generally recognized rule in Missouri

1956Haeussler v. Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 188 , 19 S.W. 75 , 16 L.R.A. 220 .

1956Haeussler v. Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 188 , 19 S.W. 75 , 16 L.R.A. 220 .

2011“The generally recognized exception to this rule is that if a finding in the main claim necessarily carries with it a determination of the counterclaim, then this constitutes a final judgment even though the counterclaim was not specifically mentioned in the judgment.” Id.

1981And at page 22[5], the court went on to say, “This conclusion is consistent with the generally recognized rule that, unless specifically provided for ‘in clear and unequivocal terms’, Straus-Frank Co. v. Hughes, 138 Tex. 50 , 156 S.W.2d 519 (1941), ‘a continuing guaranty does not cover renewals, after revocation, of obligations which were covered by the guaranty at the time of revocation.’ (Citing cases).” The principal debtors obligation was upon a demand note upon which appellants guaranteed the payment.

1981And at page 22[5], the court went on to say, “This conclusion is consistent with the generally recognized rule that, unless specifically provided for ‘in clear and unequivocal terms’, Straus-Frank Co. v. Hughes, 138 Tex. 50 , 156 S.W.2d 519 (1941), ‘a continuing guaranty does not cover renewals, after revocation, of obligations which were covered by the guaranty at the time of revocation.’ (Citing cases).” The principal debtors obligation was upon a demand note upon which appellants guaranteed the payment.

1972In Lessard v. Snell, 155 Or. 293 , 63 P.2d 893 , a duly elected and seated state senator was alleged to have accepted employment as attorney for the state aid commission, in violation of a specific constitutional prohibition.

1972In Lessard v. Snell, 155 Or. 293 , 63 P.2d 893 , a duly elected and seated state senator was alleged to have accepted employment as attorney for the state aid commission, in violation of a specific constitutional prohibition.

1970Barnhart v. Ripka, Mo.App., 297 S.W.2d 787 , involved rejection of a testimonial assertion of a witness about the location of a boundary marker when the witness’s testimony taken as a whole demonstrated his lack of knowledge of the fact about which he purported to testify.

1936"Such presumption seems to have had its origin in the fact that material alterations modifying or defeating vested rights under written documents are usually the outgrowth of a criminal intent, the existence of which the law does not willingly presume, always preferring the presumption of innocence to that of guilt." [67 A.L.R., p. 1141.] But plaintiff points out that an exception to the rule exists in case of wills "which from their very nature cannot become operative or vest any right during the lifetime of the testator, and are absolutely subject to the volition of the testator up to the ti

1936Eq. 139 , 115 A. 370 ; Hembree v. Bolton, 132 S.C. 136 , 128 S.E. 841 .] Defendants having failed to meet the burden of showing that the alteration was made before execution of the codicil plaintiff invokes and relies upon this presumption. *Page 1236 In this State the rule, generally stated, as to written instruments, other than wills, seems to be that material alterations or erasures therein are presumed to have been made at or prior to the time of their execution unless the alteration or erasure appears suspicious on its face in which event no presumption arises and the time of making them

1936This is indeed a generally recognized doctrine of the law of compensation, and if it may be said that there was sufficient competent evidence adduced to warrant the belief that the employment of the deceased did result in his excessive exposure to the common risk from lightning, then the award of the commission in favor of the dependent should obviously be affirmed. [Van Kirk v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 226 Mo. App. 1137 , 49 S.W.2d 631 .] To this the employer and insurer counter with the suggestion that the stroke of lightning which killed the deceased was a danger common to the neighbo

1936This is indeed a generally recognized doctrine of the law of compensation, and if it may be said that there was sufficient competent evidence adduced to warrant the belief that the employment of the deceased did result in his excessive exposure to the common risk from lightning, then the award of the commission in favor of the dependent should obviously be affirmed. [Van Kirk v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 226 Mo. App. 1137 , 49 S.W.2d 631 .] To this the employer and insurer counter with the suggestion that the stroke of lightning which killed the deceased was a danger common to the neighbo

1936"Such presumption seems to have had its origin in the fact that material alterations modifying or defeating vested rights under written documents are usually the outgrowth of a criminal intent, the existence of which the law does not willingly presume, always preferring the presumption of innocence to that of guilt." [67 A.L.R., p. 1141.] But plaintiff points out that an exception to the rule exists in case of wills "which from their very nature cannot become operative or vest any right during the lifetime of the testator, and are absolutely subject to the volition of the testator up to the ti

1936"Such presumption seems to have had its origin in the fact that material alterations modifying or defeating vested rights under written documents are usually the outgrowth of a criminal intent, the existence of which the law does not willingly presume, always preferring the presumption of innocence to that of guilt." [67 A.L.R., p. 1141.] But plaintiff points out that an exception to the rule exists in case of wills "which from their very nature cannot become operative or vest any right during the lifetime of the testator, and are absolutely subject to the volition of the testator up to the ti

1936Eq. 139 , 115 A. 370 ; Hembree v. Bolton, 132 S.C. 136 , 128 S.E. 841 .] Defendants having failed to meet the burden of showing that the alteration was made before execution of the codicil plaintiff invokes and relies upon this presumption. *Page 1236 In this State the rule, generally stated, as to written instruments, other than wills, seems to be that material alterations or erasures therein are presumed to have been made at or prior to the time of their execution unless the alteration or erasure appears suspicious on its face in which event no presumption arises and the time of making them

