15 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1910–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Humegreen2 sentences2013The court stated, “It is a generally recognized principle that migratory fish in the navigable waters of a state, like game within its borders, are classed as animals ferae naturae, the title to which, so far as that claim is capable of being asserted before possession is obtained, is held by the state, in its sovereign capacity in trust for all its citizens * * Hume, 52 Or at 5 . 2011In State v. Hume, 52 Or 1, 5 , 95 P 808 (1908), the court stated, “It is a generally recognized principle that migratory fish in the navigable waters of a state, like game within its borders, are classed as animals ferae naturae, the title to which, so far as that claim is capable of being asserted before possession is obtained, is held by the state, in its sovereign capacity in trust for all its citizensf.]” The court explained that the state’s “assumed ownership” gave the state authority to regulate the treatment and taking of wildlife. | 1 | 4 |
Anthony v. Veatchgreen2 sentences2004In State v. Hume, 52 Or 1, 5-6, 95 P 808 (1908), for example, the court explained that £‘[i]t is a generally recognized principle that migratory fish in the navigable waters of a state, like game within its borders, are classed as animals ferae naturae, the title to which, so far as that claim is capable of being asserted before possession is obtained, is held by the state, in its sovereign capacity in trust for all its citizens.” Similarly, in Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 487 , 220 P2d 493 (1950), the court quoted from a Washington Supreme Court decision the proposition that “ 2004In State v. Hume, 52 Or 1, 5-6, 95 P 808 (1908), for example, the court explained that £‘[i]t is a generally recognized principle that migratory fish in the navigable waters of a state, like game within its borders, are classed as animals ferae naturae, the title to which, so far as that claim is capable of being asserted before possession is obtained, is held by the state, in its sovereign capacity in trust for all its citizens.” Similarly, in Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 487 , 220 P2d 493 (1950), the court quoted from a Washington Supreme Court decision the proposition that “ | 1 | 2 |
State v. Pulosgreen2 sentences2011Id. at 5-6 (“[A]s an incident of the assumed ownership, the legislative assembly may enact such laws as tend to protect the species from injury by human means and from extinction by exhaustive methods of capture[.]”); see also State v. Pulos, 64 Or 92, 95 , 129 P 128 (1913) (“[It is a] well-known principle that title to wild game is in the State, and that no person has an absolute property right in game or fish while in a state of nature and at large; that the taking of them is not a right, but is a privilege, which may be restricted, prohibited, or conditioned, as the law-making power may see 2011Id. at 5-6 (“[A]s an incident of the assumed ownership, the legislative assembly may enact such laws as tend to protect the species from injury by human means and from extinction by exhaustive methods of capture[.]”); see also State v. Pulos, 64 Or 92, 95 , 129 P 128 (1913) (“[It is a] well-known principle that title to wild game is in the State, and that no person has an absolute property right in game or fish while in a state of nature and at large; that the taking of them is not a right, but is a privilege, which may be restricted, prohibited, or conditioned, as the law-making power may see | 1 | 2 |
Robertson Rock Bit Co. v. Hughes Tool Co.green1 sentence2013Because the state holds title to wildlife in trust for its citizens, in Simpson , we held that the state’s property interest in wildlife is “not proprietary or possessory [.]” 242 Or App at 304 ; see Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 487 , 220 P2d 493 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 US 923 (1951) (the state’s property interest in wild fish is sovereign, not proprietary); Monroe v. Withycombe, 84 Or 328, 334-35 , 165 P 227 (1917) (“Fish are classified as ferae naturae, and while in a state of freedom, their ownership, so far as a right of property can be asserted, is in the state, not | 1 | 1 |
