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16 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ferguson v. City of Charlestongreen1 sentence2017The dissent asserted that what the patients objected to was not the taking or testing of the urine, but, instead, the disclosure of the test results to the police. 532 US at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of McKeegreen2 sentences2000See In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 128 , 849 P2d 509 (1993) (full disclosure under former DR 5-105(0 “requires a full disclosure of the possible effect of multiple representation on the exercise of the lawyer’s independent professional judgment on behalf of each client”) (emphasis in original). 2000See In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 128 , 849 P2d 509 (1993) (full disclosure under former DR 5-105(0 “requires a full disclosure of the possible effect of multiple representation on the exercise of the lawyer’s independent professional judgment on behalf of each client”) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Altstattgreen2 sentences1997See In re Alstatt, 321 Or 324, 331 , 897 P2d 1164 (1995), cert dism_US_, 116 S Ct 1372 , 134 L Ed 2d 536 (1996) (“If a conflict of interest develops during the course of representation, DR 5-101(A) precludes a lawyer from continuing professional employment, except with the consent of the lawyer’s client after full disclosure.”). 1997See In re Alstatt, 321 Or 324, 331 , 897 P2d 1164 (1995), cert dism_US_, 116 S Ct 1372 , 134 L Ed 2d 536 (1996) (“If a conflict of interest develops during the course of representation, DR 5-101(A) precludes a lawyer from continuing professional employment, except with the consent of the lawyer’s client after full disclosure.”). | 1 | 1 |
Altstatt v. Oregon State Bargreen1 sentence1997See In re Alstatt, 321 Or 324, 331 , 897 P2d 1164 (1995), cert dism_US_, 116 S Ct 1372 , 134 L Ed 2d 536 (1996) (“If a conflict of interest develops during the course of representation, DR 5-101(A) precludes a lawyer from continuing professional employment, except with the consent of the lawyer’s client after full disclosure.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Mooregreen2 sentences1995See In re Moore, 299 Or 496, 507 , 703 P2d 961 (1985) (if additional conflicts develop during the course of representation, the full disclosure requirement must be met and consent of the client received). 1995See In re Moore, 299 Or 496, 507 , 703 P2d 961 (1985) (if additional conflicts develop during the course of representation, the full disclosure requirement must be met and consent of the client received). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Roegreen2 sentences1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 93 Misc.2d 201 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d at 830 ; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. 1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 93 Misc.2d 201 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d at 830 ; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Geisberger v. Willuhngreen2 sentences1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 93 Misc.2d 201 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d at 830 ; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. 1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F Supp 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F Supp at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 400 NYS2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 287 So2d at 830; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill App 3d 435, 390 NE2d 945, 948 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Logan v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 93 Misc.2d 201 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d at 830 ; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. 1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 93 Misc.2d 201 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d at 830 ; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Whipplegreen1 sentence1984We have held such advice is necessary to satisfy the full disclosure requirement of DR 5-104(A) in In re Drake, supra, 292 Or at 714 , and have since approved that holding in In re Whipple, supra, 296 Or at 112-113. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Cobb
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 133 . *761 Second, the Bar argued that, in the course of moving to withdraw from representing the entity, the lawyer should have advised the entity in writing — through the bankruptcy trustee — to seek independent legal advice before consenting to the lawyer’s withdrawal. 2015Id. at 133 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Wang v. Board of Massage Therapists
neutral
1 sentence2022The disclosure requirement is thus a limited exception to the general rule of confidentiality that 2 The board does not argue, and thus we do not address, whether the notice of proposed action denying plaintiff’s license application constituted a “notice of proposed sanction.” Cite as 322 Or App 491 (2022) 497 exists to allow current applicants or licensees to prepare for disciplinary proceedings that affect them. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson
green
2 sentences2018The requirement to which the parties refer, and the likely source of the disclosure requirement in IP 33, § 2(1)(c), is imposed by Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 , 106 S.Ct. 1066 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 232 (1986). 2018The requirement to which the parties refer, and the likely source of the disclosure requirement in IP 33, § 2(1)(c), is imposed by Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 , 106 S.Ct. 1066 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 232 (1986). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bjurstrom v. Oregon Lottery
green
2 sentences2016We begin with defendants’ argument that plaintiff failed to “blow the whistle.” We analyzed the disclosure requirement of ORS 659A.203 in Bjurstrom v. Oregon Lottery, 202 Or App 162 , 120 P3d 1235 (2005). 2016We begin with defendants’ argument that plaintiff failed to “blow the whistle.” We analyzed the disclosure requirement of ORS 659A.203 in Bjurstrom v. Oregon Lottery, 202 Or App 162 , 120 P3d 1235 (2005). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re the Marriage of Pollock
neutral
2 sentences2015The only salient reference to marital assets in the premarital agreement is in paragraph 16 B, which provides that, in the event of a future dissolution of the parties’ marriage, “co-owned” property shall be divided as the parties’ “interests may appear.” Cite as 357 Or 575 (2015) 589 As discussed, the Court of Appeals concluded that the full disclosure requirement had, at most, a limited appli- cation after the parties executed the mediated agreement. 2015As explained below, 357 Or at 594 , 594 n 14, careful practitioners generally should provide in a settlement agreement that the parties have made full disclosure of all their assets and that each is satisfied with the information provided. 13 Husband also appeals from a supplemental judgment denying his petition for attorney fees and costs. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Buckley v. Valeo
green
2 sentences2010Relying on those assumptions, the Supreme Court concluded that a statutory requirement that campaign contributors disclose their identities did not violate the First Amendment, because the disclosure requirement was narrowly limited to those situations in which the information sought had a substantial connection with the governmental interests to be advanced; that is, “disclosure helps voters to define more of the candidates’ constituencies.” Id. at 81 . 2010The Court explained that “[t]he burden imposed by [disclosure] is no prior restraint, but a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to *239 public view.” Id. at 82 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
green
2 sentences2002We begin with the policy in its original form, involving the mandatory disclosure before testing. [5] Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), the district contends that the disclosure requirement is reasonable because it does not require much in the way of information that students are not already required to provide and because the information would remain confidential. 2002We begin with the policy in its original form, involving the mandatory disclosure before testing. [5] Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), the district contends that the disclosure requirement is reasonable because it does not require much in the way of information that students are not already required to provide and because the information would remain confidential. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hannerty v. Standard Theater Co.
