generally recognized principle in Michigan

2023First-time trial identifications—which are essentially formalized showups—fall comfortably within that category. 18 Moreover, as 17 Notably, while there is caselaw highlighting the hidden nature of pretrial identification procedures and the importance of effective trial scrutiny of such identifications, see United States v Wade, 388 US 218 ; 87 S Ct 1926 ; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967), the generally recognized factors for assessing reliability and whether there was an independent basis for an in-court identification do not account for the ability (or lack thereof) of the defendant and the jury to pe

2023First-time trial identifications—which are essentially formalized showups—fall comfortably within that category. 18 Moreover, as 17 Notably, while there is caselaw highlighting the hidden nature of pretrial identification procedures and the importance of effective trial scrutiny of such identifications, see United States v Wade, 388 US 218 ; 87 S Ct 1926 ; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967), the generally recognized factors for assessing reliability and whether there was an independent basis for an in-court identification do not account for the ability (or lack thereof) of the defendant and the jury to pe

2023See Manson, 432 US at 114 ; Gray, 457 Mich at 116 .

2023See Manson, 432 US at 114 ; Gray, 457 Mich at 116 .

2013“A generally recognized principle of insurance law is that the burden of proof lies with the insured to show that the policy covered the damage suffered.” Solomon v Royal Maccabees Life Ins Co, 243 Mich App 375, 379 ; 622 NW2d 101 (2000), citing 10 Couch, Insurance (3d ed), § 147:29, p 146-147, and Williams v Detroit Fire & Marine Ins Co, 280 Mich 215, 218 ; 273 NW 452 (1937).

2013“A generally recognized principle of insurance law is that the burden of proof lies with the insured to show that the policy covered the damage suffered.” Solomon v Royal Maccabees Life Ins Co, 243 Mich App 375, 379 ; 622 NW2d 101 (2000), citing 10 Couch, Insurance (3d ed), § 147:29, p 146-147, and Williams v Detroit Fire & Marine Ins Co, 280 Mich 215, 218 ; 273 NW 452 (1937).

2015Moreover, we believe that Joslin’s holding conflicts with the generally recognized principle that “‘[t]here is no doubt the control of a city police department is a function of local municipal government.’” Royal v Police & Fire Comm’n of Ecorse, 345 Mich 214, 219 ; 75 NW2d 841 (1956), quoting Smith v Flint City Comm’n, 258 Mich 698, 700 ; 242 NW 814 (1932).

2015Moreover, we believe that Joslin’s holding conflicts with the generally recognized principle that “‘[t]here is no doubt the control of a city police department is a function of local municipal government.’” Royal v Police & Fire Comm’n of Ecorse, 345 Mich 214, 219 ; 75 NW2d 841 (1956), quoting Smith v Flint City Comm’n, 258 Mich 698, 700 ; 242 NW 814 (1932).

2015Moreover, we believe that Joslin’s holding conflicts with the generally recognized principle that “‘[t]here is no doubt the control of a city police department is a function of local municipal government.’” Royal v Police & Fire Comm’n of Ecorse, 345 Mich 214, 219 ; 75 NW2d 841 (1956), quoting Smith v Flint City Comm’n, 258 Mich 698, 700 ; 242 NW 814 (1932).

2015Moreover, we believe that Joslin’s holding conflicts with the generally recognized principle that “‘[t]here is no doubt the control of a city police department is a function of local municipal government.’” Royal v Police & Fire Comm’n of Ecorse, 345 Mich 214, 219 ; 75 NW2d 841 (1956), quoting Smith v Flint City Comm’n, 258 Mich 698, 700 ; 242 NW 814 (1932).

2015Because the use of the word “may” in MCL 764.15(1) denotes discretionary behavior, see Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 383 ; 751 NW2d 431 (2008), a local police officer has discretion, and is not required by law, to make arrests in connection with violations of state law.

2015Because the use of the word “may” in MCL 764.15(1) denotes discretionary behavior, see Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 383 ; 751 NW2d 431 (2008), a local police officer has discretion, and is not required by law, to make arrests in connection with violations of state law.

2013“A generally recognized principle of insurance law is that the burden of proof lies with the insured to show that the policy covered the damage suffered.” Solomon v Royal Maccabees Life Ins Co, 243 Mich App 375, 379 ; 622 NW2d 101 (2000), citing 10 Couch, Insurance (3d ed), § 147:29, p 146-147, and Williams v Detroit Fire & Marine Ins Co, 280 Mich 215, 218 ; 273 NW 452 (1937).

2013“A generally recognized principle of insurance law is that the burden of proof lies with the insured to show that the policy covered the damage suffered.” Solomon v Royal Maccabees Life Ins Co, 243 Mich App 375, 379 ; 622 NW2d 101 (2000), citing 10 Couch, Insurance (3d ed), § 147:29, p 146-147, and Williams v Detroit Fire & Marine Ins Co, 280 Mich 215, 218 ; 273 NW 452 (1937).

1994Tamulion, supra at 69 . [28] 2 Yet, plaintiffs observe that they have lost much fast land.

