generally recognized rule in Virginia

2003See Williams v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 45, 46 , 189 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1972) (“It is a generally recognized rule that records and reports prepared by public officials pursuant to a duty imposed by statute, or required by the nature of their offices, are admissible as proof of the facts stated therein.

2003See Williams v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 45, 46 , 189 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1972) (“It is a generally recognized rule that records and reports prepared by public officials pursuant to a duty imposed by statute, or required by the nature of their offices, are admissible as proof of the facts stated therein.

1995In Ingram v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 335 , 338 S.E.2d 657 (1986), we held that the official records of the Division of Motor Vehicles * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule "if the document 'relates facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official to which he could testify should he be called as a witness.'" Id. at 339, 338 S.E.2d at 658 ; see also Hall v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 170 , 421 S.E.2d 887 (1992) (court order reflecting habitual offender adjudicatio

1995In Ingram v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 335 , 338 S.E.2d 657 (1986), we held that the official records of the Division of Motor Vehicles * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule "if the document 'relates facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official to which he could testify should he be called as a witness.'" Id. at 339, 338 S.E.2d at 658 ; see also Hall v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 170 , 421 S.E.2d 887 (1992) (court order reflecting habitual offender adjudicatio

1993The generally recognized test is whether “the legitimate probative value outweighs the incidental prejudice to the accused.” Hawks v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 244, 247 , 321 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1984).

1993The generally recognized test is whether “the legitimate probative value outweighs the incidental prejudice to the accused.” Hawks v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 244, 247 , 321 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1984).

2020Quality, 976 P.2d 872, 875 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]he principle of legislative acquiescence applies only where a statute has been construed by the court of last resort, not an intermediate appellate court.”). 3 No intermediate or lower court binds, directly or indirectly, a 3 See also Hefner v. White, 47 N.E.2d 964, 965 (Ind. 1943) (“[T]he failure of the Legislature to change a statute after a line of decisions of a court of last resort giving the statute a certain construction amounts to an acquiescence by the Legislature in the construction of the court . . . .” (emphasis added)); Common

2020Quality, 976 P.2d 872, 875 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]he principle of legislative acquiescence applies only where a statute has been construed by the court of last resort, not an intermediate appellate court.”). 3 No intermediate or lower court binds, directly or indirectly, a 3 See also Hefner v. White, 47 N.E.2d 964, 965 (Ind. 1943) (“[T]he failure of the Legislature to change a statute after a line of decisions of a court of last resort giving the statute a certain construction amounts to an acquiescence by the Legislature in the construction of the court . . . .” (emphasis added)); Common

2020Quality, 976 P.2d 872, 875 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]he principle of legislative acquiescence applies only where a statute has been construed by the court of last resort, not an intermediate appellate court.”). 3 No intermediate or lower court binds, directly or indirectly, a 3 See also Hefner v. White, 47 N.E.2d 964, 965 (Ind. 1943) (“[T]he failure of the Legislature to change a statute after a line of decisions of a court of last resort giving the statute a certain construction amounts to an acquiescence by the Legislature in the construction of the court . . . .” (emphasis added)); Common

2006Pennington v. Bluefield Orthopedics, P.C., 187 W.Va. 344 , 419 S.E.2d 8 , 13 (1992); see also McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374 , 377, 185 S.E. 873 , 874 (1936) ("the injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction for the same cause of action").

2006Pennington v. Bluefield Orthopedics, P.C., 187 W.Va. 344 , 419 S.E.2d 8 , 13 (1992); see also McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374 , 377, 185 S.E. 873 , 874 (1936) ("the injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction for the same cause of action").

2006Virginia law provides that “it is a generally recognized principle that there can be only one recovery of damages for a single wrong or injury.” Cox v. Geary, 271 Va. 141, 147-48 (2006).

1994In Ingram v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 335 , 338 S.E.2d 657 (1986), we held that the official records of the Division of Motor Vehicles were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule “if the document ‘relates facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official to which he could testify should he be called as a witness.’ ” Id. at 339 , 338 S.E.2d at 658 ; see also Hall v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 170 , 421 S.E.2d 887 (1992) (court order reflecting habitual offender adjudication recorded by DMV on an operator’s driving record admissible). *565 In Virginia

1994In Ingram v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 335 , 338 S.E.2d 657 (1986), we held that the official records of the Division of Motor Vehicles were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule “if the document ‘relates facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official to which he could testify should he be called as a witness.’ ” Id. at 339 , 338 S.E.2d at 658 ; see also Hall v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 170 , 421 S.E.2d 887 (1992) (court order reflecting habitual offender adjudication recorded by DMV on an operator’s driving record admissible). *565 In Virginia

1991The court went on to state, however, that “the mere fact that a record or report qualifies as a public document does not automatically overcome the hearsay objection unless the document relates facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official to which he could testify should he be called as a witness.” Id.; see also Bailey, Adm’x v. Hunter, Inc., 207 Va. 123, 125-26 , 148 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1966); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 1954).

1991The court went on to state, however, that “the mere fact that a record or report qualifies as a public document does not automatically overcome the hearsay objection unless the document relates facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official to which he could testify should he be called as a witness.” Id.; see also Bailey, Adm’x v. Hunter, Inc., 207 Va. 123, 125-26 , 148 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1966); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 1954).

1991The court went on to state, however, that “the mere fact that a record or report qualifies as a public document does not automatically overcome the hearsay objection unless the document relates facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official to which he could testify should he be called as a witness.” Id.; see also Bailey, Adm’x v. Hunter, Inc., 207 Va. 123, 125-26 , 148 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1966); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 1954).