generally recognized principle in Kansas

2010The generally recognized rule is that a statute which does not purport to establish a civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity is not subject to construction establishing a civil liability." 241 Kan. at 804 , 740 P.2d 606 By 1991, the requirement for the plaintiff to establish an individual right of action to recover under negligence per se had become entrenched in Kansas case law.

2010The generally recognized rule is that a statute which does not purport to establish a civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity is not subject to construction establishing a civil liability." 241 Kan. at 804 , 740 P.2d 606 By 1991, the requirement for the plaintiff to establish an individual right of action to recover under negligence per se had become entrenched in Kansas case law.

2008The Nicholson court further emphasized the generally recognized principle that “a person already in custody cannot be arrested on an outstanding warrant from another county or jurisdiction.” 243 Kan. at 750 (citing Hayes v. United States, 367 F.2d 216, 221 [10th Cir. 1966]; State v. Bowman, 106 Kan. 430, 435-36 , 188 P. 242 [1920]; 6A C.J.S., Arrest § 5).

2008The Nicholson court further emphasized the generally recognized principle that “a person already in custody cannot be arrested on an outstanding warrant from another county or jurisdiction.” 243 Kan. at 750 (citing Hayes v. United States, 367 F.2d 216, 221 [10th Cir. 1966]; State v. Bowman, 106 Kan. 430, 435-36 , 188 P. 242 [1920]; 6A C.J.S., Arrest § 5).

2008The Nicholson court further emphasized the generally recognized principle that “a person already in custody cannot be arrested on an outstanding warrant from another county or jurisdiction.” 243 Kan. at 750 (citing Hayes v. United States, 367 F.2d 216, 221 [10th Cir. 1966]; State v. Bowman, 106 Kan. 430, 435-36 , 188 P. 242 [1920]; 6A C.J.S., Arrest § 5).

2008For these reasons, the court held there was no unreasonable delay in executing the warrant. 243 Kan. at 750-51 .

1995For it must be remembered that we have here a situation dealing not with penalties alone but with the remission of the entire amount of the tax. ‘It is a generally recognized principle of the law of taxation that a statute authorizing the acceptance, directly or indirectly, of a part of the tax in satisfaction of the whole is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection of the laws and as a disregard of the equality and uniformity of treatment of all taxpayers, where it may be applied as a favoritism extended to the property owner, or some one acting for him, and not as a permission to

1995For it must be remembered that we have here a situation dealing not with penalties alone but with the remission of the entire amount of the tax. ‘It is a generally recognized principle of the law of taxation that a statute authorizing the acceptance, directly or indirectly, of a part of the tax in satisfaction of the whole is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection of the laws and as a disregard of the equality and uniformity of treatment of all taxpayers, where it may be applied as a favoritism extended to the property owner, or some one acting for him, and not as a permission to

1995For it must be remembered that we have here a situation dealing not with penalties alone but with the remission of the entire amount of the tax. ‘It is a generally recognized principle of the law of taxation that a statute authorizing the acceptance, directly or indirectly, of a part of the tax in satisfaction of the whole is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection of the laws and as a disregard of the equality and uniformity of treatment of all taxpayers, where it may be applied as a favoritism extended to the property owner, or some one acting for him, and not as a permission to

1969Ed.) Pleadings, § 76; State v. LeVier, 202 Kan. 544 , 451 P. 2d 142 .) The rule is applicable in both civil and criminal proceedings.

1969Ed.) Pleadings, § 76; State v. LeVier, 202 Kan. 544 , 451 P. 2d 142 .) The rule is applicable in both civil and criminal proceedings.

1959It was, on the contrary, based upon the generally recognized rule independent of the statute, and the principal supporting authority was an Illinois equity case of Martin v. Martin (Ill.) 48 N. E. 924 , 62 A. S. R. 411 (in which the general rule was recognized, but the existence of exceptions noted).

1935This is true where the minds fail to meet as to the compensation to be paid.” In the case of Millspaugh v. McKnab, 134 Kan. 579 , 7 P. 2d 51 , it was held: “Where there is an express contract of employment to obtain an oil and gas lease which provides that the compensation of the employee is to be graduated, determined and established by the success of his endeavors and the value of the lease, as shown by developments thereon, and the lease is obtained, recovery may be had for services rendered on the basis of quantum meruit.” (Syl.

1935This is true where the minds fail to meet as to the compensation to be paid.” In the case of Millspaugh v. McKnab, 134 Kan. 579 , 7 P. 2d 51 , it was held: “Where there is an express contract of employment to obtain an oil and gas lease which provides that the compensation of the employee is to be graduated, determined and established by the success of his endeavors and the value of the lease, as shown by developments thereon, and the lease is obtained, recovery may be had for services rendered on the basis of quantum meruit.” (Syl.