generally recognized rule in Oklahoma

2017“Remedial or procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested ... rights, and which relate only to remedies or modes of procedure are generally held to operate retroactively and to apply to pending actions or proceedings .... ” Thomas, 1977 OK 164, ¶ 4 , 569 P.2d 974 .

2017“Remedial or procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested ... rights, and which relate only to remedies or modes of procedure are generally held to operate retroactively and to apply to pending actions or proceedings .... ” Thomas, 1977 OK 164, ¶ 4 , 569 P.2d 974 .

1990There are also cases such as Bateman v. Riner, 170 Okla. 13 , 38 P.2d 581 (Okla.1934), Duncan v. Ratcliff, 63 Okla. 19 , 161 P. 1174 (Okla.1916) and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 29 Okla. 758 , 119 P. 238 (Okla.1911), which stand for the generally recognized rule that where pending appeal there is a satisfaction of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed as moot because only abstract or hypothetical questions are presented.

1990There are also cases such as Bateman v. Riner, 170 Okla. 13 , 38 P.2d 581 (Okla.1934), Duncan v. Ratcliff, 63 Okla. 19 , 161 P. 1174 (Okla.1916) and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 29 Okla. 758 , 119 P. 238 (Okla.1911), which stand for the generally recognized rule that where pending appeal there is a satisfaction of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed as moot because only abstract or hypothetical questions are presented.

1990There are also cases such as Bateman v. Riner, 170 Okla. 13 , 38 P.2d 581 (Okla.1934), Duncan v. Ratcliff, 63 Okla. 19 , 161 P. 1174 (Okla.1916) and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 29 Okla. 758 , 119 P. 238 (Okla.1911), which stand for the generally recognized rule that where pending appeal there is a satisfaction of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed as moot because only abstract or hypothetical questions are presented.

1990There are also cases such as Bateman v. Riner, 170 Okla. 13 , 38 P.2d 581 (Okla.1934), Duncan v. Ratcliff, 63 Okla. 19 , 161 P. 1174 (Okla.1916) and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 29 Okla. 758 , 119 P. 238 (Okla.1911), which stand for the generally recognized rule that where pending appeal there is a satisfaction of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed as moot because only abstract or hypothetical questions are presented.

1990There are also cases such as Bateman v. Riner, 170 Okla. 13 , 38 P.2d 581 (Okla. 1934), Duncan v. Ratcliff, 63 Okla. 19 , 161 P. 1174 (Okla. 1916) and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 29 Okla. 758 , 119 P. 238 (Okla. 1911), Which stand for the generally recognized rule that where pending appeal there is a satisfaction of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed as moot because only abstract or hypothetical questions are presented.

1990There are also cases such as Bateman v. Riner, 170 Okla. 13 , 38 P.2d 581 (Okla.1934), Duncan v. Ratcliff, 63 Okla. 19 , 161 P. 1174 (Okla.1916) and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 29 Okla. 758 , 119 P. 238 (Okla.1911), which stand for the generally recognized rule that where pending appeal there is a satisfaction of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed as moot because only abstract or hypothetical questions are presented.

1990There are also cases such as Bateman v. Riner, 170 Okla. 13 , 38 P.2d 581 (Okla. 1934), Duncan v. Ratcliff, 63 Okla. 19 , 161 P. 1174 (Okla. 1916) and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 29 Okla. 758 , 119 P. 238 (Okla. 1911), Which stand for the generally recognized rule that where pending appeal there is a satisfaction of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed as moot because only abstract or hypothetical questions are presented.

1990There are also cases such as Bateman v. Riner, 170 Okla. 13 , 38 P.2d 581 (Okla.1934), Duncan v. Ratcliff, 63 Okla. 19 , 161 P. 1174 (Okla.1916) and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 29 Okla. 758 , 119 P. 238 (Okla.1911), which stand for the generally recognized rule that where pending appeal there is a satisfaction of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed as moot because only abstract or hypothetical questions are presented.

