confrontation clause in Minnesota

1999Aubid, 578 N.W.2d at 788 ; see Byers, 570 N.W.2d at 494 (emphasizing facts that statement was cross-examined and given under oath were important indicia of reliability); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn.1981) (“Statements which are made under oath and subject to cross-examination may be sufficiently reliable to protect the values associated with the confrontation clause.”).

1997“Statements which are made under oath and subject to cross-examination may be sufficiently reliable to protect the values associated with the confrontation clause.” Hansen, 312 N.W.2d at 102 (citations omitted).

2012Prior to Crawford, the admissibility of an out-of-court statement under the Confrontation Clause turned primarily on evidentiary rules and “indicia of reliability.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (concluding that no independent Confrontation Clause analysis is necessary if a statement “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”).

2012Prior to Crawford, the admissibility of an out-of-court statement under the Confrontation Clause turned primarily on evidentiary rules and “indicia of reliability.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (concluding that no independent Confrontation Clause analysis is necessary if a statement “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”).

2017I, § 6; State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010) (stating that analysis of a Confrontation-Clause claim is the same under either the federal or Minnesota constitution).

2017I, § 6; State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010) (stating that analysis of a Confrontation-Clause claim is the same under either the federal or Minnesota constitution).

1996See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3146 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (fact that evidence is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule does not automatically satisfy requirements of the confrontation clause). 3 .

1996See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3146 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (fact that evidence is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule does not automatically satisfy requirements of the confrontation clause). 3 .

1986Although the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are not coextensive, they “are generally designed to protect similar values.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 , 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933-34 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).

1986Although the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are not coextensive, they “are generally designed to protect similar values.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 , 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933-34 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).

2016A Confrontation Clause error is harmless if “the guilty verdict actually rendered [is] surely imat-tributable to the error.” Id. at 80 (quotation omitted).

2016A Confrontation Clause error is harmless if “the guilty verdict actually rendered [is] surely imat-tributable to the error.” Id. at 80 (quotation omitted).

2016See, e.g., State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995) (declaring witness unavailability may be established by a witness invoking Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); State v. Durante, 406 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Witnesses who invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege are unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599 , 6 606 (Minn. App. 1986) (declaring witness unavailable because witness refused to testify), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 , 419- 20, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (1

2016See, e.g., State v. *713 Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995) (declaring witness unavailability may be established by a witness invoking Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); State v. Durante, 406 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Witnesses who invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege are unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599, 606 (Minn. App. 1986) (declaring witness unavailable because witness refused to testify), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 , 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1077 ,

2014See State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 582-83 (Minn.2005) (applying the plain error doctrine to a Confrontation Clause issue).

2008See State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 582-83 (Minn.2005) (applying plain error analysis to Confrontation Clause issue); State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn.2006) (applying plain error analysis to hearsay question).

2024The error in admitting the DNA evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, Steeprock’s conviction is reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. and “violate[] the confrontation clause.” Steeprock’s argument, however, misconstrues the Confrontation Clause, which prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Minn. 2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

2024Although Crawford did not expressly address the question of whether the witness in that case was “unavailable” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts,” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 , and that “the ‘right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him,’ Amdt. 6, is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” Id

2016See, e.g., State v. *713 Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995) (declaring witness unavailability may be established by a witness invoking Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); State v. Durante, 406 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Witnesses who invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege are unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599, 606 (Minn. App. 1986) (declaring witness unavailable because witness refused to testify), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 , 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1077 ,

2016See, e.g., State v. *713 Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995) (declaring witness unavailability may be established by a witness invoking Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); State v. Durante, 406 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Witnesses who invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege are unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599, 606 (Minn. App. 1986) (declaring witness unavailable because witness refused to testify), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 , 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1077 ,

1989The Court stated that the confrontation clause provides two types of protections to the criminal defendant; “the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.” Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2801 .

1989The Court stated that the confrontation clause provides two types of protections to the criminal defendant; “the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.” Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2801 .

1999See State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 663 (Minn.1990) (Kelley, J., dissenting) (dissenting on ground admission of child victim’s statements as admissible hearsay violated defendant’s right to confront witnesses under Minnesota Constitution).

1993The confrontation clause requires "reliability” and is not violated when a child’s out-of-court statement is admitted under a "firmly-rooted” hearsay exception, such as an excited utterance, "because of the weight accorded long-standing judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements.” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), quoted in State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 1990). 10 .

1986(Emphasis added.) See also United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979) (If the sole method of satisfying the confrontation clause was opportunity to cross-examine at the time the statement was made, many kinds of admissible hearsay would violate the confrontation clause); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1356 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 , 97 S.Ct. 2174 , 53 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977) (“The fact that a defendant is unable to cross-examine the declar-ant is not always controlling on the confrontation issue since the right of cross-examination is not absolute.”) The Supreme Cour

1986(Emphasis added.) See also United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1979) (If the sole method of satisfying the confrontation clause was opportunity to cross-examine at the time the statement was made, many kinds of admissible hearsay would violate the confrontation clause); United States v. *316 Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1356 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 , 97 S.Ct. 2174 , 53 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977) ("The fact that a defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant is not always controlling on the confrontation issue since the right of cross-examination is not absolute.") The Supreme

2024State v. Swaney, 787 N.W.2d 541, 555 (Minn. 2010).

