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5 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1939–1982 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wasko v. Frankelgreen2 sentences1982See, e.g., Wasko v. Frankel, 116 Ariz. 288 , 569 P.2d 230 (1977); Moorer v. Clayton Manufacturing Corporation, 128 Ariz. 565 , 627 P.2d 716 (App.1981). 1982See, e.g., Wasko v. Frankel, 116 Ariz. 288 , 569 P.2d 230 (1977); Moorer v. Clayton Manufacturing Corporation, 128 Ariz. 565 , 627 P.2d 716 (App.1981). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stampsgreen1 sentence1978App.3d 896 , 291 N.E.2d 274, 279 (1972), the court held: “ * * * it is the generally recognized principle that where a person inflicts upon another a wound which is dangerous, that is, calculated to endanger or destroy life, it is no defense to a charge of homicide that the alleged victim’s death was contributed to by, or immediately resulted from, unskillful or improper treatment of the wound or injury by attending physicians or surgeons.” See also People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692 , 389 N.Y.S.2d 804 , 358 N.E.2d 487, 491 (1976), where the court said: *224 “Neither does ‘direct’ mean ‘unaided’ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stewartgreen2 sentences1978App.3d 896 , 291 N.E.2d 274, 279 (1972), the court held: “ * * * it is the generally recognized principle that where a person inflicts upon another a wound which is dangerous, that is, calculated to endanger or destroy life, it is no defense to a charge of homicide that the alleged victim’s death was contributed to by, or immediately resulted from, unskillful or improper treatment of the wound or injury by attending physicians or surgeons.” See also People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692 , 389 N.Y.S.2d 804 , 358 N.E.2d 487, 491 (1976), where the court said: *224 “Neither does ‘direct’ mean ‘unaided’ 1978App.3d 896 , 291 N.E.2d 274, 279 (1972), the court held: “ * * * it is the generally recognized principle that where a person inflicts upon another a wound which is dangerous, that is, calculated to endanger or destroy life, it is no defense to a charge of homicide that the alleged victim’s death was contributed to by, or immediately resulted from, unskillful or improper treatment of the wound or injury by attending physicians or surgeons.” See also People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692 , 389 N.Y.S.2d 804 , 358 N.E.2d 487, 491 (1976), where the court said: *224 “Neither does ‘direct’ mean ‘unaided’ | 1 | 1 |
Ferrell v. Industrial Commission of Arizonagreen2 sentences1978See Ferrell v. Industrial Commission, 79 Ariz. 278 , 288 P.2d 492 (1955). 1978See Ferrell v. Industrial Commission, 79 Ariz. 278 , 288 P.2d 492 (1955). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Flynn & Emrich Co.green2 sentences1976In Turner v. Flynn & Emrich Co. of Baltimore City, 269 Md. 407, 306 A.2d 218, 219 (1973), the general rule was stated as follows: “It is a generally recognized principle that absent extraordinary circumstances, *247 without an enabling statute a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a corporation on application of a shareholder, [citations omitted], and that when a statutory remedy is available, the complainant must bring himself within the express terms of the act [citations omitted].” See also Glickauf v. Moss, 23 Ill.App.3d 808 , 320 N.E.2d 132 (1974), and Barbe 1976In Turner v. Flynn & Emrich Co. of Baltimore City, 269 Md. 407, 306 A.2d 218, 219 (1973), the general rule was stated as follows: “It is a generally recognized principle that absent extraordinary circumstances, *247 without an enabling statute a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a corporation on application of a shareholder, [citations omitted], and that when a statutory remedy is available, the complainant must bring himself within the express terms of the act [citations omitted].” See also Glickauf v. Moss, 23 Ill.App.3d 808 , 320 N.E.2d 132 (1974), and Barbe | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moorer v. Clayton Manufacturing Corp.
