provision rule in California

2013CRizzo v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (2013) 969 F.Supp.2d 1180 .) 23 A public entity cannot agree in advance that any time its public employee is subsequently charged with a crime, the provision of a defense would be in the best interests of the public entity and the public employee will have acted in good faith and without malice.

2013Cal. Aug. 30. 2013, CV 12-04347 DMG (FMOx)) 2013 WL 4675063 .) 20 A public entity cannot agree in advance that any time its public employee is subsequently charged with a crime, the provision of a defense would be in the best interests of the public entity and the public employee will have acted in good faith and without malice.

1964In Estate of Kearns, 36 Cal.2d 531 [ 225 P.2d 218 ], a will, following a specific bequest of property, contained a subsequent clause: “I hereby direct my Executor ... to provide for any other kin. ...” At p. 537 the court said: '“It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that clause 5 of the' will is not on its face equally as clear as the provision in clause 1, and accordingly, in view of section 104" of the Probate Code, it cannot be said that a trust or equitable charge has been created which would limit the absolute bequest to' respondent unless the intent of the testator to do so can b

1964In Estate of Kearns, 36 Cal.2d 531 [ 225 P.2d 218 ], a will, following a specific bequest of property, contained a subsequent clause: “I hereby direct my Executor ... to provide for any other kin. ...” At p. 537 the court said: '“It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that clause 5 of the' will is not on its face equally as clear as the provision in clause 1, and accordingly, in view of section 104" of the Probate Code, it cannot be said that a trust or equitable charge has been created which would limit the absolute bequest to' respondent unless the intent of the testator to do so can b

2023Relevant case law In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945 , commonly referred to as Powerine after the real party in interest, our Supreme Court interpreted a provision in the standard comprehensive general liability insurance policy requiring indemnity for “ ‘sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages.’ ” (Id. at p. 951.) The court concluded that provision limited the insurer’s duty to indemnify to “money ordered by a court.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the 28 insurer did not have to indemnify the insured for “expenses required by a

2023Relevant case law In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945 , commonly referred to as Powerine after the real party in interest, our Supreme Court interpreted a provision in the standard comprehensive general liability insurance policy requiring indemnity for “ ‘sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages.’ ” (Id. at p. 951.) The court concluded that provision limited the insurer’s duty to indemnify to “money ordered by a court.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the 28 insurer did not have to indemnify the insured for “expenses required by a

2024(Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1477 .) This provision also did not bar admission of the September 24 letter because Evidence Code section 1154 is claim specific, in that it bars admission of an offer to accept a compromise of a claim only to prove the invalidity of that claim.

2024(Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1477 .) This provision also did not bar admission of the September 24 letter because Evidence Code section 1154 is claim specific, in that it bars admission of an offer to accept a compromise of a claim only to prove the invalidity of that claim.

2022(See Eureka Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 353, 362 [“It is not necessary that a specific provision for a hearing and taking of evidence be stated for . . . section 1094.5 to apply”]; see also Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 13:203 [“Some cases imply a right to an evidentiary adjudicatory hearing (and thus to § 1094.5 review) where the applicable statute calls for an ‘administrative appeal’ or a ‘meeting’ or permits an employee to be discharged only ‘for cause’ . . .”], citing Nathan 11 G. v. Clovis Unified School Dis

1988For example, in Chavez v. Civil Service Com. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 324 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 197 ], the trial court denied respondent’s authority to conduct a hearing because of a probationary employee’s limited right to appeal his release.

2018By contrast, [ Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 33(b) ], governing interrogatories, states that the answers to interrogatories "may be used [at trial] to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence." The omission of a similar provision in rule 36(b) indicates that, although admissions have binding effect, denials do not have such an effect and cannot be introduced in evidence.' [Citation.] Therefore, the trial court 'incorrectly concluded that a denial of a request for admission is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement' to impeach a witness at trial. [Citation.]" ( *564 Go

2018By contrast, [Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 33(b)], governing interrogatories, states that the answers to interrogatories “may be used [at trial] to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence.” The omission of a similar provision in rule 36(b) indicates that, although admissions have binding effect, denials do not have such an effect and cannot be introduced in evidence.’ [Citation.] Therefore, the trial court ‘incorrectly concluded that a denial of a request for admission is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement’ to impeach a witness at trial. [Citation.]” (Gonsalves,

2018By contrast, [ Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 33(b) ], governing interrogatories, states that the answers to interrogatories "may be used [at trial] to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence." The omission of a similar provision in rule 36(b) indicates that, although admissions have binding effect, denials do not have such an effect and cannot be introduced in evidence.' [Citation.] Therefore, the trial court 'incorrectly concluded that a denial of a request for admission is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement' to impeach a witness at trial. [Citation.]" ( *564 Go

2018By contrast, [Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 33(b)], governing interrogatories, states that the answers to interrogatories “may be used [at trial] to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence.” The omission of a similar provision in rule 36(b) indicates that, although admissions have binding effect, denials do not have such an effect and cannot be introduced in evidence.’ [Citation.] Therefore, the trial court ‘incorrectly concluded that a denial of a request for admission is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement’ to impeach a witness at trial. [Citation.]” (Gonsalves,

2018By contrast, [ Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 33(b) ], governing interrogatories, states that the answers to interrogatories "may be used [at trial] to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence." The omission of a similar provision in rule 36(b) indicates that, although admissions have binding effect, denials do not have such an effect and cannot be introduced in evidence.' [Citation.] Therefore, the trial court 'incorrectly concluded that a denial of a request for admission is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement' to impeach a witness at trial. [Citation.]" ( *564 Go

