confrontation clause in Rhode Island

1984The United States Supreme Court recognizes the right of cross-examination as a primary interest secured by the confrontation clause and “the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974).

1984The United States Supreme Court recognizes the right of cross-examination as a primary interest secured by the confrontation clause and “the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974).

1998This Court has long recognized that a defendant’s right encompassed within the confrontation clause, while fundamentally a trial right and not a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery, nonetheless should not restrict a defendant’s ability to adequately prepare for the cross-examination of the state’s trial witnesses. 12 In re Douglas L., 625 A.2d 1357, 1360 (R.I.1993)(citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 , 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937 (1965)).

1998This Court has long recognized that a defendant’s right encompassed within the confrontation clause, while fundamentally a trial right and not a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery, nonetheless should not restrict a defendant’s ability to adequately prepare for the cross-examination of the state’s trial witnesses. 12 In re Douglas L., 625 A.2d 1357, 1360 (R.I.1993)(citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 , 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937 (1965)).

2001We have held repeatedly “that the right to cross-examination is guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (quoting State v. Dame, 488 A.2d 418, 423 (R.I.1985) and citing State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 552 (R.I.1982)).

2001We have held repeatedly "that the right to cross-examination is guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment." Id. (quoting State v. Dame, 488 A.2d 418, 423 (R.I.1985) and citing State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 552 (R.I.1982)).

2016As such, the “trial justice has no discretion at all under the confrontation clause to completely prohibit defense counsel from attempting to elicit testimony from a crucial witness to demon-, strate bias upon his part.” Id. (quoting Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357 (emphasis omitted)); “For cross-examination to satisfy constitutional guarantees, the trial justice is required to afford the accused ‘reasonable latitude’ to establish or reveal bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives as they may relate to the case being tried.” Id. at 1122-23 (quoting State v. Hazard, 745 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I.2000)). “[0]nce

2016As such, the “trial justice has no discretion at all under the confrontation clause to completely prohibit defense counsel from attempting to elicit testimony from a crucial witness to demon-, strate bias upon his part.” Id. (quoting Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357 (emphasis omitted)); “For cross-examination to satisfy constitutional guarantees, the trial justice is required to afford the accused ‘reasonable latitude’ to establish or reveal bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives as they may relate to the case being tried.” Id. at 1122-23 (quoting State v. Hazard, 745 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I.2000)). “[0]nce

2000Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 , 100 S.Ct. at 2543 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 613 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 , 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968) (“[A] witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the * * * exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutional authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial”)).

2000Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 , 100 S.Ct. at 2543 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 613 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 , 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968) (“[A] witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the * * * exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutional authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial”)).

2001We have held repeatedly “that the right to cross-examination is guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (quoting State v. Dame, 488 A.2d 418, 423 (R.I.1985) and citing State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 552 (R.I.1982)).

2001We have held repeatedly "that the right to cross-examination is guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment." Id. (quoting State v. Dame, 488 A.2d 418, 423 (R.I.1985) and citing State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 552 (R.I.1982)).

1998State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149, 1153 (R.I.1984) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974)).

1998State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149, 1153 (R.I. 1984) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974)).

1981In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 , 91 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213, 222 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause was not necessarily violated by the admission of hearsay testimony under the coconspirator exception.

1981In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 , 91 S.Ct. 210, 215 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213, 222 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause was not necessarily violated by the admission of hearsay testimony under the coconspirator exception.

1981Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965).

1981Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 , 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965).

1984In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the Court defined the threefold purpose of the confrontation requirement: (1) to ensure reliability by means of an oath; (2) to expose the witness to the probe of cross-examination; and (3) to permit the trier of fact to weigh the demeanor of the witness.

1984In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the Court defined the threefold purpose of the confrontation requirement: (1) to ensure reliability by means of an oath; (2) to expose the witness to the probe of cross-examination; and (3) to permit the trier of fact to weigh the demeanor of the witness.

2025See, e.g., State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 580 (R.I. 2009) (“After carefully reviewing the record, we are unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in this case was harmless.”); State v. Doctor, 644 A.2d 1287, 1290 (R.I. 1994) (discussing the right to cross-examine as well as the case of Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), and then concluding that “[i]n the present case we cannot find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872, 874-75 (R.I. 1987); State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349, 1358 n.5 (R.I. 1984). - 35 - Supreme Co

2025See, e.g., State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 580 (R.I. 2009) (“After carefully reviewing the record, we are unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in this case was harmless.”); State v. Doctor, 644 A.2d 1287, 1290 (R.I. 1994) (discussing the right to cross-examine as well as the case of Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), and then concluding that “[i]n the present case we cannot find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872, 874-75 (R.I. 1987); State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349 , 1358 n.5 (R.I. 1984). - 35 - Supreme C

2001This Court repeatedly has stressed the importance that both the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions attach to a defendant’s confrontation rights; but those protections “ensure that a criminal defendant has the right to confront those who testify against him or her at trial.” State v. Olsen, 610 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I.1992) (emphasis added); see also State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1372 (R.I.1984) (“the right of cross-examination is a primary interest secured by the confrontation clause, it being the principal means by which to test the truth and veracity of a witness’s testimony”).

1987Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 , 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937 (1965); State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872 (R.I.1987); State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367 (R.I.1984); State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149 (R.I.1984); State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549 (R.I.1982); State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921 (R.I.1980); State v. Benevides, 420 A.2d 65 (R.I.1980).

2000Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 , 100 S.Ct. at 2543 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 613 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 , 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968) (“[A] witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the * * * exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutional authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial”)).