green
2 sentences1982See, e.g., Wasko v. Frankel, 116 Ariz. 288 , 569 P.2d 230 (1977); Moorer v. Clayton Manufacturing Corporation, 128 Ariz. 565 , 627 P.2d 716 (App.1981). 1982See, e.g., Wasko v. Frankel, 116 Ariz. 288 , 569 P.2d 230 (1977); Moorer v. Clayton Manufacturing Corporation, 128 Ariz. 565 , 627 P.2d 716 (App.1981). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. . Kane
green
2 sentences1978Thus if ‘felonious assault is operative as a cause of death, the causal co-operation of erroneous surgical or medical treatment does not relieve the assailant from liability for homicide’ (People v. Kane, 213 N.Y. 260, 270 , 107 N.E. 655, 657 .” Only if the death is attributable to the medical malpractice and not induced at all by the original wound does the intervention of the medical malpractice constitute a defense. 1978Thus if ‘felonious assault is operative as a cause of death, the causal co-operation of erroneous surgical or medical treatment does not relieve the assailant from liability for homicide’ (People v. Kane, 213 N.Y. 260, 270 , 107 N.E. 655, 657 .” Only if the death is attributable to the medical malpractice and not induced at all by the original wound does the intervention of the medical malpractice constitute a defense. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Barber v. Irving
green
2 sentences1976In Turner v. Flynn & Emrich Co. of Baltimore City, 269 Md. 407, 306 A.2d 218, 219 (1973), the general rule was stated as follows: “It is a generally recognized principle that absent extraordinary circumstances, *247 without an enabling statute a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a corporation on application of a shareholder, [citations omitted], and that when a statutory remedy is available, the complainant must bring himself within the express terms of the act [citations omitted].” See also Glickauf v. Moss, 23 Ill.App.3d 808 , 320 N.E.2d 132 (1974), and Barbe 1976In Turner v. Flynn & Emrich Co. of Baltimore City, 269 Md. 407, 306 A.2d 218, 219 (1973), the general rule was stated as follows: “It is a generally recognized principle that absent extraordinary circumstances, *247 without an enabling statute a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a corporation on application of a shareholder, [citations omitted], and that when a statutory remedy is available, the complainant must bring himself within the express terms of the act [citations omitted].” See also Glickauf v. Moss, 23 Ill.App.3d 808 , 320 N.E.2d 132 (1974), and Barbe | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Glickauf v. Moss
green
1 sentence1976In Turner v. Flynn & Emrich Co. of Baltimore City, 269 Md. 407, 306 A.2d 218, 219 (1973), the general rule was stated as follows: “It is a generally recognized principle that absent extraordinary circumstances, *247 without an enabling statute a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a corporation on application of a shareholder, [citations omitted], and that when a statutory remedy is available, the complainant must bring himself within the express terms of the act [citations omitted].” See also Glickauf v. Moss, 23 Ill.App.3d 808 , 320 N.E.2d 132 (1974), and Barbe | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Johnson
neutral
1 sentence1976In Turner v. Flynn & Emrich Co. of Baltimore City, 269 Md. 407, 306 A.2d 218, 219 (1973), the general rule was stated as follows: “It is a generally recognized principle that absent extraordinary circumstances, *247 without an enabling statute a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a corporation on application of a shareholder, [citations omitted], and that when a statutory remedy is available, the complainant must bring himself within the express terms of the act [citations omitted].” See also Glickauf v. Moss, 23 Ill.App.3d 808 , 320 N.E.2d 132 (1974), and Barbe | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Gilde v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1939“This rule, like that of subdivision 7, which was involved in Glide v. Superior Court, supra [ 147 Cal. 21 , 81 Pac. 225 ], has its underlying basis in the division of the activities of government into three separate and independent departments, each of which is, in the exercise of its own peculiar functions, free from the control of either of the others. 5 Pom. 1939“This rule, like that of subdivision 7, which was involved in Glide v. Superior Court, supra [ 147 Cal. 21 , 81 Pac. 225 ], has its underlying basis in the division of the activities of government into three separate and independent departments, each of which is, in the exercise of its own peculiar functions, free from the control of either of the others. 5 Pom. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.