confrontation clause in Florida

2012Our supreme court has opined, in a case involving very different facts, that one circumstance which satisfies the confrontation requirement is "where the opportunity [for cross-examination] is exercised, is more than 'de minimis,' and is 'the equivalent of signifi cant cross-examination.' " State v. Contreras, 979 So.2d 896, 909 (Fla.2008) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70, 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)).

2012Our supreme court has opined, in a case involving very different facts, that one circumstance which satisfies the confrontation requirement is "where the opportunity [for cross-examination] is exercised, is more than 'de minimis,' and is 'the equivalent of signifi cant cross-examination.' " State v. Contreras, 979 So.2d 896, 909 (Fla.2008) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70, 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)).

1996As the Supreme Court explained in Cruz , the defendant's own confession may be considered on appeal in assessing whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless. 481 U.S. at 193-94 , 107 S.Ct. at 1719-20.

1994See generally Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193-94 , 107 S.Ct. at 1719 (interlocking nature of confessions "may be considered on appeal in assessing whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless") (citation omitted).

2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing

2008The Rodgers majority cited Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 43 (Fla.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 859 , 121 S.Ct. 145 , 148 L.Ed.2d 96 (2000), for the proposition that "the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial." See also Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 917 (Fla.2000) (stating that the confrontation clause applies to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1155 , 121 S.Ct. 1104 , 148 L.Ed.2d 975 (2001); Engle v. State, 438 So.2d 803, 814 (Fla. 1983) (holding that a defendant has the right to confrontation and cross-examination of the author i

2024See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 (“The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts.

2020Finally, there was no Confrontation Clause violation because the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 59 n.9 (2004).

2001See also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 720 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (acknowledging that an exception to the confrontation requirement exists where the witness is unavailable and has been cross-examined *444 by the defendant at prior judicial proceeding).

2001See also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 720 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (acknowledging that an exception to the confrontation requirement exists where the witness is unavailable and has been cross-examined *444 by the defendant at prior judicial proceeding).

2024But, regardless, the effect of overturning Roberts was that the Confrontation Clause analysis was restored to its original common law understanding, except in the factual circumstances applicable in Craig—where “a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 ; see also State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 902 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing that “[i]n Crawford, the Supreme Court dispensed with the Roberts reliabilit

2024But, regardless, the effect of overturning Roberts was that the Confrontation Clause analysis was restored to its original common law understanding, except in the factual circumstances applicable in Craig—where “a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 ; see also State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 902 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing that “[i]n Crawford, the Supreme Court dispensed with the Roberts reliabilit

2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing

2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing

2016However, “[w]hen new material is developed on redirect examination, reeross-examination must be allowed.” Bordelon v. State, 908 So.2d 543, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “[D]enying recross effectively denies the opposing party the right to any cross examination on the new matter and, thus, violates the confrontation clause.” Kelly v. State, 842 So.2d 223, 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1518 (11th Cir.1994)).

2016This Court held in Kelly v. State, 842 So.2d 223, 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), that “when new matters are introduced during redirect examination, denying recross effectively denies the opposing party the right to any cross examination on the new matter and, thus, violates the confrontation clause.” See also Bordelon v. State, 908 So.2d 543, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“When new material is developed on redirect examination, recross-examination must be allowed.”).

2012We have “repeatedly held that ‘in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, the specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the trial court.’ ” Kokal v. State, 901 So.2d 766, 778-79 (Fla.2005) (quoting Bertolotti v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1095, 1096 (Fla.1987)); see also Schoenwetter, 931 So.2d at 871 (holding that in order to preserve a Confrontation Clause challenge for appeal, a defendant must object on Confrontation Clause grounds in the trial court).

2012We have “repeatedly held that ‘in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, the specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the trial court.’ ” Kokal v. State, 901 So.2d 766, 778-79 (Fla.2005) (quoting Bertolotti v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1095, 1096 (Fla.1987)); see also Schoenwetter, 931 So.2d at 871 (holding that in order to preserve a Confrontation Clause challenge for appeal, a defendant must object on Confrontation Clause grounds in the trial court).

2002See generally Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988)(reversing judgment against defendant convicted of lascivious acts with a child and remanding for determination of whether the Confrontation Clause error was harmless; although the Iowa statute at issue permitted testimony by a child behind a screen in the courtroom, there were no individualized findings by the trial court that these particular witnesses needed special protection).

2002See generally Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988)(reversing judgment against defendant convicted of lascivious acts with a child and remanding for determination of whether the Confrontation Clause error was harmless; although the Iowa statute at issue permitted testimony by a child behind a screen in the courtroom, there were no individualized findings by the trial court that these particular witnesses needed special protection).

