disclosure requirement in California

2011In finding “no reason to interpret the appearance-of-partiality rule more broadly in the context of arbitrator disclosure than in the context of judicial recusal” (Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 393 ), the Supreme Court was considering two arguments: First, that the standard for arbitrator disclosure should be broader than that for judicial recusal in that “all doubts should be resolved in favor of disclosure” and, second, that the disclosure requirement for arbitrators should be based on the party’s perspective rather than the perspective of an “ ‘objective, reasonable person.’ ” (Id. at p.

2010Unlike the cases upon which BWM relies, the disclosure at issue here was of matters that clearly could create a reasonable belief that the arbitrator "`was biased for or against a party for a particular reason. ' ( Betz v. Pankow, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 , italics added.)" ( Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 389 .) (5) In finding "no reason to interpret the appearance-of-partiality rule more broadly in the context of arbitrator disclosure than in the context of judicial recusal" ( Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 393 ), the Supreme Court was considering two arguments: First, that the s

2016Disclosure of Business Activities With respect to the nature of the business of an arbitrator, courts have recognized that “ ‘[b]ecause arbitrators are selected for their familiarity with the type of business dispute involved, they are not expected to be entirely without business contacts in the particular field, but they should disclose any repeated or significant contacts which they may have with a party to the dispute, his attorney or his chosen arbitrator.’ ” (Casden Park La Brea Retail LLC v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 468, 477 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 763 ].) Despite this g

2016Disclosure of Business Activities With respect to the nature of the business of an arbitrator, courts have recognized that “ ‘[b]ecause arbitrators are selected for their familiarity with the type of business dispute involved, they are not expected to be entirely without business contacts in the particular field, but they should disclose any repeated or significant contacts which they may have with a party to the dispute, his attorney or his chosen arbitrator.’ ” (Casden Park La Brea Retail LLC v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 468, 477 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 763 ].) Despite this g

2017(Del. 1994) 650 A.2d 1270 , 1287 ( Arnold ); Transkaryotic, supra , at p. 360 ["where a breach of the disclosure duty does not implicate bad faith or self-interest, both legal and equitable monetary remedies ... are barred on account of [ section 102(b)(7) ]"].) Furthermore, due to the nature of a disclosure violation-i.e., depriving shareholders of complete and accurate information in casting their votes, a breach of the disclosure duty leads to irreparable harm, limiting a court's ability to remedy the harm once the merger has closed. ( Transkaryotic, supra , at p. 361.) We find plaintiff's

2017(See Arnold, supra , 650 A.2d at p. 1288 ["where a defendant is a director and officer, only those actions taken solely in the defendant's capacity as an officer are outside the purview of Section 102(b)(7)"].) In Arnold , the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention on cross-motions for summary judgment that a disclosure violation by the defendant, who was a director and officer of the corporation, fell outside the scope of protection of the section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision, because "plaintiff has failed to highlight any specific actions [the CEO] undertook as an offi

2016(Cf. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798 , 825, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 ["Where statutes involving similar issues contain language demonstrating the Legislature knows how to express its intent, ' "the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed with reference to the different statutes." ' "] ) Moreover, Rojas's conclusion as to the intent of the express statutory remedy was confirmed by the clear legislative history declaring the Legislature intended the remedy provide

2016(Cf. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798 , 825, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 ["Where statutes involving similar issues contain language demonstrating the Legislature knows how to express its intent, ' "the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed with reference to the different statutes." ' "] ) Moreover, Rojas's conclusion as to the intent of the express statutory remedy was confirmed by the clear legislative history declaring the Legislature intended the remedy provide

2023(E.g., § 832.7(b)(1)(A)–(E).) However, Government Code section 7927.705 states the CPRA “does not require disclosure of records, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.” Government Code section 7927.705 is “ ‘not an independent exemption’ ” to disclosure; rather, it “ ‘merely incorporates other prohibitions established by law.’ ” (Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1283 (Copley Press).) The question here is whether the nonconfidential offic

2007(See Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1283 , 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 183 , 141 P.3d 288 .) [8] Except as expressly noted above, I do not join the majority's analysis of this issue.

