confrontation clause in Nevada

2021See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 68 (2004) (indicating no Confrontation Clause violation occurs when witnesses testify and are available for cross-examination).

2016Accordingly, we conclude that no relief is warranted on this claim. . . . continued Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 59 n.9 (2004); see generally Williams v. Illinois, U .S. , 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235 (2012) (reiterating that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted).

2022However, even where a Confrontation Clause error occurs, "reversal is not required ‘if the State could show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Medina v. State, 122 Nev. 346, 355 , 143 P.3d 471, 477 (2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)); see also NRS 178.598 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").

2022However, even where a Confrontation Clause error occurs, "reversal is not required ‘if the State could show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Medina v. State, 122 Nev. 346, 355 , 143 P.3d 471, 477 (2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)); see also NRS 178.598 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").

2019See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706 , 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

2019See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706 , 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

2019Accordingly, we conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause violation when the district court permitted Best's preliminary hearing testimony to SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 be introduced at tria1. 2 Chavez, 125 Nev. at 339 , 213 P.3d at 484 .

2019Accordingly, we conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause violation when the district court permitted Best's preliminary hearing testimony to SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 be introduced at tria1. 2 Chavez, 125 Nev. at 339 , 213 P.3d at 484 .

2020But in Vega v. State, 126 Nev. 332, 338, 236 P.3d 632, 636 (2010), we extended plain error review to an otherwise forfeited Confrontation Clause objection.

2020But in Vega v. State, 126 Nev. 332, 338, 236 P.3d 632, 636 (2010), we extended plain error review to an otherwise forfeited Confrontation Clause objection.

2026Cf People v. Nadey, 555 P.3d 961 , 1009 (Cal. 2024) (explaining testimony based on autopsy photographs does not violate the Confrontation Clause because “photographs [are] not hearsay”); People v. Leon, 352 P.3d 289, 314 (Cal. 2015) (explaining photographs are not testimonial statements and that “the admission of autopsy photographs, and competent testimony based on such photographs, does not violate the confrontation clause”) (emphasis added).

2020Id. at 331 (It is clear that the admission of autopsy photographs, and competent testimony based on such photographs, does not violate the confrontation clause" because photographs are not out-of-court testimonial statements.) (quoting People v. Leon, 352 P.3d 289, 314 (Cal. 2015)); see Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 54, 412 P.3d at 51 (finding no Confrontation Clause violation "because the substitute coroner testified about independent conclusions she made based on photographs from the victims autopsies").

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 (0) 194Th 1024 (2020) (providing that where the State fails to argue that error is harmless, this court may still determine that an error was harmless after considering the following factors: "(1) the length and complexity of the record, (2) whether the harmlessness of an error is certain or debatable, and (3) the futility and costliness of reversal and further litigation."); Medina v. State, 122 Nev. 346, 355 , 143 P.3d 471, 477 (2006) (concluding that when State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that Confrontation Clause error did not contribute to the verdict, rev

2022Supreme Gourt OF NEVADA 5 (0) 19974 Ge 1024 (2020) (providing that where the State fails to argue that error is harmless, this court may still determine that an error was harmless after considering the following factors: “(1) the length and complexity of the record, (2) whether the harmlessness of an error is certain or debatable, and (3) the futility and costliness of reversal and further litigation.”); Medina v. State, 122 Nev. 346, 355 , 143 P.3d 471, 477 (2006) (concluding that when State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that Confrontation Clause error did not contribute to the verdict,

1979We need not, however, reach the substance of the constitutional claim presented in this case, nor differentiate it from cases, such as Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), in which a codefendant’s absolute right to refuse to testify rendered hearsay testimony as to his confession inadmissible under the confrontation clause.

1979The dissent notes that when the appellant returned home from his construction job, "he quickly saddled his horse and followed Blythe's path." Stripped of emotive language, this statement, and the record, shows only that appellant went riding immediately after work, as he apparently often did, and that he rode north, as commonly was the case. [1] Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), held that the use against Bruton of a co-defendant's confession was violative of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. [2] Additional evidence of appellant's sexu

2014Walsh, 121 Nev. at 906, 124 P.3d at 208; see also Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327 ("The defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection.").

2014Although we upheld the constitutionality of NRS 50.315(6) against a Confrontation Clause challenge in Walsh, we decided Walsh prior to the U.S. Supreme 1 While the Court appears to have approved of Walsh's holding that NRS 50.315(4) declarations are testimonial, see Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325-26 & n.11 (citing Walsh, 121 Nev. at 904-06, 124 P.3d at 207-08), it explicitly refused to address the validity of all but the simplest notice-and- demand statutes.

2020Dias v. State, 95 Nev. 710, 714, 601 P.2d 706, 709 (1979).

2020Dias v. State, 95 Nev. 710, 714, 601 P.2d 706, 709 (1979).

