generally recognized rule in Washington

1995Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). *800 A generally recognized rule of international comity states that an American court will only recognize a final and valid judgment.

1982In Bond v. State, 70 Wn.2d 746, 748 , 425 P.2d 10 (1967), the court noted the generally recognized rule that a State is not liable for interest in any case "except where expressly, or by a reasonable construction of a contract or statute, it has placed itself in a position of liability." (Italics ours.) Here, the term "loss of compensation" under RCW 28A.58-.490 is again at issue.

1982In Bond v. State, 70 Wn.2d 746, 748 , 425 P.2d 10 (1967), the court noted the generally recognized rule that a State is not liable for interest in any case "except where expressly, or by a reasonable construction of a contract or statute, it has placed itself in a position of liability." (Italics ours.) Here, the term "loss of compensation" under RCW 28A.58-.490 is again at issue.

1972R. 864 , 58 L.R.A. 293 (1902) at 431: [i]t is, and has long been, a generally recognized rule that there is no line of separation between the liability of joint tort feasors.

1967Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480 , *749 287 P.2d 1018 (1955); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 (1949); Horton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 199 Wash. 212 , 90 P.2d 1009 (1939); Spier v. Department of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 374 , 29 P.2d 679 (1934).

1967Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480 , *749 287 P.2d 1018 (1955); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 (1949); Horton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 199 Wash. 212 , 90 P.2d 1009 (1939); Spier v. Department of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 374 , 29 P.2d 679 (1934).

1967Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480 , *749 287 P.2d 1018 (1955); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 (1949); Horton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 199 Wash. 212 , 90 P.2d 1009 (1939); Spier v. Department of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 374 , 29 P.2d 679 (1934).

1967Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480 , *749 287 P.2d 1018 (1955); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 (1949); Horton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 199 Wash. 212 , 90 P.2d 1009 (1939); Spier v. Department of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 374 , 29 P.2d 679 (1934).

1967Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480 , *749 287 P.2d 1018 (1955); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 (1949); Horton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 199 Wash. 212 , 90 P.2d 1009 (1939); Spier v. Department of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 374 , 29 P.2d 679 (1934).

1967Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480 , *749 287 P.2d 1018 (1955); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 (1949); Horton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 199 Wash. 212 , 90 P.2d 1009 (1939); Spier v. Department of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 374 , 29 P.2d 679 (1934).

1967Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480 , *749 287 P.2d 1018 (1955); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 (1949); Horton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 199 Wash. 212 , 90 P.2d 1009 (1939); Spier v. Department of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 374 , 29 P.2d 679 (1934).

1967Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480 , *749 287 P.2d 1018 (1955); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn.2d 700 , 209 P.2d 482 (1949); Horton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 199 Wash. 212 , 90 P.2d 1009 (1939); Spier v. Department of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 374 , 29 P.2d 679 (1934).

1965Guth v. Loft, Inc. (1939), 23 Del.

1958Nor does our opinion in Seattle, Port Angeles & L.C.R. v. Land (1914), 81 Wash. 206 , 142 Pac. 680 support the conclusion that such testimony was inadmissible.

1958Nor does our opinion in Seattle, Port Angeles & L.C.R. v. Land (1914), 81 Wash. 206 , 142 Pac. 680 support the conclusion that such testimony was inadmissible.

1947Or, as was said in Williams v. Stallard, 185 Ky. 10 , 213 S. W. 197 : “It would also result in lending encouragement to one who is not vested with duties or discretion in such matters to substitute his judgment and discretion for that of those to whom the law has confided them.” Appellant, in effect, urges that he comes within the generally recognized exception to the rule—that a demand need not be made if it would be clearly useless to request the proper public officer to take appropriate action—and that the fact that the attorney general is defending this action makes it apparent that a dema

1947Or, as was said in Williams v. Stallard, 185 Ky. 10 , 213 S. W. 197 : “It would also result in lending encouragement to one who is not vested with duties or discretion in such matters to substitute his judgment and discretion for that of those to whom the law has confided them.” Appellant, in effect, urges that he comes within the generally recognized exception to the rule—that a demand need not be made if it would be clearly useless to request the proper public officer to take appropriate action—and that the fact that the attorney general is defending this action makes it apparent that a dema

1938R. 965 to the effect that the immediate parties to a trust may by mutual agreement change or revoke the same. “ ‘There seems to be a generally recognized principle that a trust may be revoked at any time by the consent of all of the interested parties, and the “interested parties” seem to have been held to be the settlor and the cestuis que trustent.’ ” Riedlin’s Guardian v. Cobb, 222 Ky. 654 , 1 S. W. (2d) 1071 .

1938R. 965 to the effect that the immediate parties to a trust may by mutual agreement change or revoke the same. “ ‘There seems to be a generally recognized principle that a trust may be revoked at any time by the consent of all of the interested parties, and the “interested parties” seem to have been held to be the settlor and the cestuis que trustent.’ ” Riedlin’s Guardian v. Cobb, 222 Ky. 654 , 1 S. W. (2d) 1071 .

1925In support of this view, the following cases are cited from this court: Cummings v. Erickson, 116 Wash. 347 , 199 Pac. 736 ; Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 92 Wash. 52 , 158 Pac. 740 , L.

1925In support of this view, the following cases are cited from this court: Cummings v. Erickson, 116 Wash. 347 , 199 Pac. 736 ; Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 92 Wash. 52 , 158 Pac. 740 , L.

1925In support of this view, the following cases are cited from this court: Cummings v. Erickson, 116 Wash. 347 , 199 Pac. 736 ; Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 92 Wash. 52 , 158 Pac. 740 , L.

1925In support of this view, the following cases are cited from this court: Cummings v. Erickson, 116 Wash. 347 , 199 Pac. 736 ; Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 92 Wash. 52 , 158 Pac. 740 , L.

1917Jones, Blue Book of Evidence, § 468; Don Yook v. Washington Mill Co., 16 Wash. 459 , 47 Pac. 964 ; Van Lehn v. Morse, 16 Wash. 219 , 47 Pac. 435 .

1917Jones, Blue Book of Evidence, § 468; Don Yook v. Washington Mill Co., 16 Wash. 459 , 47 Pac. 964 ; Van Lehn v. Morse, 16 Wash. 219 , 47 Pac. 435 .

1917Jones, Blue Book of Evidence, § 468; Don Yook v. Washington Mill Co., 16 Wash. 459 , 47 Pac. 964 ; Van Lehn v. Morse, 16 Wash. 219 , 47 Pac. 435 .

1917Jones, Blue Book of Evidence, § 468; Don Yook v. Washington Mill Co., 16 Wash. 459 , 47 Pac. 964 ; Van Lehn v. Morse, 16 Wash. 219 , 47 Pac. 435 .