provision rule in Georgia

14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
World Harvest Church, Inc. v. Guideone Mutual Insurancegreen ga · 2010 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017World Harvest Church, 287 Ga. at 152 (1). 11 reservation of rights as an indication that the company has waived the coverage issue. 2017(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 153 (1).	1	1
Rice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green gactapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012To the extent that they are referring to the provision in the standard policy that called for an award to be itemized, based on our holding in Division (1) (a), we 16 Rice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 208 Ga. App. 166, 169 (1) ( 430 SE2d 75 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 17 Willingham, supra. 10 discern no detriment or unfair prejudice to the Bells because the homeowner’s policy did not include that provision. 2012To the extent that they are referring to the provision in the standard policy that called for an award to be itemized, based on our holding in Division (1) (a), we 16 Rice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 208 Ga. App. 166, 169 (1) ( 430 SE2d 75 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 17 Willingham, supra. 10 discern no detriment or unfair prejudice to the Bells because the homeowner’s policy did not include that provision.	1	1
State v. Hendersongreen ga · 1993 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012See State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 ( 436 SE2d 209 ) (1993) (in considering a 60-day hearing requirement in the forfeiture statute, OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), the Court noted that the provision allowed the hearing to be continued for good cause, and “[i]f the 60-day requirement were directory, rather than mandatory, there would be no need for a ‘good cause’ continuance”). 10 Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family & Children Services, 237 Ga. 406, 410 ( 229 SE2d 66 ) (1976) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2012See State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 ( 436 SE2d 209 ) (1993) (in considering a 60-day hearing requirement in the forfeiture statute, OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), the Court noted that the provision allowed the hearing to be continued for good cause, and “[i]f the 60-day requirement were directory, rather than mandatory, there would be no need for a ‘good cause’ continuance”). 10 Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family & Children Services, 237 Ga. 406, 410 ( 229 SE2d 66 ) (1976) (citation and punctuation omitted).	1	1
Sanchez v. Walker County Department of Family & Children Servicesgreen ga · 1976 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012See State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 ( 436 SE2d 209 ) (1993) (in considering a 60-day hearing requirement in the forfeiture statute, OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), the Court noted that the provision allowed the hearing to be continued for good cause, and “[i]f the 60-day requirement were directory, rather than mandatory, there would be no need for a ‘good cause’ continuance”). 10 Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family & Children Services, 237 Ga. 406, 410 ( 229 SE2d 66 ) (1976) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2012See State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 ( 436 SE2d 209 ) (1993) (in considering a 60-day hearing requirement in the forfeiture statute, OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), the Court noted that the provision allowed the hearing to be continued for good cause, and “[i]f the 60-day requirement were directory, rather than mandatory, there would be no need for a ‘good cause’ continuance”). 10 Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family & Children Services, 237 Ga. 406, 410 ( 229 SE2d 66 ) (1976) (citation and punctuation omitted).	1	1
Shessel v. Gaygreen gactapp · 1976 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981 2 sentences 1981See Shessel v. Gay, 139 Ga. App. 429 ( 228 SE2d 361 ) (1976). 1981See Shessel v. Gay, 139 Ga. App. 429 ( 228 SE2d 361 ) (1976).	1	1
