confrontation clause in New York

2022To the extent those questions may have alluded to some issue, they were consistent with a hearsay claim under state evidentiary law, and raising such an issue does not preserve a Confrontation Clause claim ( People v Kello , 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]; People v Maher , 89 NY2d 456, 462-463 [1997]).

2022To the extent those questions may have alluded to some issue, they were consistent with a hearsay claim under state evidentiary law, and raising such an issue does not preserve a Confrontation Clause claim ( People v Kello , 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]; People v Maher , 89 NY2d 456, 462-463 [1997]).

2022To the extent those questions may have alluded to some issue, they were consistent with a hearsay claim under state evidentiary law, and raising such an issue does not preserve a Confrontation Clause claim ( People v Kello , 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]; People v Maher , 89 NY2d 456, 462-463 [1997]).

2022To the extent those questions may have alluded to some issue, they were consistent with a hearsay claim under state evidentiary law, and raising such an issue does not preserve a Confrontation Clause claim ( People v Kello , 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]; People v Maher , 89 NY2d 456, 462-463 [1997]).

2014Further, the admission of the contents of the 911 emergency telephone call made by the third person was also proper under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and did not constitute a confrontation clause violation in any event (see Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822, 826-828 [2006]; People v Bradley, 8 NY3d 124, 127-128 [2006]; People v Kenyon, 108 AD3d 933 [2013]; People v Conyers, 33 AD3d 929 [2006]; People v Marino, 21 AD3d at 430 ).

2014Further, the admission of the contents of the 911 emergency telephone call made by the third person was also proper under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and did not constitute a confrontation clause violation in any event (see Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822, 826-828 [2006]; People v Bradley, 8 NY3d 124, 127-128 [2006]; People v Kenyon, 108 AD3d 933 [2013]; People v Conyers, 33 AD3d 929 [2006]; People v Marino, 21 AD3d at 430 ).

2007In Ohio v Roberts ( 448 US 56, 66 [1980]), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement against a defendant in a criminal proceeding provided the statement “bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability’ . . . [which] can be inferred without more . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” In White v Illinois ( 502 US 346 , 355 n 8 [1992]), the Court noted that the exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous declarations, synonymous with the excited utterance exception, was “firmly roo

1997A two-pronged approach has been advanced for determining whether such statements may still be admissible without violating the confrontation clause (People v Sanders, supra, at 64 ; see, Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 65-66 ).

2025As an alternative holding, we find no Confrontation Clause violation, as the DNA analysts testimony establishes that she conducted her own independent analysis of the data, which she reviewed in a meaningful way to enable her to independently verify of the accuracy of the results, and that she was not merely a conduit for the conclusions of others ( see People v Jordan , 40 NY3d 396 , 400-403 [2023]; People v John , 27 NY3d 294, 315 [2016]; People v Heyward , 214 AD3d 578, 580 [1st Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 934 [2023]).

2025There was no Confrontation Clause violation because [*3]the expert analyst's testimony demonstrated her own "independent analysis" of the data to make a comparison, and the analysis was not merely "a conduit for the conclusions of others" ( People v John , 27 NY3d 294, 315 [2016]; see People v Jordan , 40 NY3d 396 , 402 [2023]).

1982The confrontation clause is, therefore, something more than a mere “codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law.” (California v Green, supra, at p 155.) Nevertheless, the court has continuously declined the invitation to adopt any definitive standard that would govern the relationship between the confrontation clause and the various exceptions to the hearsay rule.

1980The historical purpose of the confrontation clause is to prohibit trial by ex parte affidavits and to advance the search for truth by guaranteeing the reliability of the evidence submitted against a criminal defendant (California v Green, 399 US 149, 156-160 ; see, also, Baker, The Right to Confrontation, 6 Conn L Rev 529; Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S Cal L Rev 1).

2014While defendant objected to this evidence as hearsay, that objection did not preserve his present Confrontation Clause claim (see People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]; People v Maher, 89 NY2d 456, 462-463 [1997]; compare People v Hardy, 4 NY3d 192, 197 n 3 [2005]), and we decline to review this claim in the interest of justice.

2014While defendant objected to this evidence as hearsay, that objection did not preserve his present Confrontation Clause claim (see People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]; People v Maher, 89 NY2d 456, 462-463 [1997]; compare People v Hardy, 4 NY3d 192, 197 n 3 [2005]), and we decline to review this claim in the interest of justice.