Monroe v. Withycombegreen2 sentences2013Because the state holds title to wildlife in trust for its citizens, in Simpson , we held that the state’s property interest in wildlife is “not proprietary or possessory [.]” 242 Or App at 304 ; see Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 487 , 220 P2d 493 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 US 923 (1951) (the state’s property interest in wild fish is sovereign, not proprietary); Monroe v. Withycombe, 84 Or 328, 334-35 , 165 P 227 (1917) (“Fish are classified as ferae naturae, and while in a state of freedom, their ownership, so far as a right of property can be asserted, is in the state, not 2013Because the state holds title to wildlife in trust for its citizens, in Simpson , we held that the state’s property interest in wildlife is “not proprietary or possessory [.]” 242 Or App at 304 ; see Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 487 , 220 P2d 493 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 US 923 (1951) (the state’s property interest in wild fish is sovereign, not proprietary); Monroe v. Withycombe, 84 Or 328, 334-35 , 165 P 227 (1917) (“Fish are classified as ferae naturae, and while in a state of freedom, their ownership, so far as a right of property can be asserted, is in the state, not | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ticegreen1 sentence2004In State v. Hume, 52 Or 1, 5-6, 95 P 808 (1908), for example, the court explained that £‘[i]t is a generally recognized principle that migratory fish in the navigable waters of a state, like game within its borders, are classed as animals ferae naturae, the title to which, so far as that claim is capable of being asserted before possession is obtained, is held by the state, in its sovereign capacity in trust for all its citizens.” Similarly, in Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 487 , 220 P2d 493 (1950), the court quoted from a Washington Supreme Court decision the proposition that “ | 1 | 1 |
Piwowarski v. Cornwellgreen2 sentences1973Parker v. School District of Valley Park, 325 SW2d 59, 61 (Mo Ct App 1959), and Piwowarski v. Cornwell, 273 NY 226 , 7 NE2d 111 -12 (1937). 1973Parker v. School District of Valley Park, 325 SW2d 59, 61 (Mo Ct App 1959), and Piwowarski v. Cornwell, 273 NY 226 , 7 NE2d 111 -12 (1937). | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. School District of Valley Parkgreen2 sentences1973Parker v. School District of Valley Park, 325 SW2d 59, 61 (Mo Ct App 1959), and Piwowarski v. Cornwell, 273 NY 226 , 7 NE2d 111 -12 (1937). 1973Parker v. School District of Valley Park, 325 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), and Piwowarski v. Cornwell, 273 N.Y. 226 , 7 N.E.2d 111, 112 (1937). | 1 | 1 |
Coos County v. Oddygreen2 sentences1938This court has given its approval to the generally recognized rule that after a levy is made the payment of taxes is regarded as a legal certainty, and for the purpose of determining whether an expenditure will exceed the debt limit of a county it will be assumed that the tax has been collected: Coos County v. Oddy, 156 Or. 546, 552 ( 68 P. (2d) 1064 ); Kneeland v. Multnomah County, 139 Or. 356, 362 ( 10 P. (2d) 342 ); State ex rel. 1938This court has given its approval to the generally recognized rule that after a levy is made the payment of taxes is regarded as a legal certainty, and for the purpose of determining whether an expenditure will exceed the debt limit of a county it will be assumed that the tax has been collected: Coos County v. Oddy, 156 Or. 546, 552 ( 68 P. (2d) 1064 ); Kneeland v. Multnomah County, 139 Or. 356, 362 ( 10 P. (2d) 342 ); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Kneeland v. Multnomah Countygreen2 sentences1938This court has given its approval to the generally recognized rule that after a levy is made the payment of taxes is regarded as a legal certainty, and for the purpose of determining whether an expenditure will exceed the debt limit of a county it will be assumed that the tax has been collected: Coos County v. Oddy, 156 Or. 546, 552 ( 68 P. (2d) 1064 ); Kneeland v. Multnomah County, 139 Or. 356, 362 ( 10 P. (2d) 342 ); State ex rel. 1938This court has given its approval to the generally recognized rule that after a levy is made the payment of taxes is regarded as a legal certainty, and for the purpose of determining whether an expenditure will exceed the debt limit of a county it will be assumed that the tax has been collected: Coos County v. Oddy, 156 Or. 546, 552 ( 68 P. (2d) 1064 ); Kneeland v. Multnomah County, 139 Or. 356, 362 ( 10 P. (2d) 342 ); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Pierce v. Slushergreen2 sentences1938Perce v. Slusher, 117 Or. 498, 500 ( 244 P. 540 , 58 A. L. 1938Perce v. Slusher, 117 Or. 498, 500 ( 244 P. 540 , 58 A. L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kendrick
green
