disclosure requirement (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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disclosure requirement in Tennessee

10 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohiogreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2002
2 sentences

2002In other words, “under current law — as announced in Zauderer — as long as the disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing deception of consumers, and not unduly burdensome, it should be upheld.” Id.

2001Responding to the appellant’s argument that the Ohio Supreme Court’s disclosure rule in that case was “unduly burdensome,” the Court stated that “[t]he vagueness of the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion regarding precisely what an attorney must disclose in an advertisement mentioning a contingent fee is . . . unfortunate.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 653 n.15, 105 S. Ct. at 2283 (suggesting that Ohio’s failure to articulate the requirements of its disclosure rule would prohibit disbarment of an attorney who violated the rule on due process and First Amendment grounds).

23
Kahn v. Kahngreen
tenn · 1988 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992In Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn.1988), however, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the disclosure requirement was incorporated into the statute’s mandate that in order for an ante-nuptial agreement to be enforceable, both spouses must enter the agreement “freely, knowledgeably and in good faith and without exertion of duress or undue influ-ence_” The court reasoned that the disclosure requirement is consistent with the statute because “numerous factual scenarios could occur in which the failure to make a full disclosure of assets, liabilities and values would breach the statutory requ

1992In Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn.1988), however, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the disclosure requirement was incorporated into the statute’s mandate that in order for an ante-nuptial agreement to be enforceable, both spouses must enter the agreement “freely, knowledgeably and in good faith and without exertion of duress or undue influ-ence_” The court reasoned that the disclosure requirement is consistent with the statute because “numerous factual scenarios could occur in which the failure to make a full disclosure of assets, liabilities and values would breach the statutory requ

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Alessio v. Crook green
tennctapp · 1982
2 sentences

2025Small, 2008 WL 360925 , at *12; Alessio, 633 S.W.2d at 779-80 . a.

2008Id. at 779 .

22008–2025
Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy green
scotus · 1994
2 sentences

2001Although the Court concluded that the disclosure requirement was unconstitutional because the Florida Board had failed to justify the need for such regulation, it also noted that the disclosure requirement was too burdensome: “The detail required in the disclaimer currently described by the Board effectively rules out notation of the ‘specialist’ designation on a business card or letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing.” Id., 512 U.S. at 146-47 , 114 S. Ct. 2090 - 91.

2001Although the Court concluded that the disclosure requirement was unconstitutional because the Florida Board had failed to justify the need for such regulation, it also noted that the disclosure requirement was too burdensome: “The detail required in the disclaimer currently described by the Board effectively rules out notation of the ‘specialist’ designation on a business card or letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing.” Id., 512 U.S. at 146-47 , 114 S. Ct. 2090 - 91.

22001–2001
Missourians for Fiscal, etc. v. James Klahr green
ca8 · 2018
1 sentence

2019Id.

12019–2019
Randolph v. Randolph green
tenn · 1996
1 sentence

2014The requirement of a “full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent and value” of a proponent spouse’s holdings must satisfy the following principles enumerated in Randolph: (1) “an agreement to marry gives rise to a confidential relationship,” and therefore the parties “do not deal at arms’ length and must exercise candor and good faith in all matters bearing upon the contract”; (2) “parties to an antenuptial agreement are very often ill- matched in terms of bargaining power,” and the disclosure requirement provides a measure of fairness to the party in the weaker position; and (3) because “

12014–2014
Estate of Stephens v. GALEN HEALTH CARE green
fladistctapp · 2005
1 sentence

2014Id.

12014–2014
State v. Byrd green
tenn · 1991
1 sentence

2000Byrd, 820 S.W.2d at 741 .

12000–2000

Where else courts name it

CA 120 (1960–2025) DE 74 (1980–2025) IL 58 (1955–2026) AZ 47 (1974–2026) NY 43 (1963–2026) TX 41 (1992–2025) PA 35 (1971–2026) MD 35 (1949–2022) CT 29 (1940–2021) NJ 29 (1971–2024) MA 26 (1975–2025) OH 26 (1989–2026) FL 20 (1974–2016) WA 20 (1992–2026) MI 18 (1928–2023) OR 16 (1984–2022) ND 15 (1981–2012) MO 14 (1975–2025) NM 13 (1986–2024) AR 11 (1988–2026) VA 11 (2004–2024) TN 10 (1992–2025) IN 10 (1978–2020) WI 10 (1980–2023) ID 10 (2002–2025) IA 9 (1988–2020) ME 9 (2001–2017) MS 9 (1989–2021) MN 8 (1976–2006) KS 8 (1973–2026) UT 8 (1989–2026) NC 8 (1986–2015) CO 7 (1985–2020) NV 7 (2012–2022) VT 7 (1992–2025) WV 6 (1914–2021) AL 6 (1973–2015) LA 5 (1989–2013) KY 5 (1995–2026) DC 5 (1980–2023) HI 5 (1995–2021) WY 4 (1988–2017) OK 4 (1983–2008) SC 3 (2006–2013) AK 3 (1996–2026) NE 3 (1981–1997) GA 2 (1981–1984) MT 2 (1997–2002) NH 2 (1995–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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