confrontation clause in Washington

2026App. at 337 ; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n. 9 (The confrontation clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”).

2026Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of an out-of-court recorded statement by a third person, which implicated Michael Crawford, and held that the confrontation clause barred its admission because the statement was “testimonial.” Based on a reading of the confrontation clause text and the history behind the clause, the Court reasoned that the confrontation clause applies to “witnesses” against the accused, that is those who “bear testimony.” 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).

2019In Crawford , the Supreme Court held that whether admission of an out-of-court statement by a declarant who does not testify at trial violates the confrontation clause depends on whether the statement was testimonial -not, as it had previously held, whether the statement was reliable. 541 U.S. at 53 , 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L.

2019In Crawford , the Supreme Court held that whether admission of an out-of-court statement by a declarant who does not testify at trial violates the confrontation clause depends on whether the statement was testimonial -not, as it had previously held, whether the statement was reliable. 541 U.S. at 53 , 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L.

2017Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court "normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial."); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 , 90 S. Ct. 1930 ; 26 L.

2017Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court "normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial."); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 , 90 S. Ct. 1930 ; 26 L.

2019In that opinion, the Supreme Court also held that "[t]he defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection." Melendez-Diaz , 557 U.S. at 327 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 .

2019In that opinion, the Supreme Court also held that "[t]he defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection." Melendez-Diaz , 557 U.S. at 327 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 .

2026The confrontation clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [they] [were] unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 , 126 S. Ct. 2266 , 165 L.

2026The confrontation clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [they] [were] unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 , 126 S. Ct. 2266 , 165 L.

2017The confrontation clause is not literally construed so as to require a physical, face-to-face confrontation between the defendant and the speaker.11 State v. Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441, 456 , 957 P.2d 712 (1998) (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 , 110 S. Ct. 3157 , 111 L.

2006B f21 Shafer contends, additionally, that the confrontation clause contained in article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution is to be interpreted more broadly than its federal counterpart in the Sixth Amendment and that RCW 9A.44.120 violates this broad interpretation. f 22 Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to meet the witnesses against him face to face.” In State v. Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441 , 957 P.2d 712 (1998), we addressed the issue of whether a statute that allowed a child wi

2026The court notes that O’Brien has rights enumerated in the confrontation clause. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S. Ct. 1431 , 89 L.

2026The court notes that O’Brien has rights enumerated in the confrontation clause. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S. Ct. 1431 , 89 L.

2024App. at 652 . 28 No. 38437-3-III State v. Howard Under the Sixth Amendment, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” State v. Davis, 154 Wn.2d 291, 298 , 111 P.3d 844 (2005). “[W]hen a witness is asked questions about the events at issue and about his or her prior statements, but answers that he or she is unable to remember the charged events or the prior statements, this provides the defendant sufficient opportunity for cross-examination to satisfy the confrontation clause.” State v. Price, 158 Wn.2d 630, 650 ,

2019Accordingly, “where the untainted evidence admitted is so overwhelming as to necessarily lead to a finding of guilt, [a confrontation clause violation] is harmless.” State v. Davis, 154 Wn.2d 291, 305 , 111 P.3d 844 (2005), aff’d by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S. Ct. 2266 , 165 L.

2016Rohrich quotes West’s statement that a declar-ant “ ‘must ... be subject to cross-examination concerning the out-of-court declaration,”’ 132 Wn.2d at 478 (quoting West, 670 F.2d at 687 ), because the questioning of the stepdaughter in Rohrich was so narrow that it did not subject her to questioning about alleged abuse at all. ¶29 Clark, which discusses the United States Supreme Court decisions in Green and Owens, states that the admission of hearsay statements will not violate the confrontation clause if the hearsay declarant “is asked about the event and the hearsay statement,” 139 Wn.2d at 1

2007Relying on State v. Rohrich, 132 Wn.2d 472 , 939 P.2d 697 (1997), he asserts that the confrontation clause requires the hearsay declarant to testify about the alleged events. ¶15 The Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const, amend.

2022A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a person accused of a crime has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution states that an “accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face.” The United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig addressed whether the Sixth Amendment prohibited a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying by one-way closed circuit television. 497 U.S. 836, 840 , 110 S. Ct. 3157 , 111 L.

2022A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a person accused of a crime has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution states that an “accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face.” The United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig addressed whether the Sixth Amendment prohibited a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying by one-way closed circuit television. 497 U.S. 836, 840 , 110 S. Ct. 3157 , 111 L.

2018The confrontation clause "bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." State v. Koslowski, 166 Wn.2d 409,417 , 209 P.3d 479 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 , 126 S. Ct. 2266 , 165 L.

2018Koslowski , 166 Wash.2d at 417 n.3, 209 P.3d 479 . ¶ 47 A violation of the confrontation clause is subject to harmless error.

2021App. 228, 248 , 279 P.3d 926 (2012) (holding that “a defendant [must] raise a Sixth Amendment confrontation clause claim at or before trial or lose the benefit of the right”); Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 256 (evidentiary rulings made 14 The confrontation clause guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend.