1993Case was relied on and explained two years later in People v Kamhout, 227 Mich 172 ; 198 NW 831 (1924).

1993Case was relied on and explained two years later in People v Kamhout, 227 Mich 172 ; 198 NW 831 (1924).

1993In arriving at this conclusion, the Court discussed its constitutional role in determining the "reasonableness" of a search or seizure: Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made. [ Id. at 389 .] In arriving at this conclusion, the Court took guidance from federal authority: The generally recognized rule is fairly stated in the following annotation to 11 Fed Stat Ann (2d ed), p 354: "The ques

1993In arriving at this conclusion, the Court discussed its constitutional role in determining the "reasonableness" of a search or seizure: Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made. [ Id. at 389 .] In arriving at this conclusion, the Court took guidance from federal authority: The generally recognized rule is fairly stated in the following annotation to 11 Fed Stat Ann (2d ed), p 354: "The ques

1983The generally recognized test of governmental immunity is that stated in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183, 200 ; 273 NW2d 413 (1978) (Moody, J., concurring): "[T]he crux of the governmental essence test should be founded upon the inquiry whether the purpose, planning and carrying out of the activity, due to its unique character or governmental mandate, can be effectively accomplished only by the government.

1983The generally recognized test of governmental immunity is that stated in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183, 200 ; 273 NW2d 413 (1978) (Moody, J., concurring): "[T]he crux of the governmental essence test should be founded upon the inquiry whether the purpose, planning and carrying out of the activity, due to its unique character or governmental mandate, can be effectively accomplished only by the government.

1983Unless liability would be an unacceptable interference with government’s ability to govern, activities that fall outside this perimeter, although performed by a government agency, are not governmental functions and therefore not immune.” In Central Advertising Co v Novi, 91 Mich App 303, 317 ; 283 NW2d 730 (1979), the Court held that adoption and enforcement of a regulatory sign ordinance was within the scope of governmental immunity under the foregoing test.

1983Unless liability would be an unacceptable interference with government’s ability to govern, activities that fall outside this perimeter, although performed by a government agency, are not governmental functions and therefore not immune.” In Central Advertising Co v Novi, 91 Mich App 303, 317 ; 283 NW2d 730 (1979), the Court held that adoption and enforcement of a regulatory sign ordinance was within the scope of governmental immunity under the foregoing test.

1976See Nevin v Mercer Casualty Co, 12 Cal App 2d 222; 55 P2d 251 (1936), 20A Insurance Law and Practice, § 11977, pp 412-413.

1972This exception in the context of criminal negligence conforms to the generally recognized exception in criminal cases which permits evidence of prior similar acts to establish motive, intent, common plan or scheme, etc. MCLA 768.27; MSA 28.1050; People v Insley, 36 Mich App 593 (1971).

1972The Thompson exception regarding knowledge then applies to civil cases as held by the courts in Tanis v Eding, 274 Mich 288, 298 (1936), and Freed v Simon, 370 Mich 473, 475 (1963).

1971That a verdict need not be returned in order for jeopardy to attach was pointed out by the Court in People v. Schepps (1925), 231 Mich 260, 265 , 268: “ # * * It may be conceded as a generally recognized rule of bench law when unmodified by constitutional or statutory provision, that jeopardy attaches as soon as a jury is called and sworn for the trial of an accused under a valid indictment or information for a felony. *472 “Under the rule which now obtains in this jurisdiction the accused is prima facie in jeopardy when his trial has been entered upon and progressed through selection and swea

1971The court cannot thereafter through caprice or because of some irritating incident of the trial discharge the jury and call it a mistrial, without raising a bar to subsequent trial for the same offense (People v. Brosky [1923], 222 Mich 651 ).

1939“The business of a real estate broker is, in general, to find a purchaser and, in the absence of express stipulation otherwise, the generally recognized rule is that he has earned his commission when he finds ánd produces a party who is ready, able and willing to take, the property and enter into a valid contract therefor upon the terms made by the principal.” Beatty v. Goodrich, 224 Mich. 538 .

1930We are impressed with a rule that appeals to common sense and which is set forth in People v. Schoenberg, supra, and states the generally recognized principle that an interpretation of a statute which must lead to mischievous and absurd consequences should not be adopted, if the statute is susceptible of another interpretation by which such consequences can be avoided.

1930We are more inclined to follow the rule set forth in Sage v. State, supra, quoted at length in the excerpt in the opinion in People v. Schoenberg, supra, which states that when the same offense is defined in the same way by both the earlier and later statutes, there is no interregnum in which the offense may be committed and the offender absolved.

1925Such was the case in People v. Taylor, 117 Mich. 583 , cited for defendant.

1893Smith v. Bodine, 74 N. Y. 30 ; Leggett v. Hyde, 58 Id. 278; Haas v. Roat, 16 Hun, 527 ; Greenwood v. Brink, 1 Id. 227; Beudel v. Hettrick, 45 How.

1893Smith v. Bodine, 74 N. Y. 30 ; Leggett v. Hyde, 58 Id. 278; Haas v. Roat, 16 Hun, 527 ; Greenwood v. Brink, 1 Id. 227; Beudel v. Hettrick, 45 How.