1988The notice shall include a written statement of the content of the child's statement, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement. (c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its ruling under this subsection. [2] The sixth amendment's confrontation clause, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), provide

1988The notice shall include a written statement of the content of the child's statement, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement. (c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its ruling under this subsection. [2] The sixth amendment's confrontation clause, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), provide

2006See Perez v. State, 536 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1988).

2004Perez v. State, 536 So.2d 206 (Fla.1988).

1991Additionally, the court in United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 , 108 S.Ct. 838 , 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988), held that the confrontation clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination in whatever way the defendant might wish.

1991Additionally, the court in United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 , 108 S.Ct. 838 , 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988), held that the confrontation clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination in whatever way the defendant might wish.

2024Thus, a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless if the State can prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict[.]” Id. (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986)).

2024Thus, a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless if the State can prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict[.]” Id. (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986)).

2013In Oliver , trial counsel objected to the use of the screen but did not raise the specific argument that the screen was “inherently prejudicial.” Notwithstanding the reference to fundamental error, the objection in Oliver was sufficient to preserve the issue. 125 So.3d at 246 n. 2 (citing Hopkins v. State, 632 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Fla.1994), where the confrontation clause objection was also found sufficient to preserve a similar issue).

2007The Hopkins court first addressed the trial court's lack of findings under section 92.54 and held that the defendant's confrontation clause objection encompassed the trial court's lack of findings as required under the statutory procedures intended to protect the defendant's right to confrontation. 632 So.2d at 1375 .

2005See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992).

2005See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992).

1997See § 90.803(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (1995). [8] The corollary provision of the Federal Evidence Code is found under rule 804(b)(3). [9] The Supreme Court planted the seed for its reasoning set out in Williamson in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 , 106 S.Ct. 2056 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), where it rejected the State of Illinois' categorization of the codefendant's confession as a simple "declaration against penal interest." The Court explained that this specific hearsay exception "defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." Lee at 544 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. at 2063-64 n. 5. [10]

1997See § 90.803(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (1995). [8] The corollary provision of the Federal Evidence Code is found under rule 804(b)(3). [9] The Supreme Court planted the seed for its reasoning set out in Williamson in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 , 106 S.Ct. 2056 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), where it rejected the State of Illinois' categorization of the codefendant's confession as a simple "declaration against penal interest." The Court explained that this specific hearsay exception "defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." Lee at 544 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. at 2063-64 n. 5. [10]

2020McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 613, 637 (Fla. 2010).

2017See McWatters, 36 So.3d at 637 .

2024But, regardless, the effect of overturning Roberts was that the Confrontation Clause analysis was restored to its original common law understanding, except in the factual circumstances applicable in Craig—where “a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 ; see also State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 902 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing that “[i]n Crawford, the Supreme Court dispensed with the Roberts reliabilit

2024But, regardless, the effect of overturning Roberts was that the Confrontation Clause analysis was restored to its original common law understanding, except in the factual circumstances applicable in Craig—where “a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 ; see also State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 902 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing that “[i]n Crawford, the Supreme Court dispensed with the Roberts reliabilit

1988At the time of trial this appeared to be permissible under Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 , 99 S.Ct. 2132 , 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979), where a plurality of the court held that interlocking confessions of codefendants could be introduced in a joint trial as an exception to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), without violating the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, provided the jury was instructed that the codefendant's statement could only be used against the codefendant.

1988At the time of trial this appeared to be permissible under Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 , 99 S.Ct. 2132 , 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979), where a plurality of the court held that interlocking confessions of codefendants could be introduced in a joint trial as an exception to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), without violating the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, provided the jury was instructed that the codefendant's statement could only be used against the codefendant.

1992See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 , 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

1990Cruz held that where a non-testifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant was not directly admissible against the defendant, the confrontation clause barred its admission at their joint trial even if the jury was instructed not to consider it against the defendant and even if the defendant’s own admission was admitted against him. 481 U.S. at 193-94 , 107 S.Ct. at 1719 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 172 .

2024Thus, a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless if the State can prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict[.]” Id. (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986)).

2024Thus, a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless if the State can prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict[.]” Id. (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986)).

2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing

2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing

1999Although state hearsay rules protect similar values, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the United States Supreme Court has been careful not to equate a hearsay violation with a Confrontation Clause violation.

1999Although state hearsay rules protect similar values, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the United States Supreme Court has been careful not to equate a hearsay violation with a Confrontation Clause violation.