2019The O'Cain opinion highlighted two principles that are *209 recognized and significant in Melendez-Diaz : (1) a defendant loses the right to confrontation if he or she does not object at trial and (2) states have the power to create their own rules that govern how a defendant may assert a confrontation clause violation. 4 See *1192 O'Cain, 169 Wash. App. at 236 -40 , 279 P.3d 926 . ¶40 In O'Cain , the court identified the applicable procedural rule in Washington to be ER 103.

2025In Lui we concluded the confrontation clause “allows expert witnesses to rely on technical data prepared by others when reaching their own conclusions, without requiring each laboratory technician to take the witness stand.” 179 Wn.2d at 483 .

2025We concluded the confrontation clause was not offended because the supervisor reviewed “the results of the control samples, she reviewed the testing procedures, and she reviewed her subordinate analysts’ results at each step in the process.” Id. at 490-91 .

2010See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 , 54 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court "normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference w

2010See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-13 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's name at pretrial hearing); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 , 54 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Noting that to accept a broader interpretation would transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of discovery and further recognizing the Court "normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference w

2020“An alleged violation of the confrontation clause is reviewed de novo.” State v. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d 96, 108 , 271 P.3d 876 (2012).

2020“An alleged violation of the confrontation clause is reviewed de novo.” State v. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d 96, 108 , 271 P.3d 876 (2012).

2015While, this court reviews alleged violations of the confrontation clause de novo, State v. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d 96, 108 , 271 P.3d 876 (2012) (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 , 119 S. Ct. 1887 , 144 L.

2015While, this court reviews alleged violations of the confrontation clause de novo, State v. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d 96, 108 , 271 P.3d 876 (2012) (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 , 119 S. Ct. 1887 , 144 L.

2011Specifically, our interpretation rested on the general requirement under the confrontation clause for “H]ive testimony ... before the watchful eyes of the jury.” Id. at 477 n.9; see also In re Pers.

2007Relying on State v. Rohrich, 132 Wn.2d 472 , 939 P.2d 697 (1997), he asserts that the confrontation clause requires the hearsay declarant to testify about the alleged events. ¶15 The Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const, amend.

2020Accordingly, to show bias on the part of a prosecution witness”); see also Lee, 188 Wn.2d at 489 (“The confrontation clause primarily protects ‘cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.’” (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 , 94 S. Ct. 1105 , 39 L.

2020Accordingly, to show bias on the part of a prosecution witness”); see also Lee, 188 Wn.2d at 489 (“The confrontation clause primarily protects ‘cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.’” (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 , 94 S. Ct. 1105 , 39 L.

2006Owens, 484 U.S. at 560 , 108 S.Ct. 838 ; see also Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 22 , 106 S.Ct. 292 (the confrontation clause offers no guaranty that every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is "marred by forgetfulness"). ¶ 32 With regard to the third purpose, exposing the jury to the witness's demeanor, when the witness takes the stand and is asked about the events and hearsay statements, the fact finder can determine whether the witness is telling the truth about her lapse of memory or evading.

2006Owens, 484 U.S. at 560 ; see also Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 22 (the confrontation clause offers no guaranty that every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is “marred by forgetfulness”). ¶32 With regard to the third purpose, exposing the jury to the witness’s demeanor, when the witness takes the stand and is asked about the events and hearsay statements, the fact finder can determine whether the witness is telling the truth about her lapse of memory or evading.

2018The confrontation clause "bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." State v. Koslowski, 166 Wn.2d 409,417 , 209 P.3d 479 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 , 126 S. Ct. 2266 , 165 L.

2018Koslowski , 166 Wash.2d at 417 n.3, 209 P.3d 479 . ¶ 47 A violation of the confrontation clause is subject to harmless error.

2017The confrontation clause is not literally construed so as to require a physical, face-to-face confrontation between the defendant and the speaker.11 State v. Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441, 456 , 957 P.2d 712 (1998) (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 , 110 S. Ct. 3157 , 111 L.

2006B f21 Shafer contends, additionally, that the confrontation clause contained in article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution is to be interpreted more broadly than its federal counterpart in the Sixth Amendment and that RCW 9A.44.120 violates this broad interpretation. f 22 Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to meet the witnesses against him face to face.” In State v. Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441 , 957 P.2d 712 (1998), we addressed the issue of whether a statute that allowed a child wi

2018“The confrontation clause applies to the state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment.” State v. Clark, 139 Wn.2d 152, 157-58 , 985 P.2d 377 (1999) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S. Ct. 1065 , 13 L.

2018"The confrontation clause applies to the state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Clark , 139 Wash.2d 152 , 157-58, 985 P.2d 377 (1999) (citing Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400 , 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1965) ).

2024Thus, we determine the testimonial nature of N.C.-C.’s statements under the confrontation clause regardless of the fact that they were made to a 911 operator rather than a police officer. 9 No. 57863-8-II In applying the primary purpose test, we “‘objectively evaluat[e] the statements and actions of the parties to the encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the interrogation occurs.’” Burke, 196 Wn.2d at 726 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 370 ).

2018But the Davis Court expressly declined to address whether statements made to individuals other than law enforcement officials could implicate the confrontation clause. 547 U.S. at 823 n.2, 126 S.Ct. 2266 . ¶ 53 Then in 2011, the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. Bryant . 3 In Bryant , the Court clarified that the primary purpose test was an objective test that requires "[a]n objective analysis of the circumstances of an encounter and the statements and actions of the parties to it," rather than "the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter." 562 U.S. a