Jefferson v. Hackneygreen scotus · 1972 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975 1 sentence 1975Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968).” Nevertheless, the U. S. Supreme Court noted in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 541 (92 SC 1724, 32 LE2d 285), that the actions by the state under federally assisted welfare programs are valid "So long as the State’s actions are not in violation of any specific provision of the Constitution or the Social Security Act . . .” Our examination of the authorities has led us to the conclusion that the provision under which the hearing examiner ruled adversely to appellant i	1	1
Friedlander Bros. v. City of Moultriegreen ga · 1923 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1934–1934 2 sentences 1934Moultrie, 155 Ga. 184, 186 ( 116 S. E. 845 ), that the provision for a hearing, properly construed, gives to the taxpayer of the city an opportunity to submit evidence to support his objections to any assessment which he desires to contest, and to show that the same is excessive. 1934Moultrie, 155 Ga. 184, 186 ( 116 S. E. 845 ), that the provision for a hearing, properly construed, gives to the taxpayer of the city an opportunity to submit evidence to support his objections to any assessment which he desires to contest, and to show that the same is excessive.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (17)

Case	Cited	Years
Willingham v. Willingham green ga · 1991 1 sentence 2012To the extent that they are referring to the provision in the standard policy that called for an award to be itemized, based on our holding in Division (1) (a), we 16 Rice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 208 Ga. App. 166, 169 (1) ( 430 SE2d 75 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 17 Willingham, supra. 10 discern no detriment or unfair prejudice to the Bells because the homeowner’s policy did not include that provision.	1	2012–2012
King v. Smith green scotus · 1968 1 sentence 1975Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968).” Nevertheless, the U. S. Supreme Court noted in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 541 (92 SC 1724, 32 LE2d 285), that the actions by the state under federally assisted welfare programs are valid "So long as the State’s actions are not in violation of any specific provision of the Constitution or the Social Security Act . . .” Our examination of the authorities has led us to the conclusion that the provision under which the hearing examiner ruled adversely to appellant i	1	1975–1975
Carleson v. Remillard green scotus · 1972 1 sentence 1975Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968).” Nevertheless, the U. S. Supreme Court noted in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 541 (92 SC 1724, 32 LE2d 285), that the actions by the state under federally assisted welfare programs are valid "So long as the State’s actions are not in violation of any specific provision of the Constitution or the Social Security Act . . .” Our examination of the authorities has led us to the conclusion that the provision under which the hearing examiner ruled adversely to appellant i	1	1975–1975
Townsend v. Swank green scotus · 1971 1 sentence 1975Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968).” Nevertheless, the U. S. Supreme Court noted in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 541 (92 SC 1724, 32 LE2d 285), that the actions by the state under federally assisted welfare programs are valid "So long as the State’s actions are not in violation of any specific provision of the Constitution or the Social Security Act . . .” Our examination of the authorities has led us to the conclusion that the provision under which the hearing examiner ruled adversely to appellant i	1	1975–1975
Burton v. Kearse neutral ga · 1949 2 sentences 1967Burton v. Kearse, 204 Ga. 765 ( 51 SE2d 796 ) and cases cited therein. 1967Burton v. Kearse, 204 Ga. 765 ( 51 SE2d 796 ) and cases cited therein.	1	1967–1967
Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance v. Franklin green ga · 1924 2 sentences 1961Co., the following holding in Corporation of Royal Exchange Assurance of London v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 644 (1, 1a) ( 124 S. E. 172 , 38 A.L.R. 626 ) is controlling: “A provision in a policy of fire insurance that, ‘No officer, agent, or other representative of this company shall have power to waive any of the terms of this policy, unless such waiver be written upon or attached hereto, nor shall any privilege or permission affecting the insurance under this policy exist or be claimed by the assured unless so written or attached,’ is valid and binding upon the insured, {a) But the insurer may be e 1961Co., the following holding in Corporation of Royal Exchange Assurance of London v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 644 (1, 1a) ( 124 S. E. 172 , 38 A.L.R. 626 ) is controlling: “A provision in a policy of fire insurance that, ‘No officer, agent, or other representative of this company shall have power to waive any of the terms of this policy, unless such waiver be written upon or attached hereto, nor shall any privilege or permission affecting the insurance under this policy exist or be claimed by the assured unless so written or attached,’ is valid and binding upon the insured, {a) But the insurer may be e	1	1961–1961
Harp v. First National Bank green ga · 1931 2 sentences 1960Bank of Reynolds, 173 Ga. 768 (3) ( 161 S. E. 355 ), and cit. 1960Bank of Reynolds, 173 Ga. 768 (3) ( 161 S. E. 355 ), and cit.	1	1960–1960
Montgomery v. Reynolds green ga · 1906 1 sentence 1959Bank v. Kendrick, 124 Ga. 1053 ( 53 S. E. 576 ), the Supreme Court held that where an order required the movant to file a brief of evidence on or before a specified date prior to the hearing on the motion for new trial, “it was m.ot within the power of the judge before the hearing and at a time when the court was not in session to extend, by an ex parte order, the time within which the brief of evidence should be filed.” We are not dealing with such a situation in this case, however, in view of the specific provision in the rule nisi as to the time for filing of the brief.	1	1959–1959
Broadway National Bank v. Kendrick neutral ga · 1906 1 sentence 1959Bank v. Kendrick, 124 Ga. 1053 ( 53 S. E. 576 ), the Supreme Court held that where an order required the movant to file a brief of evidence on or before a specified date prior to the hearing on the motion for new trial, “it was m.ot within the power of the judge before the hearing and at a time when the court was not in session to extend, by an ex parte order, the time within which the brief of evidence should be filed.” We are not dealing with such a situation in this case, however, in view of the specific provision in the rule nisi as to the time for filing of the brief.	1	1959–1959
Smoot v. Donaldson neutral gactapp · 1959 2 sentences 1959“Where a motion for a new trial is filed during term time and the rule nisi ordered during the term sets a time for hearing in vacation and allows the movant until the ‘final hearing’ or the ‘hearing, whenever it may be’ or woi'cfe of similar import, the movant has until the hearing to file the brief of evidence and a continuance of the hearing whether by order or by operation of law also extends the time for the filing of the brief.” Smoot v. Donaldson, 99 Ga. App. 191 ( 108 S. E. 2d 295 ). 1959“Where a motion for a new trial is filed during term time and the rule nisi ordered during the term sets a time for hearing in vacation and allows the movant until the ‘final hearing’ or the ‘hearing, whenever it may be’ or woi'cfe of similar import, the movant has until the hearing to file the brief of evidence and a continuance of the hearing whether by order or by operation of law also extends the time for the filing of the brief.” Smoot v. Donaldson, 99 Ga. App. 191 ( 108 S. E. 2d 295 ).	1	1959–1959
Auldridge v. Womble green ga · 1923 1 sentence 1957Auldridge v. Womble, 157 Ga. 64 , supra. The language of the new act, like that of the old one, seems to refer to probation as a part of the original sen tence, and the provision for a hearing must, considering the language as a whole, refer to a hearing on the type of sentence to be imposed, and not to authorize the court, at a subsequent term, to add to the sentence a provision for probation where he made no provision relating thereto in the first instance.	1	1957–1957
