84 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garner v. Stategreen2 sentences2025In a criminal prosecution, a witness for the State Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 6 of 19 is unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause requirement only if the prosecution “made a good faith effort to obtain the absent witness[’s] attendance at trial.” Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. 2002). 2023A “witness is unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause requirement only if the prosecution has made a good faith effort to obtain the witness’s presence at trial[.]” Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721 , 724–25 (Ind. 2002). | 7 | 10 |
Crawford v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2017Thus, for absent witnesses, the confrontation clause requires “unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . 2017Thus, for absent witnesses, the confrontation clause requires “unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . | 4 | 17 |
Tiller v. Stategreen2 sentences2018“With regard to unavailability, our Supreme Court has provided that ‘[a] witness is unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause requirement only if the prosecution has made a good faith effort to obtain the witness’s presence at trial.’” Tiller v. State, 896 N.E.2d 537, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. 2002)) (alteration original to Tiller), trans. denied. 2013“Reasonableness is the test that limits the extent of alternatives the State must exhaust.” Tiller v. State, 896 N.E.2d 537, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. 2002)). | 3 | 3 |
Delaware v. Fensterergreen2 sentences2015“The confrontation clause, however, generally only ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.’ ” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292, 295 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985)). 2015“The confrontation clause, however, generally only ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.’ ” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292, 295 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985)). | 2 | 4 |
Fowler v. Stategreen2 sentences2012In Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 465 (Ind.2005), ce rt. denied, 547 U.S. 1193 , 126 S.Ct. 2862 , 165 L.Ed.2d 898 (2006), also addressing the confrontation clause, the supreme court concluded that even though the witness left the stand without the defendant’s cross-examination, the defendant’s failure to explain why he could not have recalled the witness left his appellate challenge wanting. 2006Acknowledging the difficult choices that defendants and lawyers must make in highly charged settings such as a victim’s refusal to testify, and expressing sympathy for victims of domestic violence, we concluded, “the defendant must ask the trial judge to put a recalcitrant witness to the choice of testifying or contempt, or forgo a Confrontation Clause challenge to the introduction of the witness’s earlier statements.” Id. at 462 . | 2 | 3 |
Kentucky v. Stincergreen2 sentences2006See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739 , 107 S.Ct. at 2664 . 2006See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739 , 107 S.Ct. at 2664 . | 2 | 3 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Williams, 930 N.E.2d at 607-08 . [18] Finding the foundation for the videos adequate under the silent witness theory and that the videos did not violate Tucker’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, we affirm. 2015Id. at 607-08, n.3 ; cf. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c) (defining hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted). | 2 | 2 |
Boatner v. Stategreen2 sentences2016This is insufficient to preserve an argument based on the Confrontation Clause.See Boatner v. State, 934 N.E.2d 184, 187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that defendant’s hearsay objection was insufficient to preserve Confrontation Clause issue on appeal); Armstrong v. State, 22 N.E.3d 629, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (same), trans. denied. 2012See Boatner v. State, 934 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a defendant’s hearsay objection was insufficient to preserve a confrontation claim). | 2 | 2 |
Rubalcada v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Cf. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54 , 107 S.Ct. 989 (plurality opinion) (failure to disclose CYS file did not violate the Confrontation Clause because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all of the trial witnesses fully); Rubalcada v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (Ind.2000) (reviewing the quality of cross-examination after application of privilege limiting access to confidential *798 records and in camera review). 2011Cf. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54 , 107 S.Ct. 989 (plurality opinion) (failure to disclose CYS file did not violate the Confrontation Clause because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all of the trial witnesses fully); Rubalcada v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (Ind.2000) (reviewing the quality of cross-examination after application of privilege limiting access to con fidential records and in camera review). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harlachergreen2 sentences2010Davis v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1043 , 1048 n. 10 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). [5] Justice Scalia, the only member of the Ritchie court still sitting on the Supreme Court, displaying an uncharacteristic reticence, expressed no opinion on the confrontation clause issue. [6] See also People v. Harlacher, 262 Ill.App.3d 1 , 199 Ill.Dec. 527 , 634 N.E.2d 366, 372 (1994) (holding that defendant was not entitled to counseling records because he had not shown that they were material). [7] The plurality in Ritchie acknowledged that Nixon "suggests that the [Compulsory Process] Clause may require the production of ev 2010Davis v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1043 , 1048 n. 10 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). [5] Justice Scalia, the only member of the Ritchie court still sitting on the Supreme Court, displaying an uncharacteristic reticence, expressed no opinion on the confrontation clause issue. [6] See also People v. Harlacher, 262 Ill.App.3d 1 , 199 Ill.Dec. 527 , 634 N.E.2d 366, 372 (1994) (holding that defendant was not entitled to counseling records because he had not shown that they were material). [7] The plurality in Ritchie acknowledged that Nixon "suggests that the [Compulsory Process] Clause may require the production of ev | 2 | 2 |