2018By contrast, [Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 33(b)], governing interrogatories, states that the answers to interrogatories “may be used [at trial] to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence.” The omission of a similar provision in rule 36(b) indicates that, although admissions have binding effect, denials do not have such an effect and cannot be introduced in evidence.’ [Citation.] Therefore, the trial court ‘incorrectly concluded that a denial of a request for admission is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement’ to impeach a witness at trial. [Citation.]” (Gonsalves,

2017Aguirre held a "representative plaintiff need not identify, much less locate, individual class members to establish the existence of an ascertainable class." ( Aguirre, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301 , 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 .) "Nor must the representative plaintiff establish a means for providing personal notice of the action to individual class members," the court explained. ( Ibid. ) This language is more absolute than we find comfortable.

2017Aguirre held a "representative plaintiff need not identify, much less locate, individual class members to establish the existence of an ascertainable class." ( Aguirre, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301 , 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 .) "Nor must the representative plaintiff establish a means for providing personal notice of the action to individual class members," the court explained. ( Ibid. ) This language is more absolute than we find comfortable.

2015In Truta , the class plaintiffs challenged a provision in a standard car rental contract providing that for a fee, the rental company would agree to bear the cost of any damage to the vehicle. ( Truta, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 807 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 .) Plaintiffs argued that this provision converted the transaction into one of insurance and thus the defendants were required to comply with insurance statutes. ( Id. at pp. 807-808, 812, 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 .) Rejecting this argument, the Truta court reasoned that the "principal object and purpose of the transaction" and "the element which give

2015In Truta , the class plaintiffs challenged a provision in a standard car rental contract providing that for a fee, the rental company would agree to bear the cost of any damage to the vehicle. ( Truta, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 807 , 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 .) Plaintiffs argued that this provision converted the transaction into one of insurance and thus the defendants were required to comply with insurance statutes. ( Id. at pp. 807-808, 812, 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 .) Rejecting this argument, the Truta court reasoned that the "principal object and purpose of the transaction" and "the element which give

2014Ct. San Diego County, 2005, No. GIC841845).) As we noted in Torres, "[t]hat created an unusual situation . . . as . . . the provision of a defense would require the City to pay both prosecution and defense costs." (Torres, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 219 .) Aguirre eventually dismissed the board members from both civil actions, and they obtained defense costs under resolution R-297335, along with attorney fees incurred in obtaining defense costs.

2013Ct. San Diego County, 2005, No. GIC841845).) As we noted in Torres , “[t]hat created an unusual situation ... as ... the provision of a defense would require the City to pay both prosecution and defense costs.” (Torres, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 219 .) Aguirre eventually dismissed the board members from both civil actions, and they obtained defense costs under resolution No. R-297335, along with attorney fees incurred in obtaining defense costs.

2014In this appeal, the issue is whether the City's resolution also requires it to pay the board members' criminal defense costs in Lexin, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1050 , an action the San Diego County District Attorney brought against them for felony violation of the states' conflict of interest statute, Government Code section 1090.2 The City appeals a summary judgment for the board members in their declaratory relief action, contending (1) the resolution does not apply to criminal proceedings and (2) section 995.8 precludes an award of defense costs because, after commencement of the criminal action,

2014In this appeal, the issue is whether the City's resolution also requires it to pay the board members' criminal defense costs in Lexin, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1050 , an action the San Diego County District Attorney brought against them for felony violation of the states' conflict of interest statute, Government Code section 1090.2 The City appeals a summary judgment for the board members in their declaratory relief action, contending (1) the resolution does not apply to criminal proceedings and (2) section 995.8 precludes an award of defense costs because, after commencement of the criminal action,

1979As we explain, we have concluded that the trial court erred in applying the 1977 statute to a crime committed before the effective date of that enactment. (12) For more than a century, section 3 of the Penal Code has specifically provided that no provision of the code "is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Although past decisions have held that this provision does not bar the retroactive application of amendatory legislation which mitigates or reduces the punishment for a crime (see, e.g., In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 908 ]; People v. Rossi (1

1979As we explain, we have concluded that the trial court erred in applying the 1977 statute to a crime committed before the effective date of that enactment. (12) For more than a century, section 3 of the Penal Code has specifically provided that no provision of the code "is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Although past decisions have held that this provision does not bar the retroactive application of amendatory legislation which mitigates or reduces the punishment for a crime (see, e.g., In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 908 ]; People v. Rossi (1

2025(Frei, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1510 .) In a prior appeal, the appellate court reversed, and in an unpublished decision, directed the trial court on remand to enter judgment in favor of the defendants-sellers.

2025(In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e).) In connection with a section 388 petition, the parent must show a “genuine change of circumstances” and not merely changing circumstances.

2024Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 386 , 389– 390 (Caminetti); see Stats. 1927, ch. 744, § 1, p. 1404.) This earlier version of the statute also included a provision for waiver of disqualification by written stipulation.

2023(Stats. 2006, ch. 838 (S.B. 678); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9 .) That provision stated that juvenile courts and county welfare departments “have an affirmative and continuing duty” to inquire whether a child involved in a dependency proceeding is or may be an Indian child if the child had been placed in foster care or was “at risk of entering foster care.” (Isaiah W., at p. 9; former § 224.3, subd. (a).) Though former section 224.3 did not specify which individuals should be interviewed, our courts interpreted the provision to require inquiry of the parents only.