generally recognized principle in Ohio

2004Likewise, in Cooper v. Roose (1949), 151 Ohio St. 316 , 39 O.O. 145 , 85 N.E.2d 545 , paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, this court held: “Occupation and control of premises by a party are attributes of their ownership. * * * A lease ordinarily transfers those attributes of ownership to the lessee.” {¶ 30} Under the written lease, PAS not only has possession and control of the property for which it is seeking exemption, but it is also responsible for maintenance and utilities and for reimbursement of the lessor for the cost of casualty insurance and real property taxes.

2004Likewise, in Cooper v. Roose (1949), 151 Ohio St. 316 , 39 O.O. 145 , 85 N.E.2d 545 , paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, this court held: “Occupation and control of premises by a party are attributes of their ownership. * * * A lease ordinarily transfers those attributes of ownership to the lessee.” {¶ 30} Under the written lease, PAS not only has possession and control of the property for which it is seeking exemption, but it is also responsible for maintenance and utilities and for reimbursement of the lessor for the cost of casualty insurance and real property taxes.

1989The appellate court in the case of In re Estate of Brown (Ariz.App.1983), 137 Ariz. 309 , 670 P.2d 414 , stated the rule in the following manner: “ * * * [A] person or persons who employ attorneys for the preservation of a common fund may be entitled to have their attorney’s fees paid out of that fund.

1989The appellate court in the case of In re Estate of Brown (Ariz.App.1983), 137 Ariz. 309 , 670 P.2d 414 , stated the rule in the following manner: “ * * * [A] person or persons who employ attorneys for the preservation of a common fund may be entitled to have their attorney’s fees paid out of that fund.

1969While defendant urges the adoption here of the generally recognized rule that the right to impose regulations on an enterprise carries with it a right to impose a reasonable fee to cover the cost of enforcement, which contention has undeniable cogency and was the basis of the decision in Prudential Co-Operative Realty Co. v. Youngstown, 118 Ohio St. 204 , we conclude that does not apply to the case at bar.

1969We find the better view to be that set forth in Casey v. Youngstown, 9 Ohio App. 2d 246 , at page 249, that is, that the fiscal policies of general health districts are controlled by statute.

1956R. (2d), 1160, 1162, the generally recognized rule is stated as follows: “At common law, a person engaged in a public calling, such as innkeeper or common carrier, was held to be under a duty to the general public and was obliged to serve, without discrimination, all who sought service. * * * On the other hand, proprietors of private enterprises, such as places of amusement and resort, were under no such obligation, enjoying an absolute power to serve whom they pleased. * * * “The common-law power of exclusion, noted above, continues until changed by legislative enactment.” (Emphasis supplied.

1941Black on Rescission and Cancellation, Second Edition, Volume 3, §657, page 1576, Bonsal v Camp, 69 S. E. 978 ; Barney v Baltimore City, 6 Wall 284; Shields v Barrow, 17 Howard, 130 , 15 Law Edition, 158.

1941Black on Rescission and Cancellation, Second Edition, Volume 3, §657, page 1576, Bonsal v Camp, 69 S. E. 978 ; Barney v Baltimore City, 6 Wall 284; Shields v Barrow, 17 Howard, 130 , 15 Law Edition, 158.

1937“It is a generally recognized principle of the law of taxation that a statute authorizing the acceptance, directly or indirectly, of a part of the tax in satisfaction of the whole, is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection *581 of the laws and as a disregard of the equality and uniformity of treatment of all taxpayers, where it may be applied as a favoritism extended to the property owner, or some one acting for him, and not as a permission to the local officers to accept less than the full amount due only because actual test has demonstrated that no more can be obtained.” Ranger

1937“It is a generally recognized principle of the law of taxation that a statute authorizing the acceptance, directly or indirectly, of a part of the tax in satisfaction of the whole, is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection *581 of the laws and as a disregard of the equality and uniformity of treatment of all taxpayers, where it may be applied as a favoritism extended to the property owner, or some one acting for him, and not as a permission to the local officers to accept less than the full amount due only because actual test has demonstrated that no more can be obtained.” Ranger