2000Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 , 100 S.Ct. at 2543 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 613 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 , 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968) (“[A] witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the * * * exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutional authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial”)).

1998The majority correctly reiterates the general rule that the confrontation clause is fundamentally a trial right and should not be confused with a “constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 , 107 S.Ct. 989, 999 , 94 L,Ed.2d 40, 54 (1987).

1998The majority correctly reiterates the general rule that the confrontation clause is fundamentally a trial right and should not be confused with a “constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 , 107 S.Ct. 989, 999 , 94 L,Ed.2d 40, 54 (1987).

2026Nevertheless, Vasquez argues that, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), discussed infra, issued during the pendency of his appeal, the state’s failure to present Vele as a witness violated the Confrontation Clause. 6 “When an intervening decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine, counsel’s failure to raise the issue at trial will not preclude our review.” State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1240 (R.I. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.

2026Nevertheless, Vasquez argues that, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), discussed infra, issued during the pendency of his appeal, the state’s failure to present Vele as a witness violated the Confrontation Clause. 6 “When an intervening decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine, counsel’s failure to raise the issue at trial will not preclude our review.” State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1240 (R.I. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.

2025See, e.g., State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 580 (R.I. 2009) (“After carefully reviewing the record, we are unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in this case was harmless.”); State v. Doctor, 644 A.2d 1287, 1290 (R.I. 1994) (discussing the right to cross-examine as well as the case of Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), and then concluding that “[i]n the present case we cannot find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872, 874-75 (R.I. 1987); State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349, 1358 n.5 (R.I. 1984). - 35 - Supreme Co

2025See, e.g., State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 580 (R.I. 2009) (“After carefully reviewing the record, we are unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in this case was harmless.”); State v. Doctor, 644 A.2d 1287, 1290 (R.I. 1994) (discussing the right to cross-examine as well as the case of Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), and then concluding that “[i]n the present case we cannot find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872, 874-75 (R.I. 1987); State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349 , 1358 n.5 (R.I. 1984). - 35 - Supreme C

2025In the leading case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the United States 2 Even though the majority has decided not to rule directly on the Confrontation Clause issue in this case, I would note that this Court has historically been assiduously vigilant about recognizing the quasi-sanctity of the constitutionally based right to cross-examine and has not been hesitant to reverse a conviction when there has been a violation of the Confrontation Clause and the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error was truly harmless.

2025In the leading case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the United States 2 Even though the majority has decided not to rule directly on the Confrontation Clause issue in this case, I would note that this Court has historically been assiduously vigilant about recognizing the quasi-sanctity of the constitutionally based right to cross-examine and has not been hesitant to reverse a conviction when there has been a violation of the Confrontation Clause and the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error was truly harmless.

2025See, e.g., State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 580 (R.I. 2009) (“After carefully reviewing the record, we are unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in this case was harmless.”); State v. Doctor, 644 A.2d 1287, 1290 (R.I. 1994) (discussing the right to cross-examine as well as the case of Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), and then concluding that “[i]n the present case we cannot find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872, 874-75 (R.I. 1987); State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349, 1358 n.5 (R.I. 1984). - 35 - Supreme Co

2025See, e.g., State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 580 (R.I. 2009) (“After carefully reviewing the record, we are unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in this case was harmless.”); State v. Doctor, 644 A.2d 1287, 1290 (R.I. 1994) (discussing the right to cross-examine as well as the case of Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), and then concluding that “[i]n the present case we cannot find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872, 874-75 (R.I. 1987); State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349 , 1358 n.5 (R.I. 1984). - 35 - Supreme C

2022See State v. Johnson, 251 A.3d 872 , 885 (R.I. 2021) (determining that the defendant waived his Confrontation Clause claim because he failed to raise a Confrontation Clause argument at trial and, instead, argued for the admission of the cross-examination on other grounds); State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228, 234-35 (R.I. 2008) (concluding that the defendant failed to preserve a Confrontation Clause issue concerning a witness’s motive and bias when the record indicated that cross-examination at trial focused only on character evidence).

2016As such, the “trial justice has no discretion at all under the confrontation clause to completely prohibit defense counsel from attempting to elicit testimony from a crucial witness to demon-, strate bias upon his part.” Id. (quoting Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357 (emphasis omitted)); “For cross-examination to satisfy constitutional guarantees, the trial justice is required to afford the accused ‘reasonable latitude’ to establish or reveal bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives as they may relate to the case being tried.” Id. at 1122-23 (quoting State v. Hazard, 745 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I.2000)). “[0]nce

2016Thus, when “the trial justice does not totally prevent or completely prohibit the defendant from exploring the issues of motive, bias, or prejudice of the witness, we employ an abuse-of-diseretion standard on review.” Id. at 1122, “It is well settled that this Court will not disturb a. trial justice’s ruling on an evidentiary issue unless that ruling constitutes an abuse of the justice’s discretion that prejudices the complaining party.” Thomas v. Proctor, 63 A.3d 881, 884 (R.I.2013) (quoting State v. Tetreault, 31 A.3d 777, 782 (R.I.2011)). 2.

2016Thus, when “the trial justice does not totally prevent or completely prohibit the defendant from exploring the issues of motive, bias, or prejudice of the witness, we employ an abuse-of-diseretion standard on review.” Id. at 1122, “It is well settled that this Court will not disturb a. trial justice’s ruling on an evidentiary issue unless that ruling constitutes an abuse of the justice’s discretion that prejudices the complaining party.” Thomas v. Proctor, 63 A.3d 881, 884 (R.I.2013) (quoting State v. Tetreault, 31 A.3d 777, 782 (R.I.2011)). 2.