2 sentences1984Defendant recognizes this exception, explained by the Supreme Court in State v. Kendrick, 239 Or 512, 515-16 , 398 P2d 471 (1965), as follows: “Statements known as spontaneous exlamations [sic] fall within a generally recognized exception to the rule. 1984Defendant recognizes this exception, explained by the Supreme Court in State v. Kendrick, 239 Or 512, 515-16 , 398 P2d 471 (1965), as follows: “Statements known as spontaneous exlamations [sic] fall within a generally recognized exception to the rule. | 2 | 1980–1984 |
Willis v. State Accident Insurance Fund
green
2 sentences1973Fund, 3 Or App 565 , 475 P2d 986 (1970); White v. S.I.A.C., 236 Or 444, 447 , 389 P2d 310 (1964); 8 Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text 3, § 1710 (3d Ed 1951).” Respondent contends and the trial court concluded that the “special task” exception to the “going and coming rule” is applicable here. 1973Fund, 3 Or App 565 , 475 P2d 986 (1970); White v. S.I.A.C., 236 Or 444, 447 , 389 P2d 310 (1964); 8 Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text 3, § 1710 (3d Ed 1951).” Respondent contends and the trial court concluded that the “special task” exception to the “going and coming rule” is applicable here. | 2 | 1971–1973 |
White v. State Industrial Accident Commission
neutral
2 sentences1973Fund, 3 Or App 565 , 475 P2d 986 (1970); White v. S.I.A.C., 236 Or 444, 447 , 389 P2d 310 (1964); 8 Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text 3, § 1710 (3d Ed 1951).” Respondent contends and the trial court concluded that the “special task” exception to the “going and coming rule” is applicable here. 1973Fund, 3 Or App 565 , 475 P2d 986 (1970); White v. S.I.A.C., 236 Or 444, 447 , 389 P2d 310 (1964); 8 Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text 3, § 1710 (3d Ed 1951).” Respondent contends and the trial court concluded that the “special task” exception to the “going and coming rule” is applicable here. | 2 | 1971–1973 |
Simpson v. Department of Fish & Wildlife
green
1 sentence2013Because the state holds title to wildlife in trust for its citizens, in Simpson , we held that the state’s property interest in wildlife is “not proprietary or possessory [.]” 242 Or App at 304 ; see Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 487 , 220 P2d 493 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 US 923 (1951) (the state’s property interest in wild fish is sovereign, not proprietary); Monroe v. Withycombe, 84 Or 328, 334-35 , 165 P 227 (1917) (“Fish are classified as ferae naturae, and while in a state of freedom, their ownership, so far as a right of property can be asserted, is in the state, not | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Timber Access Industries Co. v. U. S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Although the statement did not fit within a generally recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the Supreme Court found "an aura of trustworthiness about [the declarant's words] which makes evidence of them admissible." Timber Access Ind., 263 Or. at 519 , 503 P.2d 482 . 2007Although the statement did not fit within a generally recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the Supreme Court found "an aura of trustworthiness about [the declarant's words] which makes evidence of them admissible." Timber Access Ind., 263 Or. at 519 , 503 P.2d 482 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Adams v. Hoover
green
2 sentences2006It then quoted the generally recognized principle that “[t]he original survey in all cases must, whenever possible, be retraced, since it cannot be disregarded or needlessly altered after property rights have been acquired in reliance upon it.” Id. at 652 , 493 NW2d at 283 (quoting Boundaries, 12 Am Jur 2d 462-63 § 57 (1997)) (emphasis omitted). 2006It then quoted the generally recognized principle that “[t]he original survey in all cases must, whenever possible, be retraced, since it cannot be disregarded or needlessly altered after property rights have been acquired in reliance upon it.” Id. at 652 , 493 NW2d at 283 (quoting Boundaries, 12 Am Jur 2d 462-63 § 57 (1997)) (emphasis omitted). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Belanger v. Howard
green
2 sentences2004In State v. Pulos, 64 Or 92, 95 , 129 P 128 (1913), for example, the Oregon Supreme Court explained that “title to wild game is in the State, and that no person has an absolute property right in game or fish while in a state of nature and at large.” (Emphasis added.) *677 Even more to the point for our purposes is the court’s decision in Belanger v. Howard, 166 Or 408 , 112 P2d 1022 (1941). 2004In State v. Pulos, 64 Or 92, 95 , 129 P 128 (1913), for example, the Oregon Supreme Court explained that “title to wild game is in the State, and that no person has an absolute property right in game or fish while in a state of nature and at large.” (Emphasis added.) *677 Even more to the point for our purposes is the court’s decision in Belanger v. Howard, 166 Or 408 , 112 P2d 1022 (1941). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Fenn v. Charles T. Parker Construction Company