1936Eq. 139 , 115 A. 370 ; Hembree v. Bolton, 132 S.C. 136 , 128 S.E. 841 .] Defendants having failed to meet the burden of showing that the alteration was made before execution of the codicil plaintiff invokes and relies upon this presumption. *Page 1236 In this State the rule, generally stated, as to written instruments, other than wills, seems to be that material alterations or erasures therein are presumed to have been made at or prior to the time of their execution unless the alteration or erasure appears suspicious on its face in which event no presumption arises and the time of making them

1934In case of doubt every possible presumption, not directly and clearly inconsistent with the language and subject matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act.' [State ex rel. v. Railroad Co., 48 Mo. 468 ; The State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357 .]" This statement of the law has been quoted and approved in Hamman v. Central Coal Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232 , 242, 56 S.W. 1091 , and Miners' Bank v. Clark, 252 Mo. 20 , 30, 158 S.W. 597 . [7] Furthermore, it is the generally recognized rule of law that legislative enactments which apply to or deal with a single class are not necessarily spec

1934In case of doubt every possible presumption, not directly and clearly inconsistent with the language and subject matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act.' [State ex rel. v. Railroad Co., 48 Mo. 468 ; The State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357 .]" This statement of the law has been quoted and approved in Hamman v. Central Coal Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232 , 242, 56 S.W. 1091 , and Miners' Bank v. Clark, 252 Mo. 20 , 30, 158 S.W. 597 . [7] Furthermore, it is the generally recognized rule of law that legislative enactments which apply to or deal with a single class are not necessarily spec

1934In case of doubt every possible presumption, not directly and clearly inconsistent with the language and subject matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act.' [State ex rel. v. Railroad Co., 48 Mo. 468 ; The State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357 .]" This statement of the law has been quoted and approved in Hamman v. Central Coal Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232 , 242, 56 S.W. 1091 , and Miners' Bank v. Clark, 252 Mo. 20 , 30, 158 S.W. 597 . [7] Furthermore, it is the generally recognized rule of law that legislative enactments which apply to or deal with a single class are not necessarily spec

1934In case of doubt every possible presumption, not directly and clearly inconsistent with the language and subject matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act.' [State ex rel. v. Railroad Co., 48 Mo. 468 ; The State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357 .]" This statement of the law has been quoted and approved in Hamman v. Central Coal Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232 , 242, 56 S.W. 1091 , and Miners' Bank v. Clark, 252 Mo. 20 , 30, 158 S.W. 597 . [7] Furthermore, it is the generally recognized rule of law that legislative enactments which apply to or deal with a single class are not necessarily spec

1934In case of doubt every possible presumption, not directly and clearly inconsistent with the language and subject matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act.' [State ex rel. v. Railroad Co., 48 Mo. 468 ; The State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357 .]" This statement of the law has been quoted and approved in Hamman v. Central Coal Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232 , 242, 56 S.W. 1091 , and Miners' Bank v. Clark, 252 Mo. 20 , 30, 158 S.W. 597 . [7] Furthermore, it is the generally recognized rule of law that legislative enactments which apply to or deal with a single class are not necessarily spec

1934In case of doubt every possible presumption, not directly and clearly inconsistent with the language and subject matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act.' [State ex rel. v. Railroad Co., 48 Mo. 468 ; The State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357 .]" This statement of the law has been quoted and approved in Hamman v. Central Coal Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232 , 242, 56 S.W. 1091 , and Miners' Bank v. Clark, 252 Mo. 20 , 30, 158 S.W. 597 . [7] Furthermore, it is the generally recognized rule of law that legislative enactments which apply to or deal with a single class are not necessarily spec

1929Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600 , 31 S. W. 1045 , which lays down the familiar and generally recognized rule (applied in that case to a city ordinance which was measured by a charter provision similar to Section 28, Article IV, of the State Constitution), that “the evident object of the provision of the organic law relative to the title of an act was to have the title like a guide board, indicate the general contents of the bill, and contain but one general subject which might be expressed in a few or a greater number of words.

1929Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600 , 31 S. W. 1045 , which lays down the familiar and generally recognized rule (applied in that case to a city ordinance which was measured by a charter provision similar to Section 28, Article IV, of the State Constitution), that “the evident object of the provision of the organic law relative to the title of an act was to have the title like a guide board, indicate the general contents of the bill, and contain but one general subject which might be expressed in a few or a greater number of words.

1922It is for the benefit of the creditors and in the interest of fair dealing with them and must be construed in harmony *619 with this purpose. [Birkett v. Bank, supra; Custard v. Wigderson, 130 Wis. 412, 414 .] We hold that it is a question of due diligence in every case and in the case at har, defendant will be charged with lack of such due diligence.

1894Robins v. Insurance Co., 12 Mo. 380 ; Reed v. Foot, 36 Mo. App. 471 ; Norway v. Clear Lake, 11 Iowa, 506 ; Jacobs v. Pollard, 10 Cush.

1894Robins v. Insurance Co., 12 Mo. 380 ; Reed v. Foot, 36 Mo. App. 471 ; Norway v. Clear Lake, 11 Iowa, 506 ; Jacobs v. Pollard, 10 Cush.