Gardner v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Gardner v. State, 641 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). 1997Gardner v. State, 641 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). | 2 | 2 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2016In Melendez-Diaz , the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a confrontation challenge raised upon the admission of “certificates of analysis,” which showed the results of a forensic test confirming that the substance seized from the defendant was cocaine. 557 U.S. at 308 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 . 2016In Melendez-Diaz , the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a confrontation challenge raised upon the admission of “certificates of analysis,” which showed the results of a forensic test confirming that the substance seized from the defendant was cocaine. 557 U.S. at 308 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 . | 1 | 3 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Jackson, 735 N.E.2d at 1151 . 2002Jackson, 735 N.E.2d at 1151 . | 1 | 3 |
Pointer v. Texasgreen2 sentences2016Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 1989Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1067-68 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 ; Franklin v. Duckworth (N.D.Ind.1982), 530 F.Supp. 1315, 1319 . | 1 | 2 |
People v. Turnergreen2 sentences2010Id. at 646-47. 2010Id. at 646-47 . | 1 | 2 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1998It is necessary to make this assumption because the Confrontation Clause analysis under Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 applies only if it initially has been determined that a statement falls within a valid hearsay exception. 1998It is necessary to make this assumption because the Confrontation Clause analysis under Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 applies only if it initially has been determined that a statement falls within a valid hearsay exception. | 1 | 2 |
| Small v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coltan A. Perryman v. State of Indianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mishler v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Purvis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Howard v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Avilagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cuesta-Rodriguez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Leachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kennedygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nathaniel Armstrong v. State of Indianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Nesbittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Calhoungreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wallace v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harkins v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Koenig v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Benson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grindle v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ramirez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gilmoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
green
2 sentences2011Cf. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54 , 107 S.Ct. 989 (plurality opinion) (failure to disclose CYS file did not violate the Confrontation Clause because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all of the trial witnesses fully); Rubalcada v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (Ind.2000) (reviewing the quality of cross-examination after application of privilege limiting access to con fidential records and in camera review). 2011Cf. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54 , 107 S.Ct. 989 (plurality opinion) (failure to disclose CYS file did not violate the Confrontation Clause because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all of the trial witnesses fully); Rubalcada v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (Ind.2000) (reviewing the quality of cross-examination after application of privilege limiting access to con fidential records and in camera review). | 5 | 1989–2011 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences2000We have a different view however on the question of whether the officer was unavailable. “[A] witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of ... the exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Robert, 448 U.S. at 74 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968)). 2000We have a different view however on the question of whether the officer was unavailable. “[A] witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of ... the exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Robert, 448 U.S. at 74 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968)). | 4 | 1984–2000 |
Miller v. State
green
2 sentences1993"Although the Indiana Constitution specifically provides criminal defendants with the right to confront their accusers face-to-face, the Indiana Supreme Court stated in Miller v. State (1987), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 64, 69 , that cross-examination is the primary interest secured by the confrontation clause of Ind. Const. of 1851, art. 1991Even against the pressure of policies favoring specialized treatment of child victims, the confrontation clause in article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution does not permit wholesale denial of cross-examination.” 517 N.E.2d at 73 . *1302 Subsequently, our Supreme Court decided Miller v. State (1988) Ind., 531 N.E.2d 466 (Miller II). | 3 | 1989–1993 |
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2010The confrontation clause does not apply to the children who did not testify. ''The Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). 2010The confrontation clause does not apply to the children who did not testify. ''The Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). | 2 | 2010–2012 |
Fowler v. Indiana
green