2023State v. Swaney, 787 N.W.2d 541, 555 (Minn. 2010).

2024Turning to the first element of a Confrontation Clause violation—whether the evidence was a testimonial statement—the “critical determinative factor . . . is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309 (citing State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement ‘with an eye toward trial.’”) and State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he central considerations are . . . whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a sub

2024Turning to the first element of a Confrontation Clause violation—whether the evidence was a testimonial statement—the “critical determinative factor . . . is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309 (citing State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement ‘with an eye toward trial.’”) and State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he central considerations are . . . whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a sub

2017The plain error standard requires that the defendant show: “(1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d at 618 (quoting State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 2011)).

2014See State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn.2011) (determining whether a claimed ground for an objection was apparent by considering whether there were other plausible grounds for the objection in context).

2016See, e.g., State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995) (declaring witness unavailability may be established by a witness invoking Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); State v. Durante, 406 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Witnesses who invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege are unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599 , 6 606 (Minn. App. 1986) (declaring witness unavailable because witness refused to testify), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 , 419- 20, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (1

2016See, e.g., State v. *713 Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995) (declaring witness unavailability may be established by a witness invoking Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); State v. Durante, 406 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Witnesses who invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege are unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599, 606 (Minn. App. 1986) (declaring witness unavailable because witness refused to testify), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 , 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1077 ,

2016State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 537 (Minn. 2012); see also Robinson, 718 N.W.2d at 409 (holding that the Confrontation Clause did not bar consideration of evidence corroborating a witness’s out-of-court statements because the witness testified at trial).

2014See State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 638 , 641–42 (Minn. 2007) (reasoning that the “primary purpose” of six-year-old victim’s report of sexual abuse by defendant to a nurse at Midwest Children’s Resource Center was “to assess and protect [victim]’s health and welfare” and “conclud[ing] that [victim]’s statements to [the nurse] were nontestimonial and that admission of those statements will not violate [defendant]’s rights under the Confrontation Clause”). 9 “statements of identification by child sexual abuse victims are always admissible under the medical diagnosis exception.” State v. Robinso

2016See Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 467 (Ind. 2005) (“[A] request for an order directing the witness to respond is necessary to preserve a Confrontation Clause objection to prior statements by a witness.”).

2016The state also argues that, because Salinas was available, despite his refusal to cooperate or testify, appellant should have taken steps to compel his testimony, citing to a non-binding case: See Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 467 (Ind. 2005) (“[A] request for an order directing the witness to respond is necessary to preserve a Confrontation Clause objection to prior statements by a witness.”).

2014In State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2014), the supreme court addressed a Confrontation Clause claim under the plain-error standard when the defendant failed to object to admission of hearsay testimony and “a Confrontation Clause challenge was not apparent” when the defendant objected only on hearsay grounds.

2014See State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2014) (holding defendant failed to preserve for review on direct appeal a claim that his right of confrontation was violated when defendant’s objection to admission of victim’s statements was based solely on the residual hearsay exception and it was not apparent from the context of defendant’s argument that the Confrontation Clause was the basis for defendant’s challenge to evidence); see also State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010) (holding that “a hearsay objection at trial is not sufficient to preserve a confrontation clause objection

2025“Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4(c) establishes a permissible exception to the confrontation clause because it requires a specific finding that the denial of the right to confrontation is necessary to effectuate an important public policy.” State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Minn. 1989).

1990State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d at 272 ; Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988); see Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4(c)' (court must “determine” defendant’s presence would traumatize the child).

2024Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d at 736 n.1; State v. Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Minn. 1985).

2019Id.

2024Turning to the first element of a Confrontation Clause violation—whether the evidence was a testimonial statement—the “critical determinative factor . . . is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309 (citing State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement ‘with an eye toward trial.’”) and State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he central considerations are . . . whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a sub

2024Turning to the first element of a Confrontation Clause violation—whether the evidence was a testimonial statement—the “critical determinative factor . . . is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309 (citing State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement ‘with an eye toward trial.’”) and State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he central considerations are . . . whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a sub

2019Indeed, in Melendez-Diaz , the state raised precisely the same argument, that the Court "should find no Confrontation Clause violation ... because [the defendant] had the ability to subpoena the analysts." 557 U.S. at 324 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 .

2019Indeed, in Melendez-Diaz , the state raised precisely the same argument, that the Court "should find no Confrontation Clause violation ... because [the defendant] had the ability to subpoena the analysts." 557 U.S. at 324 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 .

2016Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 864 .

2014See id.

2016See, e.g., State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995) (declaring witness unavailability may be established by a witness invoking Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); State v. Durante, 406 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Witnesses who invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege are unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599 , 6 606 (Minn. App. 1986) (declaring witness unavailable because witness refused to testify), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 , 419- 20, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (1

2016See, e.g., State v. *713 Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995) (declaring witness unavailability may be established by a witness invoking Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination); State v. Durante, 406 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Witnesses who invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege are unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599, 606 (Minn. App. 1986) (declaring witness unavailable because witness refused to testify), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 , 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1077 ,