confrontation clause in Missouri

2023But “falling within a hearsay exception does not resolve the Confrontation Clause issue because Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)] divorced the hearsay exceptions from the Confrontation Clause analysis.” State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007).

2023But “falling within a hearsay exception does not resolve the Confrontation Clause issue because Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)] divorced the hearsay exceptions from the Confrontation Clause analysis.” State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007).

2022“The Confrontation Clause analysis thus centers on whether the particular evidence at issue is ‘testimonial’ in nature.” Id. (quoting Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Mo. banc 2007)). “[A] testimonial out-of-court statement is not admissible against the defendant under the Confrontation Clause unless the requirements of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 [ ] (2004), are met.” Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 535 (internal citation omitted).

2022“The Confrontation Clause analysis thus centers on whether the particular evidence at issue is ‘testimonial’ in nature.” Id. (quoting Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Mo. banc 2007)). “[A] testimonial out-of-court statement is not admissible against the defendant under the Confrontation Clause unless the requirements of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 [ ] (2004), are met.” Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 535 (internal citation omitted).

2023Cf. State v. Hill, 247 S.W.3d 34, 42 (Mo.App. 2008) (holding that minor inconsistencies in child molestation victims’ out-of-court statements—including a victim’s denial of touching to a CAC specialist after victim had made allegations of touching to parents and police—did not prevent a confrontation clause violation involving victims’ trial testimony from being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2021Id. at 1021-22 ; accord Hill, 247 S.W.3d at 42 (“[w]e evaluate harmlessness by reviewing the remaining evidence” separate from the testimony affected by Confrontation Clause violation). 18 In this case, all of the live testimony was taken in violation of C.A.R.A.’s right to confrontation.

1997“An exception to the confrontation requirement exists where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony which was subject to cross-examination at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant.” State v. Holt, 592 S.W.2d at 765 .

1984Contrary to the allegations of the defendant in that case that the admissibility violated the defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine the witness in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the court found that “[a]n exception to the confrontation requirement exists where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony which was subject to cross-examination at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant.” State v. Holt, 592 S.W.2d at 765 .

2003“The confrontation clause does not apply to a postconviction relief hearing.” Leisure, 828 S.W.2d at 878 (citing Cain v. State, 780 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Mo.App.

2003“The confrontation clause does not apply to a postconviction relief hearing.” Leisure, 828 S.W.2d at 878 (citing Cain v. State, 780 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Mo.App.

2023But “falling within a hearsay exception does not resolve the Confrontation Clause issue because Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)] divorced the hearsay exceptions from the Confrontation Clause analysis.” State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007).

2023But “falling within a hearsay exception does not resolve the Confrontation Clause issue because Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)] divorced the hearsay exceptions from the Confrontation Clause analysis.” State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007).

2008The Supreme Court of Missouri held in State v. Griffin, 848 S.W.2d 464, 470 (Mo. banc 1993): Testimony given at a properly held preliminary hearing satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial.

2007Nonetheless, Missouri confrontation jurisprudence rests upon the general rule that “[testimony given at a properly held preliminary hearing satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial.” Griffin, 848 S.W.2d at 470 .

2003“The confrontation clause does not apply to a postconviction relief hearing.” Leisure, 828 S.W.2d at 878 (citing Cain v. State, 780 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Mo.App.

1994The confrontation clause does not apply to a post-conviction relief hearing.” Leisure v. State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 343 , 121 L.Ed.2d 259 (1992).

2022“A hearsay objection does not preserve constitutional claims relating to the same testimony.” State v. Minner, 311 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (finding the defendant’s hearsay objection at trial did not preserve his claim on appeal that the hearsay was testimonial and thus violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause); see also State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Mo. banc 2007) (Although the Confrontation Clause analysis “is similar to the hearsay analysis, this is a separate and distinct evidentiary determination.”); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007) (“falling

2022“A hearsay objection does not preserve constitutional claims relating to the same testimony.” State v. Minner, 311 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (finding the defendant’s hearsay objection at trial did not preserve his claim on appeal that the hearsay was testimonial and thus violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause); see also State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Mo. banc 2007) (Although the Confrontation Clause analysis “is similar to the hearsay analysis, this is a separate and distinct evidentiary determination.”); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007) (“falling

2020“Whether testimony violates the confrontation clause is a question of law this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 896 (Mo. banc 2015). 16 Prior to trial, the state filed a motion informing Loper it intended to introduce E.S.L.’s statements about her wrist injury to first responders as excited utterances, to which Loper objected.