2023“Even assuming that counsel failed to assert a meritorious Confrontation Clause challenge, the alleged omission does not ‘involve an issue that [was] so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it’” (People v Rodriguez, 31 NY3d 1067 , 1068 [2018], quoting People v McGee, 20 NY3d 513, 518 [2013]).

2020The Confrontation Clause issue was not " so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it'" ( People v Rodriguez , 31 NY3d 1067, 1068 , quoting People v McGee , 20 NY3d 513, 518 ).

2019The District Court properly overruled defendant's Confrontation Clause objection to the calibration document produced by the Forensic Investigation Center ( see People v Pealer , 20 NY3d 447 , 456 [2013]), which had been certified by the state analyst to verify that calibration and maintenance tests performed on defendant's instrument, insofar as they involve the simulator solution, sufficed to ensure that the instrument was functioning properly at the time of defendant's test.

2016Referencing those cases, we rejected the notion “that Melendez-Diaz pronounced a shift in Confrontation Clause analysis that might call our precedent into question” (Pealer, 20 NY3d at 455 ).

2014As an alternative holding, we find no Confrontation Clause violation, because the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose other than its truth (see Tennessee v Street, 471 US 409 [1985]; United States v Reyes, 18 F3d 65, 70-71 [1994]).

2014As an alternative holding, we find no Confrontation Clause violation, because the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose other than its truth (see Tennessee v Street, 471 US 409 [1985]; United States v Reyes, 18 F3d 65, 70-71 [1994]).

2022In Bruton v United States, 391 US 123 (1968], the Supreme Court held that the admission of a confession made by one defendant, who does not testify, and which contains references implicating his codefendant, violates the latter's right of cross-examination under the confrontation clause.

2012Under the circumstances, merely requesting certain remedies associated with Bruton v United States ( 391 US 123 [1968]) did not suffice to preserve a Confrontation Clause claim, particularly because the court was not alerted to the issue of whether the remark in question was testimonial.

1983As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, the confrontation clause envisions a “personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look upon him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” (Mattox v United States, 156 US 237, 242-243 .) Thus, the right of cross-examination is far more than a desirabl

1980The confrontation clause includes and guarantees the right of cross-examination (Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415 ; Mattox v United States, 156 US 237 ).

2026Further, the defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the Confrontation Clause issue is without merit ( see People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708; People v Baldi , 54 NY2d 137), as the Confrontation Clause issue was not "'so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it'" ( People v Liggins , 185 AD3d 721, 721 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Rodriguez , 31 NY3d 1067, 1068).

2026Further, the defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the Confrontation Clause issue is without merit ( see People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708; People v Baldi , 54 NY2d 137), as the Confrontation Clause issue was not "'so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it'" ( People v Liggins , 185 AD3d 721, 721 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Rodriguez , 31 NY3d 1067, 1068).

2026Further, the defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the Confrontation Clause issue is without merit ( see People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708; People v Baldi , 54 NY2d 137), as the Confrontation Clause issue was not "'so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it'" ( People v Liggins , 185 AD3d 721, 721 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Rodriguez , 31 NY3d 1067, 1068).

2026Further, the defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the Confrontation Clause issue is without merit ( see People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708; People v Baldi , 54 NY2d 137), as the Confrontation Clause issue was not "'so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it'" ( People v Liggins , 185 AD3d 721, 721 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Rodriguez , 31 NY3d 1067, 1068).

2025However, we find that the statements made by the victim were voluntary, non-testimonial, and not made in response to structured questioning, and therefore did not violate the confrontation clause ( see Ohio v Clark , 576 US 237, 245 [2015]; People v Franklin , 42 NY3d 157 , 163-164 [2024], cert denied sub nom Franklin v New York , 604 US —, 145 S Ct 831 [2025]).

2025However, we find that the statements made by the victim were voluntary, non-testimonial, and not made in response to structured questioning, and therefore did not violate the confrontation clause ( see Ohio v Clark , 576 US 237, 245 [2015]; People v Franklin , 42 NY3d 157 , 163-164 [2024], cert denied sub nom Franklin v New York , 604 US —, 145 S Ct 831 [2025]).

2024Wilson predates the seminal Crawford v Washington ( 541 US 36 [2004]), as does its dicta "were we to review" the "Confrontation Clause claim, . . . we would reject it" ( 297 AD2d at 608 ).