1986Because Mack did not testify as a witness and was not subject to cross-examination (California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); *202 Corbin v. State, 97 Nev. 245 , 627 P.2d 862 (1981); Sparkman v. State, 95 Nev. 76 , 590 P.2d 151 (1979); Levi v. State, 95 Nev. 746 , 602 P.2d 189 (1979); Maginnis v. State, 93 Nev. 173 , 561 P.2d 922 (1977)), the district court’s error in admitting Mack’s suicide note violated Summers’ right to be confronted with the witnesses testifying against her, a right secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment 7 and made obligatory on the States by the Fourt

1979Whether the confrontation clause is a substantive restraint upon the power of the state and federal governments to prescribe rules of evidence admitting hearsay testimony, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), or merely a requirement that a cross-examining procedure be used in taking the testimony of witnesses who *714 actually appear at trial, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result), we need not decide.

2022Two-way video does not constitute a reversible Confrontation Clause error here ‘"[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to- face confrontation at trial, but that preference 'must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.'" Lipsitz v. SupREME COURT OF NEVADA 15 (0) 1947A agagisz, State, 135 Nev. 131 , 136, 442 P.3d 138, 143 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990)); see also SCR Part IX-A(B) Rule 4(1) (explaining a witness may testify via two-way video if necessary to advance an important pu

2022Two-way video does not constitute a reversible Confrontation Clause error here ‘"[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to- face confrontation at trial, but that preference 'must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.'" Lipsitz v. SupREME COURT OF NEVADA 15 (0) 1947A agagisz, State, 135 Nev. 131, 136, 442 P.3d 138, 143 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990)); see also SCR Part IX-A(B) Rule 4(1) (explaining a witness may testify via two-way video if necessary to advance an important pub

2022Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) (concluding that a confrontation analysis overemphasize the importance of the confession’s accusation.” Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998).

2022Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) (concluding that a confrontation analysis overemphasize the importance of the confession's accusation." Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998).

2022Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) (concluding that a confrontation analysis overemphasize the importance of the confession’s accusation.” Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998).

2022Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) (concluding that a confrontation analysis overemphasize the importance of the confession's accusation." Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998).

2020Id. at 331 (It is clear that the admission of autopsy photographs, and competent testimony based on such photographs, does not violate the confrontation clause" because photographs are not out-of-court testimonial statements.) (quoting People v. Leon, 352 P.3d 289, 314 (Cal. 2015)); see Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 54, 412 P.3d at 51 (finding no Confrontation Clause violation "because the substitute coroner testified about independent conclusions she made based on photographs from the victims autopsies").

2020Id. at 331 (It is clear that the admission of autopsy photographs, and competent testimony based on such photographs, does not violate the confrontation clause" because photographs are not out-of-court testimonial statements.) (quoting People v. Leon, 352 P.3d 289, 314 (Cal. 2015)); see Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 54, 412 P.3d at 51 (finding no Confrontation Clause violation "because the substitute coroner testified about independent conclusions she made based on photographs from the victims autopsies").

2019Cf. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 211 (finding no Confrontation- Clause violation when a confession was redacted to remove "not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence").

2019Cf. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 211 (finding no Confrontation- Clause violation when a confession was redacted to remove "not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence").

2016See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 68 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the use of a testimonial statement made by an unavailable witness unless the defendant had an opportunity to previously cross-examine the witness about the statement); Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 782, 789 , 138 P.3d 477, 481-82 (2006).

2016See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 68 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the use of a testimonial statement made by an unavailable witness unless the defendant had an opportunity to previously cross-examine the witness about the statement); Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 782, 789 , 138 P.3d 477, 481-82 (2006).

2014OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A ce When "considering whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless, this court looks to 'the importance of the witnessis] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, . . . and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecutor's case." Hernandez, 124 Nev. at 652-53 , 188 P.3d at 1135-36 (alterations in original) (quoting Power v. State, 102 Nev. 381, 384 , 724 P.2d 211, 213 (1986)).

2014OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A ce When "considering whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless, this court looks to 'the importance of the witnessis] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, . . . and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecutor's case." Hernandez, 124 Nev. at 652-53 , 188 P.3d at 1135-36 (alterations in original) (quoting Power v. State, 102 Nev. 381, 384 , 724 P.2d 211, 213 (1986)).

1979Whether the confrontation clause is a substantive restraint upon the power of the state and federal governments to prescribe rules of evidence admitting hearsay testimony, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), or merely a requirement that a cross-examining procedure be used in taking the testimony of witnesses who *714 actually appear at trial, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result), we need not decide.

1979As the high court made clear in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), decided the following year, the parameters of the hearsay rule are not to be equated with the requirements of the confrontation clause. 400 U.S. at 81-82, 86 .

1991Davis, 415 U.S. at 308 .

1986Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1974).