2015Point II “The question of whether a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated by a ruling of the trial court is a question of law that we review de novo.” State v. Hill, 247 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Mo.App.E.D.2008) (citing State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 664-65 (Mo. banc 2007)); see also State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 896 (Mo. banc 2015) (“Whether testimony violates the confrontation clause is a question of law this Court reviews de novo.”).

2016State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 881 (Mo. banc 2006).

2016State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 881 (Mo. banc 2006).

1991Relying largely on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the Court held that the admission of the out-of-court statement of the child would not violate the confrontation clause if there are “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” drawn from the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the de-clarant particularly worthy of belief.

1991Relying largely on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the Court held that the admission of the out-of-court statement of the child would not violate the confrontation clause if there are “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” drawn from the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the de-clarant particularly worthy of belief.

2022“The Confrontation Clause analysis thus centers on whether the particular evidence at issue is ‘testimonial’ in nature.” Id. (quoting Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Mo. banc 2007)). “[A] testimonial out-of-court statement is not admissible against the defendant under the Confrontation Clause unless the requirements of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 [ ] (2004), are met.” Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 535 (internal citation omitted).

2022“The Confrontation Clause analysis thus centers on whether the particular evidence at issue is ‘testimonial’ in nature.” Id. (quoting Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Mo. banc 2007)). “[A] testimonial out-of-court statement is not admissible against the defendant under the Confrontation Clause unless the requirements of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 [ ] (2004), are met.” Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 535 (internal citation omitted).

2011The fact that a witness’s testimony is unsatisfactory does not render the witness unavailable. 3 The confrontation clause only guarantees “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-ex *478 amination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 , 108 S.Ct. 838 , 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987).

2011The fact that a witness’s testimony is unsatisfactory does not render the witness unavailable. 3 The confrontation clause only guarantees “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-ex *478 amination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 , 108 S.Ct. 838 , 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987).

2000See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).

2000See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).

1981As appellant says, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), requires that under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a defendant be allowed to cross-examine the state’s witnesses on the issues of bias and interest.

1981As appellant says, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), requires that under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a defendant be allowed to cross-examine the state’s witnesses on the issues of bias and interest.

1992See White v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992), and United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986).

1992See White v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992), and United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986).

2022“Where the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and to submit to cross- examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion that the admission of his out- of-court statements does not create a confrontation problem.” [California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).] “[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.” [ Id. at 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930 .] State v. Kleeschulte, 618 S.W.3d 246 , 251–52

2022“Where the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and to submit to cross- examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion that the admission of his out- of-court statements does not create a confrontation problem.” [California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).] “[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.” [ Id. at 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930 .] State v. Kleeschulte, 618 S.W.3d 246 , 251–52

2022“A hearsay objection does not preserve constitutional claims relating to the same testimony.” State v. Minner, 311 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (finding the defendant’s hearsay objection at trial did not preserve his claim on appeal that the hearsay was testimonial and thus violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause); see also State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Mo. banc 2007) (Although the Confrontation Clause analysis “is similar to the hearsay analysis, this is a separate and distinct evidentiary determination.”); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007) (“falling

2022“A hearsay objection does not preserve constitutional claims relating to the same testimony.” State v. Minner, 311 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (finding the defendant’s hearsay objection at trial did not preserve his claim on appeal that the hearsay was testimonial and thus violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause); see also State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Mo. banc 2007) (Although the Confrontation Clause analysis “is similar to the hearsay analysis, this is a separate and distinct evidentiary determination.”); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007) (“falling

2020See Williams, 567 U.S. at 57–58, 132 S.Ct. at 2228 (finding that there was no Confrontation Clause violation where a lab report admitted at trial “was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against [defendant], who was not even under suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on the loose.”).

2020See Williams, 567 U.S. at 57–58, 132 S.Ct. at 2228 (finding that there was no Confrontation Clause violation where a lab report admitted at trial “was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against [defendant], who was not even under suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on the loose.”).

2007“Of these guarantees, the ‘primary interest’ secured by ‘the confrontation clause’ is the right of cross-examination.’ ” State v. Foust, 920 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Mo.App.

1997Of these guarantees, “the primary interest secured by ‘the confrontation clause’ is the right of cross-examination.” Id. (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 , 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2662 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987)).

2003State v. Kee, 956 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Mo.App.1997).

1998See Fleming, 451 S.W.2d at 121 ; Kee, 956 S.W.2d at 302 .