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8 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
News and Observer Publishing Co. v. Poolegreen2 sentences2015As the Supreme Court explained, "[c]ourts should ensure that the exception to the disclosure requirement should extend no further than necessary to protect ongoing efforts of a public body, respecting the policy against secrecy in government that underlies both the Public Records Act and the Open Meetings Law." Id. 2015The Supreme Court concluded with an instruction that lower courts "should ensure that the exception to the disclosure requirement should extend no further than necessary to protect ongoing efforts of a public body, respecting the policy against secrecy in government that underlies both the Public Records Act and the Open Meetings Law." Id. | 1 | 2 |
Ray v. North Carolina Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2015See Ray, 366 N.C. at 9 , 727 S.E.2d at 681 (distinguishing between amendments that change the substance of a statute and those that clarify a statute, and noting that clarifying amendments “apply to all cases pending before the courts when the amendment is adopted, regardless of whether the underlying 3 We note that we use the term “clarified” in quotation marks because the General Assembly titled the session law “An Act to Clarify.” We make no determination at this time of whether the amendment constituted a clarifying amendment or a substantial change to the statute, leaving that analysis fo 2015See Ray, 366 N.C. at 9 , 727 S.E.2d at 681 (distinguishing between amendments that change the substance of a statute and those that clarify a statute, and noting that clarifying amendments “apply to all cases pending before the courts when the amendment is adopted, regardless of whether the underlying 3 We note that we use the term “clarified” in quotation marks because the General Assembly titled the session law “An Act to Clarify.” We make no determination at this time of whether the amendment constituted a clarifying amendment or a substantial change to the statute, leaving that analysis fo | 1 | 1 |
Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc.green1 sentence2013See also Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1173 (Del. 2000) ("To state a disclosure claim, appellants 'must provide some basis for a court to infer that the alleged violation were material . . . . [They] must allege that facts are missing from the [information] statement, identify those facts, state why they meet the materiality standard and how the omission caused injury.'") (citations omitted). [47] Based on the pleading standards discussed above and the definition of "materiality" developed by both Delaware and North Carolina courts, the court concludes that in order to state a c | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. National Federation of Blind of North Carolina, Inc.green2 sentences1993The statute’s requirement that “the party giving publicity to and being responsible for” such publications always either “sign” them or face imprisonment for failure to do so undoubtedly will prevent many individuals from exercising their constitutionally protected right to attack a candidate with the truth. 3 Furthermore, in addition to the deterrent effect of a disclosure requirement on the exercise of protected core political expression, “[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.” Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U 1993The statute’s requirement that “the party giving publicity to and being responsible for” such publications always either “sign” them or face imprisonment for failure to do so undoubtedly will prevent many individuals from exercising their constitutionally protected right to attack a candidate with the truth. 3 Furthermore, in addition to the deterrent effect of a disclosure requirement on the exercise of protected core political expression, “[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.” Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Bergeron Plymouth Chrysler, Inc.green1 sentence1986Accord Hill v. Bergeron Plymouth Chrysler, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. McDowell
green
2 sentences2009McDowell, 310 N.C. at 69-73 , 310 S.E.2d at 306-09 . 2009McDowell, 310 N.C. at 69-73 , 310 S.E.2d at 306-09 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Agurs
green
2 sentences2009In McDowell , a capital case, we undertook extensive analysis of existing case law to determine the proper standard on which to review the State's failure to disclose nonrequested evidence, noting that the disclosure requirement turned on the "materiality" of the evidence, a "somewhat elusive gauge" on which the leading United States Supreme Court case, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), was less than clear as to the meaning of the term, and silent as to whether the trial judge or the jury should decide the question. 2009In McDowell , a capital case, we undertook extensive analysis of existing case law to determine the proper standard on which to review the State's failure to disclose nonrequested evidence, noting that the disclosure requirement turned on the "materiality" of the evidence, a "somewhat elusive gauge" on which the leading United States Supreme Court case, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), was less than clear as to the meaning of the term, and silent as to whether the trial judge or the jury should decide the question. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
cluster 507099
green
1 sentence1995Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1988). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Buckley v. Valeo
green
2 sentences1993Both because N.C.G.S. § 163-274(7) chills the exercise of protected free expression and because it mandates the content of such expression, this statute is subject to "exacting First Amendment scrutiny." Id. at 797-98, 108 S.Ct. at 2677-78, 101 L.Ed.2d at 690 ; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 18 , 96 S.Ct. at 634 , 46 L.Ed.2d at 687 . 1993Both because N.C.G.S. § 163-274(7) chills the exercise of protected free expression and because it mandates the content of such expression, this statute is subject to "exacting First Amendment scrutiny." Id. at 797-98, 108 S.Ct. at 2677-78, 101 L.Ed.2d at 690 ; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 18 , 96 S.Ct. at 634 , 46 L.Ed.2d at 687 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.