1978Lamp v. Pennsylvania R.R., 305 Pa. 520 , 158 A. 269 , 84 A.L.R. 1217 (1931). 5 Nor is there a case *602 in this state applying a related legal presumption that proper care has been exercised by the driver of an automobile who suffered amnesia as a result of an accident — the presumption which is the subject of plaintiff’s requested instruction.

1978Lamp v. Pennsylvania R.R., 305 Pa. 520 , 158 A. 269 , 84 A.L.R. 1217 (1931). 5 Nor is there a case *602 in this state applying a related legal presumption that proper care has been exercised by the driver of an automobile who suffered amnesia as a result of an accident — the presumption which is the subject of plaintiff’s requested instruction.

1975Also see Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, Pa., 134 Pa.Super. 469 , 3 A.2d 998 ; Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931 , 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.

1975Also see Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, Pa., 134 Pa.Super. 469 , 3 A.2d 998 ; Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931 , 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.

1975Also see Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, Pa., 134 Pa.Super. 469 , 3 A.2d 998 ; Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931 , 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.

1975Also see Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, Pa., 134 Pa.Super. 469 , 3 A.2d 998 ; Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931 , 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.

1975Also see Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, Pa., 134 Pa.Super. 469 , 3 A.2d 998 ; Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931 , 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.

1975Also see Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, Pa., 134 Pa.Super. 469 , 3 A.2d 998 ; Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931 , 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.

1975Also see Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, Pa., 134 Pa.Super. 469 , 3 A.2d 998 ; Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931 , 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.

1975Also see Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, Pa., 134 Pa.Super. 469 , 3 A.2d 998 ; Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931 , 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 ; Fink v. City of Paterson, 44 N.J.

1969Co., Okl., 424 P.2d 19 , and expresses the generally recognized rule.

1947The rule announced in syllabus 1 of Drumright et al. v. Brown et al., 76 Okla. 162 , 184 P. 110 , announces the generally recognized rule applicable to the question: “Although no particular form of expression is necessary, it must appear from the plainly expressed provisions contained in a contract, independent of all extraneous matters of circumstances, that it was the intention of the parties thereto that time should be of the essence thereof.” Examination of the entire contract does not disclose that the parties intended that time was to be of the essence of this contract.

1947The rule announced in syllabus 1 of Drumright et al. v. Brown et al., 76 Okla. 162 , 184 P. 110 , announces the generally recognized rule applicable to the question: “Although no particular form of expression is necessary, it must appear from the plainly expressed provisions contained in a contract, independent of all extraneous matters of circumstances, that it was the intention of the parties thereto that time should be of the essence thereof.” Examination of the entire contract does not disclose that the parties intended that time was to be of the essence of this contract.

1937It was, on the contrary, based upon the generally recognized rule independent of the statute, and the principal supporting authority was an Illinois equity case of Martin v. Martin (Ill.) 48 N. E. 924 , 62 A. S. R. 411 (in which the general rule was recognized, but the existence of exceptions noted).

1935People v. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574 ; People ex rel.

1924In People v. Case, supra, the court said: “These constitutional restrictions like others of that type are concisely stated in general but apt terms, and it was left for the courts of the country to determine in each case or class of cases what under the conditions shown constituted ‘excessive bail,’ ‘excessive fines,’ ‘cruel and unusual punishment,’ ‘unreasonable search and seizure,’ ” etc. “The generally recognized rule is fairly stated in the following annotation to 11 Fed Stat. Ann. (2d Ed.) p. 354: ‘The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the *347 language of the Cons

1924Cr. 394 , 218 Pac. 545 .

1924A generally recognized rule is that evidence of a distinct probative fact is not cumulative evidence of another-fact, although both facts support the same issue. * * * “* * * But it is not cumulative if it télate to distinct and independent facts of a different character tending to establisu the same ground of claim or defense.” In the case of Weber v. Weber, 74 Oklahoma, 179 Pac. 31 , it is said- in the syllabus : “* * * A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, supported by affidavits that the plaintiff a short time after the alleged commission of the acts charged