Hansen v. Owens green ga · 1909 2 sentences 1942Hansen v. Owens, 132 Ga. 648 ( 64 S. E. 800 ); Gantt v. American National Insurance Co., 173 Ga. 323 ( 160 S. E. 345 ). 1942Hansen v. Owens, 132 Ga. 648 ( 64 S. E. 800 ); Gantt v. American National Insurance Co., 173 Ga. 323 ( 160 S. E. 345 ).	1	1942–1942
Gantt v. American National Insurance neutral ga · 1931 2 sentences 1942Hansen v. Owens, 132 Ga. 648 ( 64 S. E. 800 ); Gantt v. American National Insurance Co., 173 Ga. 323 ( 160 S. E. 345 ). 1942Hansen v. Owens, 132 Ga. 648 ( 64 S. E. 800 ); Gantt v. American National Insurance Co., 173 Ga. 323 ( 160 S. E. 345 ).	1	1942–1942
Haygood v. Haden neutral ga · 1904 2 sentences 1941Haygood v. Haden, 119 Ga. 463 ( 46 S. E. 625 ); Clark v. Hilliard, 19 Ga. App. 514 (3) ( 91 S. E. 926 ) ; Commons v. Ross, 44 Ga. App. 182 ( 160 S. E. 679 ). 1941Haygood v. Haden, 119 Ga. 463 ( 46 S. E. 625 ); Clark v. Hilliard, 19 Ga. App. 514 (3) ( 91 S. E. 926 ) ; Commons v. Ross, 44 Ga. App. 182 ( 160 S. E. 679 ).	1	1941–1941
Clark v. Hilliard green gactapp · 1917 2 sentences 1941Haygood v. Haden, 119 Ga. 463 ( 46 S. E. 625 ); Clark v. Hilliard, 19 Ga. App. 514 (3) ( 91 S. E. 926 ) ; Commons v. Ross, 44 Ga. App. 182 ( 160 S. E. 679 ). 1941Haygood v. Haden, 119 Ga. 463 ( 46 S. E. 625 ); Clark v. Hilliard, 19 Ga. App. 514 (3) ( 91 S. E. 926 ) ; Commons v. Ross, 44 Ga. App. 182 ( 160 S. E. 679 ).	1	1941–1941
Commins v. Ross green gactapp · 1931 2 sentences 1941Haygood v. Haden, 119 Ga. 463 ( 46 S. E. 625 ); Clark v. Hilliard, 19 Ga. App. 514 (3) ( 91 S. E. 926 ) ; Commons v. Ross, 44 Ga. App. 182 ( 160 S. E. 679 ). 1941Haygood v. Haden, 119 Ga. 463 ( 46 S. E. 625 ); Clark v. Hilliard, 19 Ga. App. 514 (3) ( 91 S. E. 926 ) ; Commons v. Ross, 44 Ga. App. 182 ( 160 S. E. 679 ).	1	1941–1941
Parker-Hensel Engineering Co. v. Schuler green ga · 1909 2 sentences 1911Parker-Hensel Engineering Co. v. Schuler, 133 Ga. 696 ( 66 S. E. 800 ). (a) Where an execution was issued and levied' before the motion for a new trial was made and supersedeas granted pending its determination, the sale under such levy, made after, the motion for a new trial was overruled, was not void because the publication of some of the advertisements thereof were made while the supersedeas was in force. (5) The filing of a bill of exceptions to the order overruling the motion for a new trial did not serve to render the sale void, or furnish grounds upon which an injunction should have be 1911Parker-Hensel Engineering Co. v. Schuler, 133 Ga. 696 ( 66 S. E. 800 ). (a) Where an execution was issued and levied' before the motion for a new trial was made and supersedeas granted pending its determination, the sale under such levy, made after, the motion for a new trial was overruled, was not void because the publication of some of the advertisements thereof were made while the supersedeas was in force. (5) The filing of a bill of exceptions to the order overruling the motion for a new trial did not serve to render the sale void, or furnish grounds upon which an injunction should have be	1	1911–1911

Where else courts name it

CA 121 (1890–2025) TX 103 (1890–2025) OH 96 (1917–2026) PA 65 (1907–2020) NY 58 (1854–2023) FL 49 (1942–2024) IL 48 (1898–2026) MA 34 (1923–2019) MI 30 (1894–2026) UT 21 (1975–2024) NJ 20 (1950–2025) MO 19 (1904–2018) WA 17 (1893–2026) IA 16 (1896–2024) MN 15 (1916–2017) MD 15 (1933–2019) GA 14 (1911–2017) SC 14 (1905–2021) AL 14 (1901–2013) OR 14 (1943–2026) LA 14 (1936–2015) MS 14 (1922–2021) CO 13 (1905–2022) NM 13 (1937–2021) OK 12 (1918–2022) AR 12 (1912–2022) WI 12 (1925–2022) CT 12 (1932–2016) TN 12 (1902–2022) NC 10 (1960–2025) VA 9 (1974–2024) IN 9 (1913–2024) KY 8 (1903–2007) AZ 8 (1962–2024) NH 7 (1977–2024) WV 7 (1932–2018) ID 7 (1942–2012) DE 7 (1967–2024) VT 6 (2015–2021) KS 6 (1913–1997) HI 6 (1902–2010) WY 5 (1923–2013) AK 5 (1974–1998) NE 5 (1920–2015) DC 5 (1982–2014) ND 5 (1909–2011) NV 4 (1970–2023) SD 3 (1970–1994) RI 3 (1998–2013) PR 2 (1954–1965) MT 2 (2012–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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