disclosure requirement in Colorado

2015Retail, Inc. , 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (citation omitted). ¶67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but “the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party’s ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. , 862 F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer , 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo. 1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b)). ¶68 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), “all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key in

2015Retail, Inc., 188 P.3d 582 , 604 (Colo.App.2007) (citation omitted). $67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but "the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party's ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial,." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 924 (Ist Cir.1988)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo.1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b)). 168 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), "all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key informa

2015Retail, Inc. , 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (citation omitted). ¶67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but “the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party’s ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. , 862 F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer , 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo. 1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b)). ¶68 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), “all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key in

2015Retail, Inc., 188 P.3d 582 , 604 (Colo.App.2007) (citation omitted). $67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but "the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party's ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial,." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 924 (Ist Cir.1988)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo.1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b)). 168 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), "all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key informa

2015Retail, Inc. , 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (citation omitted). ¶67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but “the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party’s ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. , 862 F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer , 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo. 1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b)). ¶68 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), “all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key in

2015Retail, Inc., 188 P.3d 582 , 604 (Colo.App.2007) (citation omitted). $67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but "the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party's ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial,." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 924 (Ist Cir.1988)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo.1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b)). 168 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), "all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key informa

2020Court, 531 P.2d 626, 628 (Colo. 1975)).

2020He also asserts that the disclosure requirement 6 infringes on his constitutional right to due process because it deprives him of his right to have the prosecution meet its burden of proof.2 ¶15 “The right of discovery in criminal cases is not recognized at common law.” E.G., ¶ 11, 368 P.3d at 949 (quoting Walker v. People, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (Colo. 1952)).

2020Put differently, the disclosure requirement rests on shaky constitutional ground because it improperly risks lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof.5 ¶30 Of course, it hardly bears stating that today’s decision should not be understood as sanctioning “[t]rial by ambush, or the old fox-and-hounds approach to litigation,” which we’ve repeatedly condemned as “not promot[ing] accuracy or efficiency in the search for truth.” People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148, 158 (Colo. 1981) (quoting People v. Dist.

2015In the event of a C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) violation, the wronged party may seek sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37, “ranging from monetary sanctions and orders prohibiting a disobedient party from entering certain documents or items into evidence, to orders deeming non-disclosed information admitted.” Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. , 211 P.3d 698, 704 (Colo. 2009). ¶69 “Generally, sanctions under Rule 37 should serve to cure discovery problems . . . .” Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners Ass’n , 202 P.3d 564, 571 (Colo. 2009).

2015Retail, Inc. , 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (citation omitted). ¶67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but “the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party’s ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. , 862 F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer , 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo. 1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b)). ¶68 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), “all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key in

2015Retail, Inc. , 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (citation omitted). ¶67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but “the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party’s ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. , 862 F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer , 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo. 1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b)). ¶68 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), “all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key in

2015In the event of a C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) violation, the wronged party may seek sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37, “ranging from monetary sanctions and orders prohibiting a disobedient party from entering certain documents or items into evidence, to orders deeming non-disclosed information admitted.” Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. , 211 P.3d 698, 704 (Colo. 2009). ¶69 “Generally, sanctions under Rule 37 should serve to cure discovery problems . . . .” Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners Ass’n , 202 P.3d 564, 571 (Colo. 2009).

1988Justice Scalia believed that such a disclosure requirement was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to prevent fraud. 108 S.Ct. at 2681 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 5 .

1988See Taylor v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 646, 655 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). 3 While we acknowledge that the right of an accused to call alibi witnesses in defense of a criminal charge is a fundamental component of due process of law, Hampton, 696 P.2d at 774 , nothing in the United States or Colorado Constitutions entitles a defendant to await the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief before announcing an alibi defense.

1988See Taylor v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 646, 655 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). 3 While we acknowledge that the right of an accused to call alibi witnesses in defense of a criminal charge is a fundamental component of due process of law, Hampton, 696 P.2d at 774 , nothing in the United States or Colorado Constitutions entitles a defendant to await the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief before announcing an alibi defense.

1988See Taylor v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 646, 655 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). 3 While we acknowledge that the right of an accused to call alibi witnesses in defense of a criminal charge is a fundamental component of due process of law, Hampton, 696 P.2d at 774 , nothing in the United States or Colorado Constitutions entitles a defendant to await the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief before announcing an alibi defense.

1985Although courts have reached different results on the propriety of excluding an accused's alibi testimony for failure to list the accused as an alibi witness, we agree with the reasoning of the court in Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 924 (7th Cir.1982).

1985Although courts have reached different results on the propriety of excluding an accused’s alibi testimony for failure to list the accused as an alibi witness, we agree with the reasoning of the court in Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 924 (7th Cir.1982).