generally recognized rule in Minnesota

1986The above-quoted definition of testamentary capacity was explained in In re Estate of Jenks, 291 Minn. 138 , 189 N.W.2d 695 (1971), in which we stated that “[i]t is the generally recognized rule that testamentary capacity requires only that the testator have capacity to know and understand the nature and extent of his bounty, as distinguished from the requirement that he have actual knowledge thereof.” Id. at 141, 189 N.W.2d at 697.

1981The above-quoted definition of testamentary capacity was explained in In re Estate of Jenks, 291 Minn. 138 , 189 N.W.2d 695 (1971), in which we stated that “[i]t is the generally recognized rule that testamentary capacity requires only that the testator have capacity to know and understand the nature and extent of his bounty, as distinguished from the requirement that he have actual knowledge thereof.” Id. at 141, 189 N.W.2d at 697.

1975The Poague case defined entrapment by setting out the parameters of the defense: “* * * The generally recognized principle of entrapment as a defense is well stated in the case of Newman v. United States (4 Cir.) 299 F. 128, 131 , as follows: “ * * When the criminal design originates, not with the accused, but is conceived in the mind of the government officers, and the accused is by persuasion, deceitful representation, or inducement lured into the commission of a criminal act, the government is estopped by sound public policy from prosecution therefor.’ “Entrapment exists where it appears th

1955The generally recognized principle of entrapment as a defense is well stated in the case of Newman v. United States (4 Cir.) 299 F. 128, 131 , as follows: “* * * jt is well settled that decoys may be used to entrap criminals, and to present opportunity to one intending or willing to commit crime.

1999Id. at 460 , 119 N.W. at 405 .

1999Id. at 460 , 119 N.W. at 405 .

1926Fischer v. Johnson, 51 Mo. App. 157 , rules that, as against a mortgagee after foreclosure sale, the mortgagor and his tenant stand on the same footing and says: “The rule, sometimes said to be upheld to encourage agriculture, that a tenant of uncertain tenure should reap what he sows, is not applicable in this state to a mortgagor or a tenant claiming under him, as against the mortgagee.

1926Heavilon v. Farmers Bank, 81 Ind. 249 , cites from 1 Wiashburn, Real Prop. p. 106, what the court deems a generally recognized principle, “that the tenant who sows a crop shall reap it, if the term of his tenancy is uncertain, * * * yet if a mortgagee forecloses his mortgage,, whatever crops are then growing upon the mortgaged premises, if planted after the mortgage is made, become the mortgagee’s, whether planted by the mortgagor or his tenant, free from any claim upon them by such tenant.” That case further holds that, if crops are planted by the mortgagor or tenant after the foreclosure sal

1885Langley v. Chapin, 134 Mass. 82 ; Board of Regents v. Linscott, 30 Kan. 240 ; Robbins v. Barron, 32 Mich. 36 ; 2 Desty on Taxation, 966; Blackwell, Tax Titles, 544, and note; Anderson v. Ryder, 46 Cal. 135 ; Sayles v. Davis, 22Wis. 225; Irwin v. Trego, 22 Pa. St. 368.

1885Langley v. Chapin, 134 Mass. 82 ; Board of Regents v. Linscott, 30 Kan. 240 ; Robbins v. Barron, 32 Mich. 36 ; 2 Desty on Taxation, 966; Blackwell, Tax Titles, 544, and note; Anderson v. Ryder, 46 Cal. 135 ; Sayles v. Davis, 22Wis. 225; Irwin v. Trego, 22 Pa. St. 368.

1885Langley v. Chapin, 134 Mass. 82 ; Board of Regents v. Linscott, 30 Kan. 240 ; Robbins v. Barron, 32 Mich. 36 ; 2 Desty on Taxation, 966; Blackwell, Tax Titles, 544, and note; Anderson v. Ryder, 46 Cal. 135 ; Sayles v. Davis, 22Wis. 225; Irwin v. Trego, 22 Pa. St. 368.