 453 N.E. 2d 689 .