provision rule in Maryland

2016The language of § 33, the provision under analysis in Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655 , 399 A.2d 250 (1979) and the predecessor to L & E § 9-610, provided: Whenever by statute ..., whether as part of a pension system or otherwise, any benefit or benefits are furnished employees ..., the benefit or benefits when furnished by the employer shall satisfy and discharge pro tanto or in full as the case may be, the liability or obligation of the employer ... for any benefit under this article.

2016The language of § 33, the provision under analysis in Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655 , 399 A.2d 250 (1979) and the predecessor to L & E § 9-610, provided: Whenever by statute ..., whether as part of a pension system or otherwise, any benefit or benefits are furnished employees ..., the benefit or benefits when furnished by the employer shall satisfy and discharge pro tanto or in full as the case may be, the liability or obligation of the employer ... for any benefit under this article.

2014Unless we presume that the trial judges were not aware of the requirement that the waiver be knowing and voluntary – i.e., that the judges did not know why they were engaging 1 In Valonis, in a sharp break from precedent (see, e.g., Boulden v. State, 414 Md. 284, 295-96 , 995 A.2d 268 (2010); Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 322-24 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006)) and from the rules of construction set forth in Maryland Rule 1-201, the Court indicated that it would no longer consider the “totality of the circumstances” in determining the consequences of a failure to comply with a provision of a rule tha

2014Unless we presume that the trial judges were not aware of the requirement that the waiver be knowing and voluntary – i.e., that the judges did not know why they were engaging 1 In Valonis, in a sharp break from precedent (see, e.g., Boulden v. State, 414 Md. 284, 295-96 , 995 A.2d 268 (2010); Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 322-24 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006)) and from the rules of construction set forth in Maryland Rule 1-201, the Court indicated that it would no longer consider the “totality of the circumstances” in determining the consequences of a failure to comply with a provision of a rule tha

2014Unless we presume that the trial judges were not aware of the requirement that the waiver be knowing and voluntary – i.e., that the judges did not know why they were engaging 1 In Valonis, in a sharp break from precedent (see, e.g., Boulden v. State, 414 Md. 284, 295-96 , 995 A.2d 268 (2010); Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 322-24 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006)) and from the rules of construction set forth in Maryland Rule 1-201, the Court indicated that it would no longer consider the “totality of the circumstances” in determining the consequences of a failure to comply with a provision of a rule tha

2014Unless we presume that the trial judges were not aware of the requirement that the waiver be knowing and voluntary – i.e., that the judges did not know why they were engaging 1 In Valonis, in a sharp break from precedent (see, e.g., Boulden v. State, 414 Md. 284, 295-96 , 995 A.2d 268 (2010); Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 322-24 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006)) and from the rules of construction set forth in Maryland Rule 1-201, the Court indicated that it would no longer consider the “totality of the circumstances” in determining the consequences of a failure to comply with a provision of a rule tha

2014Nalls & Melvin v. State, 437 Md. 674 , 89 A.3d 1126 , 2014 WL 1613399 (2014); Morgan v. State, 438 Md. 11 , 89 A.3d 1149 , 2014 WL 1621948 (2014). .

2014Nalls & Melvin v. State, 437 Md. 674 , 89 A.3d 1126 , 2014 WL 1613399 (2014); Morgan v. State, 438 Md. 11 , 89 A.3d 1149 , 2014 WL 1621948 (2014). .

2014Nalls & Melvin v. State, 437 Md. 674 , 89 A.3d 1126 , 2014 WL 1613399 (2014); Morgan v. State, 438 Md. 11 , 89 A.3d 1149 , 2014 WL 1621948 (2014). .

2014Nalls & Melvin v. State, 437 Md. 674 , 89 A.3d 1126 , 2014 WL 1613399 (2014); Morgan v. State, 438 Md. 11 , 89 A.3d 1149 , 2014 WL 1621948 (2014). .

2013Again, we emphasize that this Court will not “add [or] delete language in a statute so as to subvert [the issuing] body’s plain and unambiguous intent.” Foley, 410 Md. at 152 , 978 A.2d 222 (citation omitted). 8 The circuit court did not err in granting the Commission’s motion to dismiss Bush’s Petition as untimely.