2018Instead, the dictum in question merely notes that pretrial challenges to criminal preliminary examination procedures may , *918 in some circumstances involving jurisdictional error that are not applicable here, warrant relief without a showing of prejudice. [Citation.]" ( Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 , 652-653, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 410 , 304 P.3d 1071 .) For example, even where a defendant shows in a pretrial motion that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the grand jury exculpatory evidence of which he or she is aware, in violation of section 939.71, the defendant must show "sub

2018Instead, the dictum in question merely notes that pretrial challenges to criminal preliminary examination procedures may , *918 in some circumstances involving jurisdictional error that are not applicable here, warrant relief without a showing of prejudice. [Citation.]" ( Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 , 652-653, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 410 , 304 P.3d 1071 .) For example, even where a defendant shows in a pretrial motion that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the grand jury exculpatory evidence of which he or she is aware, in violation of section 939.71, the defendant must show "sub

2013(Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Del. 1995) 663 A.2d 1156, 1163, fn. 9 (Cinerama).) The Arnold court concluded that the “individual defendants did not violate the duty of loyalty under the facts of this case” (Arnold, at pp. 1287-1288) and that “on this record, the single disclosure violation which we have found was consistent only with a good faith omission.” (Id. at p. 1288, fn. 36.) That a violation of the duty of disclosure does not necessarily amount to a breach of the duty of loyalty does not mean that such violation cannot support a finding of breach of the duty of loyalty where ci

2013(Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Del. 1995) 663 A.2d 1156, 1163, fn. 9 (Cinerama).) The Arnold court concluded that the “individual defendants did not violate the duty of loyalty under the facts of this case” (Arnold, at pp. 1287-1288) and that “on this record, the single disclosure violation which we have found was consistent only with a good faith omission.” (Id. at p. 1288, fn. 36.) That a violation of the duty of disclosure does not necessarily amount to a breach of the duty of loyalty does not mean that such violation cannot support a finding of breach of the duty of loyalty where ci

2019Thus, the disclosure by the defense of its witnesses under section 1054.3 signals to the prosecution that the defense 'intends' to call those witnesses at trial." ( 54 Cal.3d at p. 375 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 , original italics.) The Izazaga Court had no occasion to apply the pertinent statutory language-it was only called upon to address the facial constitutional validity of Chapter 10-but it did enunciate a governing standard: For both the defense (§ 1054.3, subd. (a)(1) ) and the prosecution (§ 1054.1, subd. (a) ), the Court announced, " 'inten[t] to call' " means that " 'all wit

2019Thus, the disclosure by the defense of its witnesses under section 1054.3 signals to the prosecution that the defense 'intends' to call those witnesses at trial." ( 54 Cal.3d at p. 375 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 , original italics.) The Izazaga Court had no occasion to apply the pertinent statutory language-it was only called upon to address the facial constitutional validity of Chapter 10-but it did enunciate a governing standard: For both the defense (§ 1054.3, subd. (a)(1) ) and the prosecution (§ 1054.1, subd. (a) ), the Court announced, " 'inten[t] to call' " means that " 'all wit

2018Instead, the dictum in question merely notes that pretrial challenges to criminal preliminary examination procedures may , *918 in some circumstances involving jurisdictional error that are not applicable here, warrant relief without a showing of prejudice. [Citation.]" ( Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 , 652-653, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 410 , 304 P.3d 1071 .) For example, even where a defendant shows in a pretrial motion that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the grand jury exculpatory evidence of which he or she is aware, in violation of section 939.71, the defendant must show "sub

2018Instead, the dictum in question merely notes that pretrial challenges to criminal preliminary examination procedures may , *918 in some circumstances involving jurisdictional error that are not applicable here, warrant relief without a showing of prejudice. [Citation.]" ( Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 , 652-653, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 410 , 304 P.3d 1071 .) For example, even where a defendant shows in a pretrial motion that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the grand jury exculpatory evidence of which he or she is aware, in violation of section 939.71, the defendant must show "sub

