provision hearing in Alabama

1915The provision of the rule that bills of exceptions should contain a statement of the testimony-in extenso, when the general affirmative charge has been asked, does not authorize the setting forth of the stenographic report of questions and answers, but only the statement of the testimony in narrative form . — Wood ward Iron Co. v. Herndon, 130 Ala. 364 , 30 South. 370 .

1901This contention is based upon a mistaken interpretation of the provision of the rule to the effect that bills of exceptions may contain a statement of testimony in extenso, when the affirmative charge has been asked in good faith. — Woodward Iron Co. v. Herndon, 130 Ala. 364 .

2013Instead, the dis-positive factor in these cases was the character of the universities themselves as "part of the [S]tate”: " ‘Our cases are clear that the operation of a hospital is a “governmental function,” but even if we should classify the operation of University Hospital as being a "business function,” nevertheless, the State could not be sued.' ” Sarradett, 484 So.2d at 427 (quoting Hutchinson, 288 Ala. at 24 , 256 So.2d at 284 ). .

2013Instead, the dis-positive factor in these cases was the character of the universities themselves as "part of the [S]tate”: " ‘Our cases are clear that the operation of a hospital is a “governmental function,” but even if we should classify the operation of University Hospital as being a "business function,” nevertheless, the State could not be sued.' ” Sarradett, 484 So.2d at 427 (quoting Hutchinson, 288 Ala. at 24 , 256 So.2d at 284 ). .

2013Instead, the dis-positive factor in these cases was the character of the universities themselves as "part of the [S]tate”: " ‘Our cases are clear that the operation of a hospital is a “governmental function,” but even if we should classify the operation of University Hospital as being a "business function,” nevertheless, the State could not be sued.' ” Sarradett, 484 So.2d at 427 (quoting Hutchinson, 288 Ala. at 24 , 256 So.2d at 284 ). .

2008Co., 293 Ala. at 103 , 300 So.2d at 361 .

2008Co., 293 Ala. at 103 , 300 So.2d at 361 .

1999Co. of Tennessee v. Jericho Management, Inc., 722 So.2d 740 (Ala. 1998), for its finding that this provision is standard, because Jericho is not binding precedent, inasmuch as only three justices concurred, two more concurred only in the result, three dissented, and the last recused himself.

1999Co. of Tennessee v. Jericho Management, Inc. , 722 So.2d 740 (Ala. 1998), for its finding that this provision is standard, because Jericho is not binding precedent, inasmuch as only three justices concurred, two more concurred only in the result, three dissented, and the last recused himself.

1999Because the defendants have presented no proof to this Court that the arbitration agreement is standard or familiar to title insurance policies, we cannot justly find or hold that the parties contemplated it so as to effectuate or to validate its incorporation by reference into the title insurance binder under the rule of Cheeseman, supra, or that the defendant legitimately included it in the title insurance policy under the rule of Gonzales, supra .

1999Because the defendants have presented no proof to this Court that the arbitration agreement is standard or familiar to title insurance policies, we cannot justly find or hold that the parties contemplated it so as to effectuate or to validate its incorporation by reference into the title insurance binder under the rule of Cheeseman, supra , or that the defendant legitimately included it in the title insurance policy under the rule of Gonzalez, supra .

1980Brice v. Brice , 340 So.2d 792 (Ala. 1976).

1974We remand to the trial court to ascertain the applicability of Heller v. New York (1973) 413 U.S. 483 , 93 S.Ct. 2789 , 37 L.Ed.2d 745 , and cases therein cited.

1974We remand to the trial court to ascertain the applicability of Heller v. New York (1973) 413 U.S. 483 , 93 S.Ct. 2789 , 37 L.Ed.2d 745 , and cases therein cited.

1949Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258 , 44 S.Ct. 317, 319 , 68 L.Ed. 667 , stated: “The provision for a hearing implies both the privilege of introducing evidence and the duty of deciding in accordance with it.

1949Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258 , 44 S.Ct. 317, 319 , 68 L.Ed. 667 , stated: “The provision for a hearing implies both the privilege of introducing evidence and the duty of deciding in accordance with it.

1948It must follow that, under a theft policy, an insurer with full knowledge waives the provision or exception of loss by actual theft, where possession is given by the owner, by resting nonliability on other asserted grounds of defense, as that, for example, which is set up in replications 5 and 6 — ■ by a denial of liability on the ground that the policy was void because of the facts averred as to representations of cash purchase price. * * * ’ It would thus appear that this court in the above cited and quoted from case recognizes that the loss was within the coverage of the policy, but that th

1948It must follow that, under a theft policy, an insurer with full knowledge waives the provision or exception of loss by actual theft, where possession is given by the owner, by resting nonliability on other asserted grounds of defense, as that, for example, which is set up in replications 5 and 6 — ■ by a denial of liability on the ground that the policy was void because of the facts averred as to representations of cash purchase price. * * * ’ It would thus appear that this court in the above cited and quoted from case recognizes that the loss was within the coverage of the policy, but that th

1931The conclusions reached in the case of Gould v. Womack, supra, are numbered and paragraphed separately in Webb v. Webb’s heirs, supra. Those numbered 4 and 5 are as follows: “4. ‘That a provision to bar dower, where there is neither mistake, surprise, nor fraud, need not be as valuable as the dower; but it must not be greatly deficient in value; nor would this court be disppsed to institute a nice comparisóh, especially in a case where, though not fully equal in value to the dower, the amount secured in lieu of it was a competent livelihood.’ “5; ‘That the mere fact that the provision is an an

1911It is true that under such a provision the claim sued on must be the same as the one presented, and that an averment in a complaint that the claim sued on had been presented before the bringing of the suit is not sustained by proof of the presentation of a claim for a different amount. —Bland v. City of Mobile, 142 Ala. 142 , 37 South. 843 .