green
1 sentence1985There are, however, some exceptions to this disclosure requirement, all of which rest immediately on the proposition that the circumstances clearly evidence corporate inability * * * to seize the opportunity * * *. [An] exception to the requirement of tender arises where the corporation is insolvent and nearly defunct. [Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68 , 153 S.W. 50 (1913).] The problem with this exception is the difficulty of its extension to cases where the corporation is in serious financial difficulty or lacks liquid assets but may still be a going concern. [In Hannerty v. Standar | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Laumeier v. Gehner
neutral
1 sentence1985There are, however, some exceptions to this disclosure requirement, all of which rest immediately on the proposition that the circumstances clearly evidence corporate inability * * * to seize the opportunity * * *. [An] exception to the requirement of tender arises where the corporation is insolvent and nearly defunct. [Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68 , 153 S.W. 50 (1913).] The problem with this exception is the difficulty of its extension to cases where the corporation is in serious financial difficulty or lacks liquid assets but may still be a going concern. [In Hannerty v. Standar | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co.
green
2 sentences1985There are, however, some exceptions to this disclosure requirement, all of which rest immediately on the proposition that the circumstances clearly evidence corporate inability * * * to seize the opportunity * * *. [An] exception to the requirement of tender arises where the corporation is insolvent and nearly defunct. [Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68 , 153 S.W. 50 (1913).] The problem with this exception is the difficulty of its extension to cases where the corporation is in serious financial difficulty or lacks liquid assets but may still be a going concern. [In Hannerty v. Standar 1985There are, however, some exceptions to this disclosure requirement, all of which rest immediately on the proposition that the circumstances clearly evidence corporate inability * * * to seize the opportunity * * *. [An] exception to the requirement of tender arises where the corporation is insolvent and nearly defunct. [Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68 , 153 S.W. 50 (1913).] The problem with this exception is the difficulty of its extension to cases where the corporation is in serious financial difficulty or lacks liquid assets but may still be a going concern. [In Hannerty v. Standar | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Porter
green
2 sentences1984See Wise, Legal Ethics 77 (2d ed 1970); Patterson and Cheatham, The Profession of Law 232, 235 (1971); Drinker, supra at 121 [Legal Ethics (1953)]; and Annot., 17 ALR3d 835, 838-39 (1968).’ (Emphasis added).” (Footnote omitted.) In re Porter, 283 Or 517 525 , 584 P2d 744 (1978), quoting In re Boivin, 271 Or 419,424 , 533 P2d 171 (1975). 1984See Wise, Legal Ethics 77 (2d ed 1970); Patterson and Cheatham, The Profession of Law 232, 235 (1971); Drinker, supra at 121 [Legal Ethics (1953)]; and Annot., 17 ALR3d 835, 838-39 (1968).’ (Emphasis added).” (Footnote omitted.) In re Porter, 283 Or 517 525 , 584 P2d 744 (1978), quoting In re Boivin, 271 Or 419,424 , 533 P2d 171 (1975). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
green
2 sentences1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 93 Misc.2d 201 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d at 830 ; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. 1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F Supp 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F Supp at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 400 NYS2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 287 So2d at 830; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill App 3d 435, 390 NE2d 945, 948 (1979). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Boivin
green
2 sentences1984See Wise, Legal Ethics 77 (2d ed 1970); Patterson and Cheatham, The Profession of Law 232, 235 (1971); Drinker, supra at 121 [Legal Ethics (1953)]; and Annot., 17 ALR3d 835, 838-39 (1968).’ (Emphasis added).” (Footnote omitted.) In re Porter, 283 Or 517 525 , 584 P2d 744 (1978), quoting In re Boivin, 271 Or 419,424 , 533 P2d 171 (1975). 1984See Wise, Legal Ethics 77 (2d ed 1970); Patterson and Cheatham, The Profession of Law 232, 235 (1971); Drinker, supra at 121 [Legal Ethics (1953)]; and Annot., 17 ALR3d 835, 838-39 (1968).’ (Emphasis added).” (Footnote omitted.) In re Porter, 283 Or 517 525 , 584 P2d 744 (1978), quoting In re Boivin, 271 Or 419,424 , 533 P2d 171 (1975). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Horne v. Patton
green
2 sentences1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 93 Misc.2d 201 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d at 830 ; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. 1984Logan v. District of Columbia, supra, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1978); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ; Doe v. Roe, supra, 93 Misc.2d 201 , 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1977); Horne v. Patton, supra, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d at 830 ; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Drake
green
1 sentence1984We have held such advice is necessary to satisfy the full disclosure requirement of DR 5-104(A) in In re Drake, supra, 292 Or at 714 , and have since approved that holding in In re Whipple, supra, 296 Or at 112-113. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.