1986Because Mack did not testify as a witness and was not subject to cross-examination (California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); *202 Corbin v. State, 97 Nev. 245 , 627 P.2d 862 (1981); Sparkman v. State, 95 Nev. 76 , 590 P.2d 151 (1979); Levi v. State, 95 Nev. 746 , 602 P.2d 189 (1979); Maginnis v. State, 93 Nev. 173 , 561 P.2d 922 (1977)), the district court’s error in admitting Mack’s suicide note violated Summers’ right to be confronted with the witnesses testifying against her, a right secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment 7 and made obligatory on the States by the Fourt

1986The transcript of a witness’ preliminary hearing testimony may be admitted into evidence at a criminal trial without violating the defendant’s right to be confronted with the witnesses testifying against him, a right secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment 1 and made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Summers v. State, 102 Nev. 195 , 718 P.2d 676 (1986), if three preconditions are met.

2015Because nontestimonial statements are not subject to the confrontation clause, United States v. Figueroa Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69 , 85 - (1st Cir. 2010), Burnside had no constitutional right to cross-examine McKnight about those statements, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55-56 (2004).

2015Because nontestimonial statements are not subject to the confrontation clause, United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2010), Burnside had no constitutional right to cross-examine McKnight about those statements, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55-56 (2004).

2014OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A ce When "considering whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless, this court looks to 'the importance of the witnessis] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, . . . and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecutor's case." Hernandez, 124 Nev. at 652-53 , 188 P.3d at 1135-36 (alterations in original) (quoting Power v. State, 102 Nev. 381, 384 , 724 P.2d 211, 213 (1986)).

2014OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A ce When "considering whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless, this court looks to 'the importance of the witnessis] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, . . . and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecutor's case." Hernandez, 124 Nev. at 652-53 , 188 P.3d at 1135-36 (alterations in original) (quoting Power v. State, 102 Nev. 381, 384 , 724 P.2d 211, 213 (1986)).

1993U.S. ...., 112 S.Ct. 736 (1992), the Court reaffirmed its earlier clarification of Roberts as enunciated in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (“Roberts must be read consistently with the question it answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts”), and concluded that “Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.” White , .....

1993U.S. ...., 112 S.Ct. 736 (1992), the Court reaffirmed its earlier clarification of Roberts as enunciated in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (“Roberts must be read consistently with the question it answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts”), and concluded that “Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.” White , .....

1986Because Mack did not testify as a witness and was not subject to cross-examination (California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); *202 Corbin v. State, 97 Nev. 245 , 627 P.2d 862 (1981); Sparkman v. State, 95 Nev. 76 , 590 P.2d 151 (1979); Levi v. State, 95 Nev. 746 , 602 P.2d 189 (1979); Maginnis v. State, 93 Nev. 173 , 561 P.2d 922 (1977)), the district court’s error in admitting Mack’s suicide note violated Summers’ right to be confronted with the witnesses testifying against her, a right secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment 7 and made obligatory on the States by the Fourt

1986Because Mack did not testify as a witness and was not subject to cross-examination (California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); *202 Corbin v. State, 97 Nev. 245 , 627 P.2d 862 (1981); Sparkman v. State, 95 Nev. 76 , 590 P.2d 151 (1979); Levi v. State, 95 Nev. 746 , 602 P.2d 189 (1979); Maginnis v. State, 93 Nev. 173 , 561 P.2d 922 (1977)), the district court’s error in admitting Mack’s suicide note violated Summers’ right to be confronted with the witnesses testifying against her, a right secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment 7 and made obligatory on the States by the Fourt

2024To prevail on a due process challenge under Brady, the defendant must show (1) "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused"; (2) "the evidence was withheld SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 19 1(19 14-17A by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently"; and (3) "prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599 , 81 P.3d 1, 8 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024To prevail on a due process challenge under Brady, the defendant must show (1) "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused"; (2) "the evidence was withheld SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 19 1(19 14-17A by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently"; and (3) "prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599 , 81 P.3d 1, 8 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2022Two-way video does not constitute a reversible Confrontation Clause error here ‘"[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to- face confrontation at trial, but that preference 'must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.'" Lipsitz v. SupREME COURT OF NEVADA 15 (0) 1947A agagisz, State, 135 Nev. 131 , 136, 442 P.3d 138, 143 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990)); see also SCR Part IX-A(B) Rule 4(1) (explaining a witness may testify via two-way video if necessary to advance an important pu

2022Two-way video does not constitute a reversible Confrontation Clause error here ‘"[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to- face confrontation at trial, but that preference 'must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.'" Lipsitz v. SupREME COURT OF NEVADA 15 (0) 1947A agagisz, State, 135 Nev. 131, 136, 442 P.3d 138, 143 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990)); see also SCR Part IX-A(B) Rule 4(1) (explaining a witness may testify via two-way video if necessary to advance an important pub