confrontation clause in Virgin Islands

2017Ed. 2d 314 (2009) (holding admission of “certificates of analysis” violated the confrontation clause when admitted in the absence of the forensic analyst who produced them, even though the certificates were admissible under state rules of evidence); United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 76-77 (3d Cir. 2008); accord, Jeffrey L.

2011Moreover, the exhibits were “not offered for the truth of the matter[] asserted therein.” Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 80 .

2017LEXIS 4573 , at *19 n. 11 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2005) (unpublished) (failure to object to admission of victim’s statement did not cause Confrontation Clause issue to be invited error); cf. People ex rel R.A.S, 111 P.3d 487, 491 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (stipulation that witness is incompetent to testify does not establish waiver to right of confrontation).

2017Jarvis as a prosecution witness after the breathalyzer report was admitted into evidence through Office Charles’s testimony. 3 United States v. Clark, 480 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Hughey, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1383 , 240 Cal. Rptr. 269, 273 (1987); see also Parker v. State, 779 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defense counsel is not required to raise Confrontation Clause challenge at the time the out-of-court statement is admitted into evidence, since the prosecution can call the witness at any time prior to the end of its case).

2017Jarvis as a prosecution witness after the breathalyzer report was admitted into evidence through Office Charles’s testimony. 3 United States v. Clark, 480 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Hughey, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1383 , 240 Cal. Rptr. 269, 273 (1987); see also Parker v. State, 779 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defense counsel is not required to raise Confrontation Clause challenge at the time the out-of-court statement is admitted into evidence, since the prosecution can call the witness at any time prior to the end of its case).

2017Jarvis as a prosecution witness after the breathalyzer report was admitted into evidence through Office Charles’s testimony. 3 United States v. Clark, 480 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Hughey, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1383 , 240 Cal. Rptr. 269, 273 (1987); see also Parker v. State, 779 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defense counsel is not required to raise Confrontation Clause challenge at the time the out-of-court statement is admitted into evidence, since the prosecution can call the witness at any time prior to the end of its case).

2017Jarvis as a prosecution witness after the breathalyzer report was admitted into evidence through Office Charles’s testimony. 3 United States v. Clark, 480 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Hughey, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1383 , 240 Cal. Rptr. 269, 273 (1987); see also Parker v. State, 779 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defense counsel is not required to raise Confrontation Clause challenge at the time the out-of-court statement is admitted into evidence, since the prosecution can call the witness at any time prior to the end of its case).

2017See NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d 12,16 (9th Cir. 1969) (“We know of no theory of waiver which requires the doing of a futile act to preserve a right not dependent on and only tangentially related to the act.”); Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712 , 724 n.14 (7th Cir. 1968) (“[I]t is not required that parties engage in the futile act of objecting to the admission of evidence in order to preserve the right on review to urge that the agency’s order is not based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”).

2017See NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d 12,16 (9th Cir. 1969) (“We know of no theory of waiver which requires the doing of a futile act to preserve a right not dependent on and only tangentially related to the act.”); Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712 , 724 n.14 (7th Cir. 1968) (“[I]t is not required that parties engage in the futile act of objecting to the admission of evidence in order to preserve the right on review to urge that the agency’s order is not based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”).

2017Jarvis as a prosecution witness after the breathalyzer report was admitted into evidence through Office Charles’s testimony. 3 United States v. Clark, 480 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Hughey, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1383 , 240 Cal. Rptr. 269, 273 (1987); see also Parker v. State, 779 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defense counsel is not required to raise Confrontation Clause challenge at the time the out-of-court statement is admitted into evidence, since the prosecution can call the witness at any time prior to the end of its case).

2017Jarvis as a prosecution witness after the breathalyzer report was admitted into evidence through Office Charles’s testimony. 3 United States v. Clark, 480 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Hughey, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1383 , 240 Cal. Rptr. 269, 273 (1987); see also Parker v. State, 779 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defense counsel is not required to raise Confrontation Clause challenge at the time the out-of-court statement is admitted into evidence, since the prosecution can call the witness at any time prior to the end of its case).