2013Again, we emphasize that this Court will not “add [or] delete language in a statute so as to subvert [the issuing] body’s plain and unambiguous intent.” Foley, 410 Md. at 152 , 978 A.2d 222 (citation omitted). 8 The circuit court did not err in granting the Commission’s motion to dismiss Bush’s Petition as untimely.

2007While deciding the provision did not bar a deputy commissioner from issuing an award where the previous payment had been voluntary and did not fall under § 922, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted the claimant requested a hearing “two years after his last receipt of a voluntary payment of compensation from the carrier.” Id. at 5, 95 S.Ct. at 2019 .

2007See § 9-110(b) of the Courts Article, excepting from the privilege matters which ‘affect the criminal laws of this state.’ ” Turning to the three statutory exceptions to the accountant-client privilege, the only one which has been suggested as a basis for a civil fraud exception is the provision that the privilege “does not affect: * * * (2) The criminal laws of the State ***”(§ 9—110(d)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article). 13 The meaning of this exception was specifically addressed by this Court in two companion cases, heard and decided at the same times, In re Special Investig

2007See § 9-110(b) of the Courts Article, excepting from the privilege matters which ‘affect the criminal laws of this state.’ ” Turning to the three statutory exceptions to the accountant-client privilege, the only one which has been suggested as a basis for a civil fraud exception is the provision that the privilege “does not affect: * * * (2) The criminal laws of the State ***”(§ 9—110(d)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article). 13 The meaning of this exception was specifically addressed by this Court in two companion cases, heard and decided at the same times, In re Special Investig

2007See § 9-110(b) of the Courts Article, excepting from the privilege matters which ‘affect the criminal laws of this state.’ ” Turning to the three statutory exceptions to the accountant-client privilege, the only one which has been suggested as a basis for a civil fraud exception is the provision that the privilege “does not affect: * * * (2) The criminal laws of the State ***”(§ 9—110(d)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article). 13 The meaning of this exception was specifically addressed by this Court in two companion cases, heard and decided at the same times, In re Special Investig

2007See § 9-110(b) of the Courts Article, excepting from the privilege matters which ‘affect the criminal laws of this state.’ ” Turning to the three statutory exceptions to the accountant-client privilege, the only one which has been suggested as a basis for a civil fraud exception is the provision that the privilege “does not affect: * * * (2) The criminal laws of the State ***”(§ 9—110(d)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article). 13 The meaning of this exception was specifically addressed by this Court in two companion cases, heard and decided at the same times, In re Special Investig

2001Co. v. State Tax Comm., 238 Iowa 1369 , 28 N. W. 2d 799, 806 , in dealing with a similar rule promulgated under a similar statute, the court said: “It is clear this provision of the rule is designed to effectuate the purpose of the statute to protect Iowa retailers.

2001Co. v. State Tax Comm., 238 Iowa 1369 , 28 N. W. 2d 799, 806 , in dealing with a similar rule promulgated under a similar statute, the court said: “It is clear this provision of the rule is designed to effectuate the purpose of the statute to protect Iowa retailers.

1999The provision of this rule, “that different offenses are to be charged in a separate count for each offense, even though they may be charged in the same charging document, is mandatory.” Ayre v. State, 21 Md.App. 61, 65 , 318 A.2d 828 (1974).

1999The provision of this rule, “that different offenses are to be charged in a separate count for each offense, even though they may be charged in the same charging document, is mandatory.” Ayre v. State, 21 Md.App. 61, 65 , 318 A.2d 828 (1974).

1998Tharp v. Disabled American Veterans, 121 Md.App. 548, 551-52 , 710 A.2d 378 (1998).

1998Tharp v. Disabled American Veterans, 121 Md.App. 548, 551-52 , 710 A.2d 378 (1998).

1989Sanchez, 782 F.2d at 932 .

