provision rule in Ohio

2024“The test for prejudice is ‘ “whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” ’ ” Pierce at ¶ 13 , quoting Dangler at ¶ 16 , quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). {¶43} “Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Dangler at ¶ 17 .

2024State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). 6 Case No. 2024-A-0021 {¶16} The Supreme Court has clarified this standard, requiring that three questions be answered: “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17 . {¶17} Given the language of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the advisements relate not

2024Id. at ¶ 15; see, e.g., State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86 , 2008-Ohio-509 , 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22 (trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that it explain the maximum penalty when it made no mention of defendant’s mandatory five years of postrelease control in the plea colloquy). {¶62} On appellate review, the questions to be answered are “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstra

2024Id. at ¶ 15; see, e.g., State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86 , 2008-Ohio-509 , 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22 (trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that it explain the maximum penalty when it made no mention of defendant’s mandatory five years of postrelease control in the plea colloquy). {¶62} On appellate review, the questions to be answered are “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstra

2025Relevant to the present appeal is Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), which provides that the court in a felony case shall not accept a plea of guilty: “without first addressing the defendant personally” and “[i]nforming the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify

2025Relevant to the present appeal is Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), which provides that the court in a felony case shall not accept a plea of guilty: “without first addressing the defendant personally” and “[d]etermining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding . . . of the maximum penalty involved.” {¶12} “On appellate review the questions to be answered are ‘(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating

2026When an appellant seeks to vacate his plea on appeal because the plea was not entered in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner due to the trial court’s failure to comply with Crim.R. 11, “the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses [an appellant] from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the [appellant] met that burden?” (Brackets in original.) State v. Morgan, 202

2025And (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the [appellant] met that burden?”’” State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2008, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Morgan, 2021-Ohio-3996, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17 .

2025And (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the [appellant] met that burden?”’” State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2008, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Morgan, 2021-Ohio-3996, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17 .

2025And (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the [appellant] met that burden?”’” State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2008, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Morgan, 2021-Ohio-3996, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17 .

2008See State v. Bellman (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 208 , 210 (finding that the provision that the hearing shall be held before sentencing is not jurisdictional); see, also, State v. Webb , 9th Dist.

2007See State v. Bellman (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 208 , 210 (finding that the provision that the hearing shall be held before sentencing is not jurisdictional); see, also, State v. Webb , 9th Dist.

2026When an appellant seeks to vacate his plea on appeal because the plea was not entered in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner due to the trial court’s failure to comply with Crim.R. 11, “the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses [an appellant] from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the [appellant] met that burden?” (Brackets in original.) State v. Morgan, 202

2026When an appellant argues on appeal that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and seeks to vacate his plea because of the trial court’s failure to comply with Crim.R. 11, “the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17 .

2025State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86 (1977). {¶52} The Supreme Court of Ohio has formulated the following three-part test to determine whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his or her plea: (1) Has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule?

2025Veney at ¶ 15; State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 93 (1977). {¶15} Simplified, the questions to be answered are: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?

1998We hold, therefore, that Civ.R. 60(B)(2) is the provision of the rule that applies to Strack’s claim.” Id. at 174 , 637 N.E.2d at 916 .

1998We hold, therefore, that Civ.R. 60(B)(2) is the provision of the rule that applies to Strack’s claim.” Id. at 174 , 637 N.E.2d at 916 .

2026The Trial Court Did Not Comply with the Maximum-Penalty Requirement in Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) {¶13} Before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea in a felony case, a trial court must personally address the defendant and must ensure, among other things, that the defendant is — in the words of Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) — “making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved.” And the term “maximum penalty” in turn refers to ‘[t]he heaviest punishment permitted by law.’” State v. Fikes, 2021-Ohio-2597, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.), quoting Black’s

2026Wilmington, 2023-Ohio-512, at ¶ 26 (11th Dist.).

2026The Trial Court Did Not Comply with the Maximum-Penalty Requirement in Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) {¶13} Before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea in a felony case, a trial court must personally address the defendant and must ensure, among other things, that the defendant is — in the words of Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) — “making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved.” And the term “maximum penalty” in turn refers to ‘[t]he heaviest punishment permitted by law.’” State v. Fikes, 2021-Ohio-2597, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.), quoting Black’s

2026We have said that “a showing of prejudice by the party seeking reversal” is “a basic point of procedure that is necessary to reverse a [board] order.” (Cleaned up.) In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 2014-Ohio-4271, ¶ 31 ; see also In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3301, ¶ 16 (observing that even if the board “misapplied its filing requirements,” the appellant still had to show that it was harmed by the misapplication to warrant reversal of the board’s order); In re Application of Champaign Wind, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-1513, ¶ 15 (“Even if the board errs in a procedural or ev

2026As a result, the analysis of an appellate challenge based upon Crim.R. 11(C)(2) . . . involve[es] three main questions: ‘(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?’ Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130, at ¶ 25 (3d Dist.), quoting Dangler at ¶ 17 .

2026We have said that “a showing of prejudice by the party seeking reversal” is “a basic point of procedure that is necessary to reverse a [board] order.” (Cleaned up.) In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 2014-Ohio-4271, ¶ 31 ; see also In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3301, ¶ 16 (observing that even if the board “misapplied its filing requirements,” the appellant still had to show that it was harmed by the misapplication to warrant reversal of the board’s order); In re Application of Champaign Wind, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-1513, ¶ 15 (“Even if the board errs in a procedural or ev

2025The Supreme Court of Ohio has formulated the following three-part test to determine whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his or plea: “ (1) Has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) If the trial court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) If a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” State v. Barhams, 2025-Ohio-270, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Dangler, 2020- Ohio-2765, ¶ 17.

2025If the trial judge substantially misinforms a defendant about the consequences of the plea, “the defendant could not have entered the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Id. at ¶ 39. “[T]he point of this principle is ‘[w]hen a defendant is induced to enter a guilty plea by erroneous representations as to the applicable law, the plea has not been entered knowingly and intelligently.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Scott, 2025-Ohio-806, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.); State v. Mullins, 2023-Ohio- PAGE 4 OF 13 Case No. 2025-P-0013 803, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.) (“[w]hen material misinformation about a cons

2025See also State v. Tancak, 2022-Ohio-880, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). {¶7} When considering whether a plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, “the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of 4 prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Dangler at ¶ 17 .

2025If the trial judge substantially misinforms a defendant about the consequences of the plea, “the defendant could not have entered the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Id. at ¶ 39. “[T]he point of this principle is ‘[w]hen a defendant is induced to enter a guilty plea by erroneous representations as to the applicable law, the plea has not been entered knowingly and intelligently.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Malorni, 2024-Ohio-1122, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.); State v. Mullins, 2023-Ohio- 803, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.) (“[w]hen material misinformation about a consequence of a guilty plea is con

2025Brinkman at ¶ 12 , citing Miller at ¶ 13, 16 . {¶ 14} When an appellant seeks to vacate his plea on appeal because the plea was not entered in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary matter due to the trial court’s failure to comply with Crim.R. 11, “‘“the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied 6. fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses [an appellant] from the burden of demonstrating prejudice?

2025State v. Dovangpraseuth, 2006-Ohio-1533, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.).