2018Under federal law, as under California law, the general rule is that a trial court “may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants.” (Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 250, 254 .) In Bank of Nova Scotia, the district court found that the prosecutors had engaged in numerous instances of misconduct before the grand jury, including improperly disclosing grand jury materials, publicly identifying the targets and the subject matter of the grand jury investigation, causing Internal Revenue Service agents to mischarac

2007(See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 250, 259 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 228 , 108 S.Ct. 2369 ] [“infringement [of the grand jury’s independence] may result in grave doubt as to a violation’s effect on the grand jury’s decision to indict”]; People v. Backus, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 393 [presentation of inadmissible evidence “may . . . compfomise[] the independence of the grand jury and contiibute[] to the decision to indict”]; Mouchaourab, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 435 [due process may be violated if grand jury proceedings “are conducted in such a way as to compromise the grand jury’s

2016Disclosure of Business Activities With respect to the nature of the business of an arbitrator, courts have recognized that “ ‘[b]ecause arbitrators are selected for their familiarity with the type of business dispute involved, they are not expected to be entirely without business contacts in the particular field, but they should disclose any repeated or significant contacts which they may have with a party to the dispute, his attorney or his chosen arbitrator.’ ” (Casden Park La Brea Retail LLC v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 468, 477 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 763 ].) Despite this g

2016Disclosure of Business Activities With respect to the nature of the business of an arbitrator, courts have recognized that “ ‘[b]ecause arbitrators are selected for their familiarity with the type of business dispute involved, they are not expected to be entirely without business contacts in the particular field, but they should disclose any repeated or significant contacts which they may have with a party to the dispute, his attorney or his chosen arbitrator.’ ” (Casden Park La Brea Retail LLC v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 468, 477 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 763 ].) Despite this g

2015(Woods v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 178, 184-185 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 182 ].)” (Hajek, supra, at p. 1233 .) Without providing any legislative history relevant to statutory interpretation, petitioners argue that the phrase “the results of all tests made” (§ 2032.610, subd. (a)(1)) and the phrase “the results of physical or mental examinations” (Pen.

2015(Woods v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 178, 184-185 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 182 ].)” (Hajek, supra, at p. 1233 .) Without providing any legislative history relevant to statutory interpretation, petitioners argue that the phrase “the results of all tests made” (§ 2032.610, subd. (a)(1)) and the phrase “the results of physical or mental examinations” (Pen.

2015Code, §§ 1043-1047; §§ 832.5, 832.7-832.8.) “The procedure requires a showing of good cause for the discovery, an in camera review of the records if good cause is shown, and disclosure of information ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1316 .) “A motion for discovery of peace officer personnel records is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, reviewable for abuse.” (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039 .) 78 The trial court granted defendants’ original Pitchess motions

2007The Pitchess process contains adequate safeguards if disclosed records were to be admitted in a subsequent proceeding. ( Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1061 , 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 6 , 3 P.3d 228 (cone. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).) As I noted in Alford, the screening process preceding the initial disclosure and the requirement that admission in a subsequent proceeding comport with various Evidence Code statutes (e.g., §§ 210 [relevance], 352 [prejudice]) sufficiently protect officers' privacy. ( Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1061 , 130 Cal. Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mor

2003Free speech and association Minor contends that the disclosure requirement violates his right to free speech, "since the right to free speech must, of necessity, include the right not to speak at all." Barenblatt v. United States (1959) 360 U.S. 109 , 79 S.Ct. 1081 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 stated: "Undeniably, the First Amendment in some circumstances protects an individual from being compelled to disclose his associational relationships.

2003Free speech and association Minor contends that the disclosure requirement violates his right to free speech, "since the right to free speech must, of necessity, include the right not to speak at all." Barenblatt v. United States (1959) 360 U.S. 109 , 79 S.Ct. 1081 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 stated: "Undeniably, the First Amendment in some circumstances protects an individual from being compelled to disclose his associational relationships.

1998(E.g., People v. Dennis (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 863, 871 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) Moreover, the People generally have no interest in having the defendant represented by a particular attorney.

1998(E.g., People v. Dennis (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 863, 871 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) Moreover, the People generally have no interest in having the defendant represented by a particular attorney.