1961We find the rule to be that, in the absence of an intention manifested to the contrary, all of *243 ficers continue to hold their offices until they are superseded by duly commissioned and qualified successors, whether it is or is not so provided in terms in the constitution or statutes. ifc jjc í¡< “The controlling, if not the sole consideration has been that the law requires, in the public interest, that the offices be filled at all times, without interruption, and to this end the intention and understanding that incumbents shall hold until their successors qualify, has grown up and taken po

1961We find the rule to be that, in the absence of an intention manifested to the contrary, all of *243 ficers continue to hold their offices until they are superseded by duly commissioned and qualified successors, whether it is or is not so provided in terms in the constitution or statutes. ifc jjc í¡< “The controlling, if not the sole consideration has been that the law requires, in the public interest, that the offices be filled at all times, without interruption, and to this end the intention and understanding that incumbents shall hold until their successors qualify, has grown up and taken po

1961A comprehensive and often quoted definition of what constitutes a de facto officer, cited in part by Judge Markell for the Court in Buckler v. Bowen, 198 Md. 357 , 84 A. 2d 99 (1951), is found in the leading case of State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1871), and reads as follows (at pages 471-472) : “An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they in *244 volve the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised, “First, without a known appointment or

1961We find the rule to be that, in the absence of an intention manifested to the contrary, all of *243 ficers continue to hold their offices until they are superseded by duly commissioned and qualified successors, whether it is or is not so provided in terms in the constitution or statutes. ifc jjc í¡< “The controlling, if not the sole consideration has been that the law requires, in the public interest, that the offices be filled at all times, without interruption, and to this end the intention and understanding that incumbents shall hold until their successors qualify, has grown up and taken po

1961We find the rule to be that, in the absence of an intention manifested to the contrary, all of *243 ficers continue to hold their offices until they are superseded by duly commissioned and qualified successors, whether it is or is not so provided in terms in the constitution or statutes. ifc jjc í¡< “The controlling, if not the sole consideration has been that the law requires, in the public interest, that the offices be filled at all times, without interruption, and to this end the intention and understanding that incumbents shall hold until their successors qualify, has grown up and taken po

1961A comprehensive and often quoted definition of what constitutes a de facto officer, cited in part by Judge Markell for the Court in Buckler v. Bowen, 198 Md. 357 , 84 A. 2d 99 (1951), is found in the leading case of State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1871), and reads as follows (at pages 471-472) : “An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they in *244 volve the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised, “First, without a known appointment or

1961A comprehensive and often quoted definition of what constitutes a de facto officer, cited in part by Judge Markell for the Court in Buckler v. Bowen, 198 Md. 357 , 84 A. 2d 99 (1951), is found in the leading case of State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1871), and reads as follows (at pages 471-472) : “An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they in *244 volve the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised, “First, without a known appointment or

1938So, unless the ordinance is void, in whole or in part, because repugnant to a constitutional inhibition, or the particular provision at bar is not within the grant of the power conferred upon the municipality by article 66B of the Code of Public General Laws, the ordinance will be sustained.” The authorities in this state and other jurisdictions were again exhaustively reviewed by Judge Urner in Kramer v. Baltimore, 166 Md. 324 , 171 A. 70, 73 .

1938So, unless the ordinance is void, in whole or in part, because repugnant to a constitutional inhibition, or the particular provision at bar is not within the grant of the power conferred upon the municipality by article 66B of the Code of Public General Laws, the ordinance will be sustained.” The authorities in this state and other jurisdictions were again exhaustively reviewed by Judge Urner in Kramer v. Baltimore, 166 Md. 324 , 171 A. 70, 73 .

1933After the decision at the current term in the case of Jack Lewis, Inc., v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146 , 164 A. 220 , the constitutionality of the general provisions of Ordinance No. 1247, passed on March 30th, 1931, by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, wo-uld seem to- be implicitly recognized, with the exception of section (par.) 32, subsection g-3 and section (par.) 33, subsection (b), which were held invalid for plain and clearly stated reasons.

1933After the decision at the current term in the case of Jack Lewis, Inc., v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146 , 164 A. 220 , the constitutionality of the general provisions of Ordinance No. 1247, passed on March 30th, 1931, by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, wo-uld seem to- be implicitly recognized, with the exception of section (par.) 32, subsection g-3 and section (par.) 33, subsection (b), which were held invalid for plain and clearly stated reasons.