2017Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, 57 V.I. 596, 609 (2012) (“[S]o long as the Superior Court possesses the authority to issue an order granting or denying relief, it unquestionably possesses the authority to alter its decision prior to entry of judgment.”); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 , 632 n.6, 100 S. Ct. 2382 , 65 L.

2017Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, 57 V.I. 596, 609 (2012) (“[S]o long as the Superior Court possesses the authority to issue an order granting or denying relief, it unquestionably possesses the authority to alter its decision prior to entry of judgment.”); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 , 632 n.6, 100 S. Ct. 2382 , 65 L.

2017Ed. 2d 154 (2012); accord, Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 855 (Ind. 2013) (“[T]here is no Confrontation Clause violation where the State introduces evidence and links in the chain of custody are missing ... .

2017Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, 57 V.I. 596, 609 (2012) (“[S]o long as the Superior Court possesses the authority to issue an order granting or denying relief, it unquestionably possesses the authority to alter its decision prior to entry of judgment.”); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 , 632 n.6, 100 S. Ct. 2382 , 65 L.

2017Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, 57 V.I. 596, 609 (2012) (“[S]o long as the Superior Court possesses the authority to issue an order granting or denying relief, it unquestionably possesses the authority to alter its decision prior to entry of judgment.”); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 , 632 n.6, 100 S. Ct. 2382 , 65 L.

2015Further, “[s]o long as the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) are met, government agents may testify about a prior statement of identification made by a witness who ‘identified the defendant in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.’ ” United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (a law enforcement agent’s “statement that the defendant was the person portrayed in the photograph that the witness identified is a

2015Further, “[s]o long as the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) are met, government agents may testify about a prior statement of identification made by a witness who ‘identified the defendant in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.’ ” United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (a law enforcement agent’s “statement that the defendant was the person portrayed in the photograph that the witness identified is a

2015Further, “[s]o long as the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) are met, government agents may testify about a prior statement of identification made by a witness who ‘identified the defendant in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.’ ” United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (a law enforcement agent’s “statement that the defendant was the person portrayed in the photograph that the witness identified is a

2015Further, “[s]o long as the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) are met, government agents may testify about a prior statement of identification made by a witness who ‘identified the defendant in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.’ ” United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (a law enforcement agent’s “statement that the defendant was the person portrayed in the photograph that the witness identified is a

2015This is because “the Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” George v. People, 59 V.I. 368, 380-82 (V.I. 2013) (quoting Owens, 484 U.S. at 559-60 ) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also United States v. Keeter, 130 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme Court’s point [in Owens] was that the confrontation clause (and the rule) are satisfied when the witness must look the accused in the eye in cour

2015This is because “the Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” George v. People, 59 V.I. 368, 380-82 (V.I. 2013) (quoting Owens, 484 U.S. at 559-60 ) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also United States v. Keeter, 130 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme Court’s point [in Owens] was that the confrontation clause (and the rule) are satisfied when the witness must look the accused in the eye in cour

2012See id. at 2532.

2012See United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding a new trial is appropriate remedy if Confrontation Clause error was not harmless).

2010Compare Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (holding that a trial court violated Confrontation Clause when it prohibited all inquiry by defendant into prosecution witness’s possible bias) with Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1296 (holding no Confrontation Clause violation when court barred questions directed to prosecution’s witnesses because defendant’s cross-examination of employees “exposed facts that were more than sufficient to allow the jury to draw inferences about their reliability and to allow [the defendant] to fully argue that they were indeed biased.”).

2010Compare Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (holding that a trial court violated Confrontation Clause when it prohibited all inquiry by defendant into prosecution witness’s possible bias) with Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1296 (holding no Confrontation Clause violation when court barred questions directed to prosecution’s witnesses because defendant’s cross-examination of employees “exposed facts that were more than sufficient to allow the jury to draw inferences about their reliability and to allow [the defendant] to fully argue that they were indeed biased.”).