disclosure rule in Kansas

2026A claim asserting the State has withheld evidence in violation of this disclosure rule— commonly called a Brady claim—has three essential components: "(1) The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material so as to establish prejudice." State v. Hirsh, 310 Kan. 321 , Syl. ¶ 1, 446 P.3d 472 (2019).

2024Ch. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (finding a fair summary did not require disclosure of all projections, as long as it disclosed description of valuation exercises, key assumptions, and range of values generated; but noting that the failure to disclose that the financial advisor used a significantly higher weighted average cost of capital [WACC] in its calculation than management's WACC estimate, even when it was using management's other financial projections, could constitute a disclosure violation), rev'd on other grounds 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009); see also David P. Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Ma

2005Ctr., 23 Kan.

1997Impeachment evidence is considered “evidence favorable to the accused for. the purpose of the disclosure requirement.” Humphrey, 258 Kan. at 355 .

1995The Supreme Court has rejected any distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence; both are evidence favorable to the accused for the purpose of the disclosure requirement. 473 U.S. at 676-77 .

1995In State v. Carmichael, 240 Kan. 149 , Syl. ¶ 1, 727 P.2d 918 (1986), this court stated: “To justify a reversal of a conviction for failure to disclose evidence, the evidence withheld by the prosecution must be clearly exculpatory and the withholding of the evidence must be clearly prejudicial to the defendant.” To be clearly prejudicial, the evidence must prejudice the defendant’s ability to defend against the charges.

1995In State v. Carmichael, 240 Kan. 149 , Syl. ¶ 1, 727 P.2d 918 (1986), this court stated: “To justify a reversal of a conviction for failure to disclose evidence, the evidence withheld by the prosecution must be clearly exculpatory and the withholding of the evidence must be clearly prejudicial to the defendant.” To be clearly prejudicial, the evidence must prejudice the defendant’s ability to defend against the charges.

1987Defendant Fleming relies on the following language from Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 29 , 707 P.2d 1063 (1985): “[T]he potential for injustice is so great from the use of secret settlement agreements in any tort action where there are multiple defendants, whether under joint and several liability or comparative fault principles, that we believe a disclosure rule should be adopted.

1987Defendant Fleming relies on the following language from Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 29 , 707 P.2d 1063 (1985): “[T]he potential for injustice is so great from the use of secret settlement agreements in any tort action where there are multiple defendants, whether under joint and several liability or comparative fault principles, that we believe a disclosure rule should be adopted.

1981Lewis v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 514 (D.D.C. 1976), provides more insight into the question.

1981Lewis v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 514 (D.D.C. 1976), provides more insight into the question.

1973(Canterbury v. Spence, supra, and Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393 , 350 P. 2d 1093 .) This court said in Natanson v. Kline, supra: “Upon the record here presented Dr. Kline made no disclosures to the appellant whatever.

1973(Canterbury v. Spence, supra, and Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393 , 350 P. 2d 1093 .) This court said in Natanson v. Kline, supra: “Upon the record here presented Dr. Kline made no disclosures to the appellant whatever.

1973(Canterbury v. Spence, supra, and Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393 , 350 P. 2d 1093 .) This court said in Natanson v. Kline, supra: “Upon the record here presented Dr. Kline made no disclosures to the appellant whatever.