confrontation clause in Kansas

1993That rule was expressed in State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336 , 479 P.2d 833 , as follows:... - . ’ ‘Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a “good faith effort” to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 20 L.

1993That rule was expressed in State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336 , 479 P.2d 833 , as follows:... - . ’ ‘Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a “good faith effort” to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 20 L.

2014Although the prosecutor here obtained Thompson’s presence at trial, Gleason relies on a line of cases concerning “absent witnesses,” including State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336, 338 , 479 P.2d 833 (1971), where this court held: “Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain the witness’s presence at trial [citation omitted].

2014Although the prosecutor here obtained Thompson’s presence at trial, Gleason relies on a line of cases concerning “absent witnesses,” including State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336, 338 , 479 P.2d 833 (1971), where this court held: “Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain the witness’s presence at trial [citation omitted].

1985The admissibility of these statements has been challenged upon grounds of hearsay and the confrontation clause within the meaning of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968).

1985The admissibility of these statements has been challenged upon grounds of hearsay and the confrontation clause within the meaning of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968).

2006As discussed in State v. Rodriguez, 226 Kan. 558, 561 , 601 P.2d 686 (1979), the court stated: “[In Bruton,] the court held a defendant is deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution where the extrajudicial statement of a non-testifying codefendant inculpating the defendant is admitted and where the codefendant is not available for cross-examination, although an instruction is given limiting the use of the confession to the codefendant.” Nevertheless, the Bruton analysis is not applicable in the present situation.

2006As discussed in State v. Rodriguez, 226 Kan. 558, 561 , 601 P.2d 686 (1979), the court stated: “[In Bruton,] the court held a defendant is deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution where the extrajudicial statement of a non-testifying codefendant inculpating the defendant is admitted and where the codefendant is not available for cross-examination, although an instruction is given limiting the use of the confession to the codefendant.” Nevertheless, the Bruton analysis is not applicable in the present situation.

1987California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 26 L.

1987California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 26 L.

2026However, the primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to give the accused the opportunity for cross-examination." State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. 326, 329 , 729 P. 2d 1169 (1986).

2026However, the primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to give the accused the opportunity for cross-examination." State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. 326, 329 , 729 P. 2d 1169 (1986).

2024As a result, "[p]ost-Crawford, the threshold question in any Confrontation Clause analysis is whether the hearsay statement at issue is testimonial in nature." Appleby, 289 Kan. at 1055 .

2011Appleby, 289 Kan. at 1055 ; Brown, 285 Kan. at 285 .

2021His "inability 7 to cross-examine [Cook] a second time does not equate to a Confrontation Clause violation." See State v. Young, 277 Kan. 588, 599 , 87 P.3d 308 (2004).

2021His "inability 7 to cross-examine [Cook] a second time does not equate to a Confrontation Clause violation." See State v. Young, 277 Kan. 588, 599 , 87 P.3d 308 (2004).

2014This court has reiterated that “it is the defendant’s responsibility to ‘rais[e] his Confrontation Clause objection.’ ” State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 489 , 231 P.3d 558 (2010) (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 327 , 129 S. Ct. 2527 , 174 L.

2014This court has reiterated that “it is the defendant’s responsibility to ‘rais[e] his Confrontation Clause objection.’ ” State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 489 , 231 P.3d 558 (2010) (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 327 , 129 S. Ct. 2527 , 174 L.

2006Ed. 2d 674 , 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986), to explain application of the harmlessness rule in the particular context of a Confrontation Clause issue: *717 “ ‘The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1994The Van Arsdall Court interpreted Davis as not establishing a categorical exception to the harmless error rule. 475 U.S. at 682-83 .

2002Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 , 111 L.

1994Ed. 2d 638 , 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990), for the proposition that “[t]o be admissible despite a confrontation clause problem, ‘hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.’ ” The State responds with the assertion that “Kendra Dean, the appellant’s sister, was called as a witness and she was available for cross-examination on this point.” Analysis of this issue is somewhat complicated by an apparent lack of identification in the record of Dean as the declarant.

1980The rule of Bruton is well recognized by this court *348 and was summarized in State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 732-33 , 556 P.2d 387 (1976), as follows: "In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , the United States Supreme Court held that an accused's right of cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated where a codefendant does not testify and his extra-judicial confession inculpating the accused is admitted into evidence, notwithstanding jury instructions that the codefendant's confession must be disregarded in determi

1980The rule of Bruton is well recognized by this court *348 and was summarized in State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 732-33 , 556 P.2d 387 (1976), as follows: "In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , the United States Supreme Court held that an accused's right of cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated where a codefendant does not testify and his extra-judicial confession inculpating the accused is admitted into evidence, notwithstanding jury instructions that the codefendant's confession must be disregarded in determi

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .