confrontation clause in Iowa

1982Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, at 123,125-26, § 1396, at 127 (1940); see State v. Strabie, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Iowa 1981); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1978) (“the primary interest secured by the confrontation clause ... is the right of cross-examination”); State v. Carney, 236 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1975) (same); C.

1981“The primary interest secured by the confrontation clause, Amendment 6, United States Constitution, is the right of cross-examination.” State v. Carney, 236 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1975).

2021The Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of an unavailable witness’s statement if the evidence falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 24 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004)).

2019The Confrontation Clause issue is easily resolved. “[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 59 n.9 (2004); accord State v. Rojas, 524 N.W.2d 659, 664 (Iowa 1994) (“The Confrontation Clause was satisfied here because the 11 We note that Cagle does not set out a separate section identified as a Confrontation Clause claim, but he references the Confrontation Clause issue within argument in his brief.

1991Id. at 500 .

1982Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, at 123,125-26, § 1396, at 127 (1940); see State v. Strabie, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Iowa 1981); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1978) (“the primary interest secured by the confrontation clause ... is the right of cross-examination”); State v. Carney, 236 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1975) (same); C.

1994Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1994).

1994Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1994).

1990Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965).

1990Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965).

1990A defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness is a primary interest secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, State v. Durrell, 300 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa 1981), made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.

1989A defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness is secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, State v. Durrell, 300 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa 1981), and made applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

1986State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1978).

1982Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, at 123,125-26, § 1396, at 127 (1940); see State v. Strabie, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Iowa 1981); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1978) (“the primary interest secured by the confrontation clause ... is the right of cross-examination”); State v. Carney, 236 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1975) (same); C.

1983Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the confrontation requirement where the witness is unavailable, it has held a witness is not unavailable “unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 , 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968) (emphasis added).

1983Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the confrontation requirement where the witness is unavailable, it has held a witness is not unavailable “unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 , 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968) (emphasis added).

1995There is also "a strong interest in effective law enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings." Id. at 64 , 100 S.Ct. at 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 607 . [3] The Court has stated, "The Confrontation Clause analysis in Roberts focuses on those factors which come into play when the prosecution seeks to admit testimony from a prior judicial proceeding in place of live testimony at trial." United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 , 106 S.Ct. 1121, 1125 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390, 397 (1986). [4] The hearsay exceptions in White are nearly

1995There is also "a strong interest in effective law enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings." Id. at 64 , 100 S.Ct. at 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 607 . [3] The Court has stated, "The Confrontation Clause analysis in Roberts focuses on those factors which come into play when the prosecution seeks to admit testimony from a prior judicial proceeding in place of live testimony at trial." United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 , 106 S.Ct. 1121, 1125 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390, 397 (1986). [4] The hearsay exceptions in White are nearly

2018In that case, the defendant raised a Confrontation Clause issue, claiming the state improperly introduced a certified abstract of his driving record. 846 N.W.2d at 521 .

2018In that case, the defendant raised a Confrontation Clause issue, claiming the state improperly introduced a certified abstract of his driving record. 846 N.W.2d at 521 .

2021The Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of an unavailable witness’s statement if the evidence falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 24 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004)).

2015For the reasons stated below, we find the statements objected to were not hearsay; therefore, Harris’s counsel did not breach his duty to Harris by failing to make a Confrontation Clause objection.2 See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 24 (Iowa 2006) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause, like the hearsay rule, does not prevent ‘the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.’” (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 59 n.9 (2004))). 2.

2021See State v. Shipley, 757 N.W.2d 228, 235 (Iowa 2008) (“[T]he fighting Confrontation Clause issue with respect to admission of hearsay is whether the underlying statements should be considered ‘testimonial’ or ‘nontestimonial.’”).

2008Thus, as we have recently noted, “the fighting Confrontation Clause issue with respect to admission of hearsay is whether the underlying statements should be considered ‘testimonial’ or ‘nontestimonial.’ ” State v. Shipley, 757 N.W.2d 228, 235 (Iowa 2008).

2016Solid Waste Auth., 641 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Iowa 2002) (holding random reference to an issue, without elaboration or citation to authority, is insufficient to raise an issue for consideration by the appellate court). 5 error on appellate hearsay claim); see also State v. Farni, 325 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Iowa 1982) (holding objection that question “calls for hearsay” was too broad to raise Confrontation Clause issue).

2015See State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 487 (Iowa 2015) (noting defendant failed to preserve “any claim under the United States or Iowa Constitutions”); State v. Hicks, No. 13-1912, 2015 WL 1046130 , at *3-4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2015) (citing State v. Farni, 325 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Iowa 1982)) (rejecting assertion that hearsay objection preserved error on Confrontation Clause claim).

2025Id.

2019See, e.g., In re J.C., 877 N.W.2d 447, 457 (Iowa 2016) (noting, in Confrontation Clause analysis, child interview with Dr. Harre was not primarily for testimonial purposes but for medical treatment and citing similar testimony).

2020We find error was not preserved. 4 See Tangie, 616 N.W.2d at 568–69 (finding a Confrontation Clause claim waived because, despite the assertion in the motion in limine, the court did not rule on the issue and no objection was made at trial); see also State v. Vuong, No. 02-2097, 2003 WL 22701354 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003) (“Because he did not raise the confrontation issue to the district court, we conclude Vuong has failed to preserve error on the issue.”).

2020We find error was not preserved. 4 See Tangie, 616 N.W.2d at 568–69 (finding a Confrontation Clause claim waived because, despite the assertion in the motion in limine, the court did not rule on the issue and no objection was made at trial); see also State v. Vuong, No. 02-2097, 2003 WL 22701354 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003) (“Because he did not raise the confrontation issue to the district court, we conclude Vuong has failed to preserve error on the issue.”).

2005In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986), the Supreme Court limited its holding in Roberts and held that “unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only • when the ' challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceed *30 ing.” Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394 , 106 S.Ct. at 1125 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 398 .

2005In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986), the Supreme Court limited its holding in Roberts and held that “unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only • when the ' challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceed *30 ing.” Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394 , 106 S.Ct. at 1125 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 398 .

2022See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause only guarantees ‘an opportunity for effective cross- examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam))).

2022See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause only guarantees ‘an opportunity for effective cross- examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam))).

2022See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause only guarantees ‘an opportunity for effective cross- examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam))).

2022See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause only guarantees ‘an opportunity for effective cross- examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam))).

2021See Thompson v. State, 492 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 1992) (“[The rape shield rule] is an exception to the general rule that relevant evidence is admissible. . . . [E]ven relevant evidence is not constitutionally required to be admitted if the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.” (citations omitted)); State v. Parsons, 401 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (“The Constitution . . . requires only the introduction of relevant and admissible evidence.”). 14 Based on our review of the trial record, Donahue’s argument that the State opened the door is not persuasive.

2021See Thompson v. State, 492 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 1992) (“[The rape shield rule] is an exception to the general rule that relevant evidence is admissible. . . . [E]ven relevant evidence is not constitutionally required to be admitted if the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.” (citations omitted)); State v. Parsons, 401 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (“The Constitution . . . requires only the introduction of relevant and admissible evidence.”). 14 Based on our review of the trial record, Donahue’s argument that the State opened the door is not persuasive.

2021See Thompson v. State, 492 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 1992) (“[The rape shield rule] is an exception to the general rule that relevant evidence is admissible. . . . [E]ven relevant evidence is not constitutionally required to be admitted if the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.” (citations omitted)); State v. Parsons, 401 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (“The Constitution . . . requires only the introduction of relevant and admissible evidence.”). 14 Based on our review of the trial record, Donahue’s argument that the State opened the door is not persuasive.

2021See Thompson v. State, 492 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 1992) (“[The rape shield rule] is an exception to the general rule that relevant evidence is admissible. . . . [E]ven relevant evidence is not constitutionally required to be admitted if the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.” (citations omitted)); State v. Parsons, 401 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (“The Constitution . . . requires only the introduction of relevant and admissible evidence.”). 14 Based on our review of the trial record, Donahue’s argument that the State opened the door is not persuasive.

2019State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254, 1265 (R.I. 2007); see also Kellogg, 385 N.W.2d at 560 (noting a “primary object of the confrontation clause” is the defendant’s right to cross- examine the witness in front of the jury).

1986State v. Kellogg, 385 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1986) (“A witness who has exercised fifth amendment privilege is ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the confrontation clause.”); State v. Castillo, 315 N.W.2d 63, 65-67 (Iowa 1982) (deposition testimony used at trial satisfied confrontation clause requirements and was properly admitted when defendant “opened the door” by introducing excerpts of it or when witness was “unavailable” for trial).

2017See id. 4 of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (citation omitted).

2015We don’t even know if he’s here.” Harris’s counsel did not raise a Confrontation Clause objection. “‘It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.’” Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002)).

2016The primary- purpose test asks whether the main purpose of the conversation was to “creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 , 192 L.

2016The primary- purpose test asks whether the main purpose of the conversation was to “creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 , 192 L.

2015In reaching this decision, the district court relied upon State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Iowa 1996), to conclude S.O. was unavailable “within the meaning of our rules of evidence.” We acknowledge Liggins relied upon the definition of “unavailability of a witness” as defined by our rules of evidence to conclude there was no violation of Liggins’ Sixth Amendment rights. 557 N.W.2d at 269 (concluding no violation as Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) permitted the use of a deposition as evidence where the witness exhibited confusion and disorientation and admitted he had memory troubles).

2015In reaching this decision, the district court relied upon State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Iowa 1996), to conclude S.O. was unavailable “within the meaning of our rules of evidence.” We acknowledge Liggins relied upon the definition of “unavailability of a witness” as defined by our rules of evidence to conclude there was no violation of Liggins’ Sixth Amendment rights. 557 N.W.2d at 269 (concluding no violation as Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) permitted the use of a deposition as evidence where the witness exhibited confusion and disorientation and admitted he had memory troubles).

2015Nor did the defense ask that Alexander be recalled when the grand jury testimony itself was offered.” (Citation omitted.)); United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1985) (“We decline to hold that a defendant’s right of confrontation mandates that the prosecution call to the stand a person who is available to be called by either side simply because cross-examination of that person may be favorable to the defense.”); People v. Rodriguez, 58 Cal.4th 587 , 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 380 , 319 P.3d 151, 197 (2014) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation when the prosecution introduced a girl’s h

2015Nor did the defense ask that Alexander be recalled when the grand jury testimony itself was offered.” (Citation omitted.)); United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1985) (“We decline to hold that a defendant’s right of confrontation mandates that the prosecution call to the stand a person who is available to be called by either side simply because cross-examination of that person may be favorable to the defense.”); People v. Rodriguez, 319 P.3d 151, 197 (Cal. 2014) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation when the prosecution introduced a girl’s hearsay statement through an expert

2025This procedure complied to the letter with Iowa Code section 915.38, and—until the majority’s decision in White—it complied with our interpretation of article I section 10 of the Iowa Constitution and the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the 36 identically worded Federal Confrontation Clause.2 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990); Pitts v. Mississippi, 607 U.S. ___ , ___, 2025 WL 3260171 , at *2 (Nov. 24, 2025) (per curiam); In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d 342 , 346–47 (Iowa 1989) (en banc), overruled by, White, 9 N.W.3d 1 .

1991Id. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 3162-65, 111 L.Ed.2d at 677-80 .

2025App. 1999) (en banc) (applying Craig to find no Confrontation Clause violation in the admission of two-way closed-circuit television testimony); State v. Bergquist, 211 A.3d 946 , 963–68 (Vt. 2019) (applying Craig to uphold the constitutionality of two-way video testimony); Castillo v. Commonwealth, 827 S.E.2d 790 , 817– 20 (Va. Ct. App. 2019) (viewing Craig as allowing necessity-based exception for face-to-face confrontation and upholding use of two-way video); State v. Herbert, 767 S.E.2d 471 , 482 n.15 (W.

2019Heard urges us to depart from the clear majority rule and follow State v. Herbert, in which West Virginia’s high court held a nonparty witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination must be made in the presence of the jury, because the privilege “may only be invoked when a witness is asked a potentially incriminating question.” 767 S.E.2d 471, 479 (W.

2017The admission of evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause does not require reversal if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt See id.

2015See State v. Wells, 738 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Iowa 2007).