green
2 sentences1973As stated in Fenn v. Parker Construction Co., 6 Or App 412, 415 , 487 P2d 894 (1971): “The generally recognized rule of workmen’s compensation law known as the ‘going and coming rule’ is that in the absence of special circumstances an employe injured while going to or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of the compensation acts. 2 Will L J 75 (1962); Willis v. State Acc. Ins. 1973As stated in Fenn v. Parker Construction Co., 6 Or App 412, 415 , 487 P2d 894 (1971): “The generally recognized rule of workmen’s compensation law known as the ‘going and coming rule’ is that in the absence of special circumstances an employe injured while going to or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of the compensation acts. 2 Will L J 75 (1962); Willis v. State Acc. Ins. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Blyth & Co., Inc. v. City of Portland
green
2 sentences1971Furthermore, the effect of defendants’ contention would render subsection (5) completely meaningless, as conceded by defendants, and despite the fact that defendants’ also concede the generally recognized rule of statutory construction to be that the court may not “cast aside language of a law as meaningless if it is reasonably possible to give it effect,” citing Blyth & Co., Inc. v. City of Portland, 204 Or 153, 159 , 282 P2d 363 (1955). 1971Furthermore, the effect of defendants’ contention would render subsection (5) completely meaningless, as conceded by defendants, and despite the fact that defendants’ also concede the generally recognized rule of statutory construction to be that the court may not “cast aside language of a law as meaningless if it is reasonably possible to give it effect,” citing Blyth & Co., Inc. v. City of Portland, 204 Or 153, 159 , 282 P2d 363 (1955). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Kowcun v. Bybee
green
2 sentences1970The foregoing rule and the exceptions thereto have been discussed in a number of cases by the Oregon Supreme Court. 2 Will L J, supra. In Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Or 271 , 186 P2d 790 (1947), the Supreme Court considered the problem and said: “We do not believe that the whistle which calls the men to work in the morning and later signals the end of the day’s labors always determines whether or not an injury which befell a workman arose ‘out of and in the course of his employment.’ Likewise, we do not believe that the Workmen’s Compensation Law selects the threshold of the factory as the dividing l 1970The foregoing rule and the exceptions thereto have been discussed in a number of cases by the Oregon Supreme Court. 2 Will L J, supra. In Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Or 271 , 186 P2d 790 (1947), the Supreme Court considered the problem and said: “We do not believe that the whistle which calls the men to work in the morning and later signals the end of the day’s labors always determines whether or not an injury which befell a workman arose ‘out of and in the course of his employment.’ Likewise, we do not believe that the Workmen’s Compensation Law selects the threshold of the factory as the dividing l | 1 | 1970–1970 |
State v. Laundy
green
2 sentences1962The instant case is more properly governed by cases *304 such as State v. Laundy, 1922, 103 Or 443 , 204 P 958 , 206 P 290 , wherein it was said: “It is a generally recognized rule of criminal pleading that when an offense against a criminal statute may he committed in one or more of several ways specified by the statute, the indictment may in a single count charge the commission of the offense in any or all of the ways specified by the statute; and when a statute mentions several acts disjunctively and prescribes that each act shall constitute the same offense and be subject to the same punis 1962The instant case is more properly governed by cases *304 such as State v. Laundy, 1922, 103 Or 443 , 204 P 958 , 206 P 290 , wherein it was said: “It is a generally recognized rule of criminal pleading that when an offense against a criminal statute may he committed in one or more of several ways specified by the statute, the indictment may in a single count charge the commission of the offense in any or all of the ways specified by the statute; and when a statute mentions several acts disjunctively and prescribes that each act shall constitute the same offense and be subject to the same punis | 1 | 1962–1962 |
In re Deininger
neutral
1 sentence1910C.) 108 Fed. 623 . 8. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.