2024The prosecution's averment, that permitting them to call the civilians as testifying witnesses would negate the defense Confrontation Clause challenge, is certainly accurate ( see Crawford , 541 US at 59 n 9; People v Smith , 201 AD3d 746, 747 [2022]; People v Rahman , 137 AD3d 523, 523-524 [2016]).

2006Were we to review these claims, we would find that any hearsay or Confrontation Clause violation was harmless (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]) because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and because the testimony at issue related only to a peripheral matter.

1988However, we find that any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt of the crimes charged, which was established through the testimony of other independent witnesses, and we further find that there is no reasonable possibility that the trier of fact would have acquitted the defendant but for the erroneous admission of Torres’s statement (see, People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 ; People v McCain, 134 AD2d 286 ).

1990However, since the defendant’s own statement may be considered on appeal in assessing whether the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless (see, Cruz v New York, 481 US 186 ; People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750 ; People v Garcia, 151 AD2d 500 ), and since the defendant’s statement was identical to that of the codefendant, we find the admission of Davis’s statement to be harmless (see, People v Hamlin, supra).

1990However, since the defendant’s own statement may be considered on appeal in assessing whether the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless (see, Cruz v New York, 481 US 186 ; People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750 ; People v Garcia, 151 AD2d 500 ), and since the defendant’s statement was identical to that of the codefendant, we find the admission of Davis’s statement to be harmless (see, People v Hamlin, supra).

2026Further, the defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the Confrontation Clause issue is without merit ( see People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708; People v Baldi , 54 NY2d 137), as the Confrontation Clause issue was not "'so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it'" ( People v Liggins , 185 AD3d 721, 721 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Rodriguez , 31 NY3d 1067, 1068).

2026Further, the defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the Confrontation Clause issue is without merit ( see People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708; People v Baldi , 54 NY2d 137), as the Confrontation Clause issue was not "'so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it'" ( People v Liggins , 185 AD3d 721, 721 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Rodriguez , 31 NY3d 1067, 1068).

1986(Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 403 [1965]; People v Egan, 78 AD2d 34, 38 [1980]; NY Const, art I, § 6.) Omissions and ambiguities in the historical record have fueled a wide-ranging debate about the origin, development and intended meaning of the confrontation clause.

1980Nevertheless, hearsay evidence is not, per se, barred in criminal trials, the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution (see Dutton v Evans, 400 US 74, 80 ; California v Green, supra, pp 155-156; Pointer v Texas, supra, pp 403-407 ), or the similar clause in the New York Constitution (People v Nisonoff, 293 NY 597 ) notwithstanding.

2017We contrasted the facts in John with those in People v Brown ( 13 NY3d 332 [2009]), wherein we discerned no Confrontation Clause violation because the testifying witness had supervised the generation of a DNA profile, and personally examined and independently interpreted the data (see John, 27 NY3d at 310 , citing Brown, 13 NY3d at 337, 340 ).

2017We contrasted the facts in John with those in People v Brown ( 13 NY3d 332 [2009]), wherein we discerned no Confrontation Clause violation because the testifying witness had supervised the generation of a DNA profile, and personally examined and independently interpreted the data (see John, 27 NY3d at 310 , citing Brown, 13 NY3d at 337, 340 ).

1982“While the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause share a similarity of purpose, the protections they afford have not been viewed as entirely equatable.” (People v Salko, 47 NY2d 230, 241 .) At least as to the present case,* it is clear there is no problem.

1980They include dying declarations (see Mattox v United States, 156 US 237 ; People v Corey, 157 NY 332, 347-348 ; People v Liccione, 63 AD2d 305 , affd 50 NY2d 850 ), book entries or public records (Gilstrap v United States, 389 F2d 6; Heike v United States, 192 F 83, 94-95, affd 227 US 131 ; People v Sugden, supra; People v Nisonoff, supra), spontaneous declarations (People v Del Vermo, 192 NY 470 ) and the statements of coconspirators (Dutton v Evans, supra; People v Salko, 47 NY2d 230). 2 The confrontation clause and the hearsay rule serve similar purposes, but as the exceptions prove, the tw

1986(See, e.g., California v Green, 399 US 149, 176, n 8 [concurring opn, Harlan, J„ 1970].) In 1895, the Supreme Court, in an attempt at an historical explication of the clause stated that: "[t]he primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits * * * being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order

1980The confrontation clause includes and guarantees the right of cross-examination (Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415 ; Mattox v United States, 156 US 237 ).