2 sentences2012In Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 465 (Ind.2005), ce rt. denied, 547 U.S. 1193 , 126 S.Ct. 2862 , 165 L.Ed.2d 898 (2006), also addressing the confrontation clause, the supreme court concluded that even though the witness left the stand without the defendant’s cross-examination, the defendant’s failure to explain why he could not have recalled the witness left his appellate challenge wanting. 2012In Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 465 (Ind.2005), ce rt. denied, 547 U.S. 1193 , 126 S.Ct. 2862 , 165 L.Ed.2d 898 (2006), also addressing the confrontation clause, the supreme court concluded that even though the witness left the stand without the defendant’s cross-examination, the defendant’s failure to explain why he could not have recalled the witness left his appellate challenge wanting. | 2 | 2007–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2010Regarding the confrontation clause argument, the court followed Ritchie , but failed to recognize that that portion of Ritchie was a plurality opinion. 602 A.2d at 1296 . 2010Regarding the confrontation clause argument, the court followed Rit-chie, but failed to recognize that that portion of Ritchie was a plurality opinion. 602 A.2d at 1296 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Spencer
green
2 sentences2010When a plurality opinion is issued, "its precedent is the narrowest holding that garnered five votes." United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866 , 879 n. 4 (8th Cir.2010). 2010When a plurality opinion is issued, "its precedent is the narrowest holding that garnered five votes." United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866 , 879 n. 4 (8th Cir.2010). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Davis v. Alaska
green
2 sentences1994In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a defendant the right to cross-examine a crucial state witness who was on probation for a juvenile matter about his probation. 415 U.S. at 315-18 , 94 S.Ct. at 1110-11 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 353-56 . 1994In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a defendant the right to cross-examine a crucial state witness who was on probation for a juvenile matter about his probation. 415 U.S. at 315-18 , 94 S.Ct. at 1110-11 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 353-56 . | 2 | 1994–2000 |
Holmes v. State
green
2 sentences1997Id. 1997Id. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Bruton v. United States
green
2 sentences1992The Court held that while the confrontation clause does not totally bar the admission of such a redacted confession made incriminatory through linkage by other evidence, as it does a confession which makes a specific reference to a codefend-ant, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the clause does bar the admission of such a redacted, yet linked, confession in the absence of a limiting jury instruction, namely an instruction which advises the jury that the confession is limited in applicability to the confessor. 1992The Court held that while the confrontation clause does not totally bar the admission of such a redacted confession made incriminatory through linkage by other evidence, as it does a confession which makes a specific reference to a codefend-ant, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the clause does bar the admission of such a redacted, yet linked, confession in the absence of a limiting jury instruction, namely an instruction which advises the jury that the confession is limited in applicability to the confessor. | 2 | 1971–1992 |
Miller v. State
green
2 sentences1991Even against the pressure of policies favoring specialized treatment of child victims, the confrontation clause in article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution does not permit wholesale denial of cross-examination.” 517 N.E.2d at 73 . *1302 Subsequently, our Supreme Court decided Miller v. State (1988) Ind., 531 N.E.2d 466 (Miller II). 1989I § 18 requires face to face confrontation and in Miller v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 466 , the Court recognized the Coy holding that the sixth amendment also requires face-to-face confrontation. | 2 | 1989–1991 |
Brewster v. State
neutral
2 sentences1987Brewster v. State (1983), Ind., 450 N.E.2d 507 . 1987Although a violation of the confrontation clause may constitute harmless *74 error, Brewster v. State (1983), Ind., 450 N.E.2d 507 , that is not the case here. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
California v. Green
red
2 sentences1976The Court quoted from California v. Green, (1970) 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 : “‘[v]iewed historically * * * there is good reason to conclude that the confrontation clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.’ Id., at 158 , 90 S.Ct., at 1935 . 1976The Court quoted from California v. Green, (1970) 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 : “‘[v]iewed historically * * * there is good reason to conclude that the confrontation clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.’ Id., at 158 , 90 S.Ct., at 1935 . | 2 | 1976–1985 |
Strickland v. State
green
2 sentences1979We would not be understood as requiring counsel to make an offer to prove to substantiate a confrontation claim of this sort, as any such requirement would be contrary to present law, Strickland v. State (1977), Ind., 359 N.E.2d 244 . 1979We would not be understood as requiring counsel to make an offer to prove to substantiate a confrontation claim of this sort, as any such requirement would be contrary to present law, Strickland v. State (1977), Ind., 359 N.E.2d 244 . | 2 | 1978–1979 |
| United States v. James L. Harper green | 2 | 1972–1974 |
| Maryland v. Craig green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Clay green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Nicolas Gomez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Michael Torres v. State of Indiana green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Modesitt v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Edwin Jones v. State of Indiana green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Davis v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Famiglietti green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Fowler v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Barber v. Page green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Davis v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| United States v. Owens green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| United States v. Robert S. Chappell green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| United States v. Joseph Gironda, John Heckens, John Speiss, and John Balzano green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Williams v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Heckler v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Dean v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.