provision rule in Utah

2015And because that version of the law had been construed by this court to "expressly contemplate ] the provision of defense resources to indigent defendants separate and apart from the provision of counsel," State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, ¶ 26 , 283 P.3d 488 , he claimed a vested right to the application of that law to the disposition of his motion. 15 Salt Lake County intervened and opposed the motion. .

2015And because that version of the law had been construed by this court to "expressly contemplate ] the provision of defense resources to indigent defendants separate and apart from the provision of counsel," State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, ¶ 26 , 283 P.3d 488 , he claimed a vested right to the application of that law to the disposition of his motion. 15 Salt Lake County intervened and opposed the motion. .

2022When our Supreme Court issued State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), the relevant provision of rule 103 was found in subsection 103(d), which has since been moved, with some minor adjustments in phraseology, to subsection 103(e).

2022When our Supreme Court issued State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), the relevant provision of rule 103 was found in subsection 103(d), which has since been moved, with some minor adjustments in phraseology, to subsection 103(e).

2024But because James was not awarded attorney fees below, we deny his request. 20220559-CA 24 2024 UT App 164 Wallace v. Wallace CONCLUSION ¶50 We do not reach the merits of Joanna’s challenges to the non-disparagement provision or to the provision warning that failure to pay the special master fees may result in a change of legal custody—the former because her argument was not preserved and the latter because it is not ripe for review.

2020Rather, the court recognized that it had discretion “to reconsider any issue which was not expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal.” But it also determined that Holm had “not provided any reason why the Court should reconsider its prior rulings.” Thus, the court endorsed the reasoning behind the rulings from the first trial, and we review whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. 20190282-CA 7 2020 UT App 96 State v. Holm Holm contends that to properly interpret and apply rule 28, we must read into it a provision from rule 24 that states, “If a new trial is granted, the party s

2020Rather, the court recognized that it had discretion “to reconsider any issue which was not expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal.” But it also determined that Holm had “not provided any reason why the Court should reconsider its prior rulings.” Thus, the court endorsed the reasoning behind the rulings from the first trial, and we review whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. 20190282-CA 7 2020 UT App 96 State v. Holm Holm contends that to properly interpret and apply rule 28, we must read into it a provision from rule 24 that states, “If a new trial is granted, the party s

2016We must therefore construe the language of the CSC's rule in a manner " 'consistent with its governing statutes." See id. (quoting Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1804 , 1306 (Utah 1998)). 13 The requirement that an appeal to the CSC must be "filed" is not in the governing statute; the CSC added this provision to the rule it promulgated.

2013H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, ¶ 25 , 203 P.3d 943 . .

2013H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, ¶ 25 , 203 P.3d 943 . .

2011The vast majority of federal courts that have examined Rule 41 violations have concluded that suppression for judicial error in the application of Rule 41 is not warranted absent a showing of prejudice or evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision of the rule by police. [7] *480 ¶ 24 Dominguez cites only one federal case, United States v. Shorter, 600 F.2d 585 (6th Cir.1979), for the proposition that a magistrate's error during the warrant process demands suppression.

2011In Shorter , the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that exclusion was the proper remedy for a judge's failure to "immediately" (as then required by Rule 41(c)(2)(D) [8] ) administer the oath on a telephonic warrant request before hearing the officer's testimony. 600 F.2d at 589 .

2009The Rome court determined that the error was -not sufficient to justify excluding the evidence obtained via the search warrant, embracing a standard written by the Ninth Cireuit: "Unless there is a clear constitutional violation, non-compliance with Rule 41 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] requires suppression of evidence only where (1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the rule." Id. at 669 (qu

2004In Kawamoto v. Fratto, 2000 UT 6 , T1 n. 1, 994 P.2d 187 , we noted that this provision did not bar a party from seeking extraordinary relief from this court pursuant to rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure even where the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance was not at issue.

2004In Kawamoto v. Fratto, 2000 UT 6 , T1 n. 1, 994 P.2d 187 , we noted that this provision did not bar a party from seeking extraordinary relief from this court pursuant to rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure even where the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance was not at issue.

1997The court reasoned that if “the provision of the rule under consideration is unambiguous, we must apply the plain meaning rule of statutory construction and construe the rule as written.” Id.

1996Askew, 884 P.2d at 1262 . 1 It apparently overlooked the specific provision of rule 26(b)(3) which recognizes that documents prepared by an “insurer” may qualify for protection under the rule.

1996Askew, 884 P.2d at 1262 . [1] It apparently overlooked the specific provision of rule 26(b)(3) which recognizes that documents prepared by an "insurer" may qualify for protection under the rule.

1992As the United States Supreme Court observed in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 , 13 S.Ct. 50 , 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892), "[A] juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind." Id. at 149 , 13 S.Ct. at 53 (citing Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1871)).

1992As the United States Supreme Court observed in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 , 13 S.Ct. 50 , 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892), “[A] juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind.” Id. at 149 , 13 S.Ct. at 53 (citing Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1871)).

1992As the United States Supreme Court observed in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 , 13 S.Ct. 50 , 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892), “[A] juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind.” Id. at 149 , 13 S.Ct. at 53 (citing Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1871)).

1992As the United States Supreme Court observed in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 , 13 S.Ct. 50 , 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892), “[A] juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind.” Id. at 149 , 13 S.Ct. at 53 (citing Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1871)).

1975In the City of Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash.2d 80 , 515 P.2d 1295 (1973), a proceeding was brought by the City to forfeit the respondent's interest in an automobile which was seized by the police at the time the respondent was arrested and charged with the sale of a controlled substance — an exercise of the police power, and for that reason interesting here.

1975In the City of Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash.2d 80 , 515 P.2d 1295 (1973), a proceeding was brought by the City to forfeit the respondent's interest in an automobile which was seized by the police at the time the respondent was arrested and charged with the sale of a controlled substance — an exercise of the police power, and for that reason interesting here.