provision clause in Pennsylvania

1995The Azpell court noted that, in Davis v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 500 Pa. 84 , 454 A.2d 973 (1982), it had adopted the following rule, announced by this court in United Services Automobile Association Appeal, 227 PaiSuper. 508, 516, 323 A.2d 737, 741 (1974): ‘Thus the rule, to which all the cases conform, is that where the application or construction of the [insurance] clause is at issue the dispute is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrators; the courts will take jurisdiction only where the claimant attacks a particular provision of the clause itself as being contrary t

1995The Azpell court noted that, in Davis v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 500 Pa. 84 , 454 A.2d 973 (1982), it had adopted the following rule, announced by this court in United Services Automobile Association Appeal, 227 PaiSuper. 508, 516, 323 A.2d 737, 741 (1974): ‘Thus the rule, to which all the cases conform, is that where the application or construction of the [insurance] clause is at issue the dispute is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrators; the courts will take jurisdiction only where the claimant attacks a particular provision of the clause itself as being contrary t

1992Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511 , 341 A.2d 896 (1975). *621 In balancing these conflicting interests, four factors must be considered: “(1) Whether the state interest sought to be achieved can be effectively accomplished in some manner which will not infringe upon interests protected by constitutional rights; (2) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling when compared with the interests affected, justifies any infringement of those interests; (3) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement that is necessary to effectuate that interest;

1992Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511 , 341 A.2d 896 (1975). *621 In balancing these conflicting interests, four factors must be considered: “(1) Whether the state interest sought to be achieved can be effectively accomplished in some manner which will not infringe upon interests protected by constitutional rights; (2) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling when compared with the interests affected, justifies any infringement of those interests; (3) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement that is necessary to effectuate that interest;

1992Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511 , 341 A.2d 896 (1975). *621 In balancing these conflicting interests, four factors must be considered: “(1) Whether the state interest sought to be achieved can be effectively accomplished in some manner which will not infringe upon interests protected by constitutional rights; (2) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling when compared with the interests affected, justifies any infringement of those interests; (3) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement that is necessary to effectuate that interest;

1992Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511 , 341 A.2d 896 (1975). *621 In balancing these conflicting interests, four factors must be considered: “(1) Whether the state interest sought to be achieved can be effectively accomplished in some manner which will not infringe upon interests protected by constitutional rights; (2) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling when compared with the interests affected, justifies any infringement of those interests; (3) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement that is necessary to effectuate that interest;

2001See Commonwealth v. Rosenbloom Finance Corp., 457 Pa. 496, 500 , 325 A.2d 907, 909 (1974) (stating that "referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent, which consists of `the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence' " (citations omitted)).

2001See Commonwealth v. Rosenbloom Finance Corp., 457 Pa. 496, 500 , 325 A.2d 907, 909 (1974) (stating that "referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent, which consists of `the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence' " (citations omitted)).

1995The Azpell court noted that, in Davis v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 500 Pa. 84 , 454 A.2d 973 (1982), it had adopted the following rule, announced by this court in United Services Automobile Association Appeal, 227 PaiSuper. 508, 516, 323 A.2d 737, 741 (1974): ‘Thus the rule, to which all the cases conform, is that where the application or construction of the [insurance] clause is at issue the dispute is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrators; the courts will take jurisdiction only where the claimant attacks a particular provision of the clause itself as being contrary t

1991Appellant contends that his motion to compel arbitration was improperly denied as a result of the trial court’s misapprehension of the rationale of those cases, beginning with Webb v. United Services Automobile Association, 227 Pa.Super. 508 , 323 A.2d 737 (1974), which permit a court to exercise its jurisdiction in a coverage dispute otherwise subject to arbitration, “ ‘where the claimant attacks a particular provision of the clause itself as being contrary to a constitutional, legislative, or administrative mandate, or against public policy or unconscionable.’ ” Azpell v. Old Republic Insura

1985However, the courts will take jurisdiction if the claimant attacks a particular provision of the clause “as being contrary to a constitutional, legislative, or administrative mandate.” White, supra, 296 Pa.Superior Ct. at 176, 442 A.2d at 713, 716 .

1982White v. Concord, supra, 296 Pa.Super. at 174 , 442 A.2d 713 .

2020“Clearly, this provision is an exception to Section 110, because the exception applies to Sections 109—111.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 221 A.3d 217, 220 (Pa. Super. 2019).

2018To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). -9- J-S51002-18 & J-S51003-18 With respect to Section 2511(b), this provision requires an analysis of whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child: Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.

2017In Commonwealth v. Washington, 547 Pa. 563, 571-572 , 692 A.2d 1024, 1028 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1006 (1998), the court reiterated the principle that "jury instructions regarding particular crimes or defenses are not warranted where the facts of the case do not support those instructions." Accordingly, this court did not err in refusing defendant's requested diminished capacity instruction because the facts did not warrant the provision of such instruction.

2017In Commonwealth v. Washington, 547 Pa. 563, 571-572 , 692 A.2d 1024, 1028 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1006 (1998), the court reiterated the principle that "jury instructions regarding particular crimes or defenses are not warranted where the facts of the case do not support those instructions." Accordingly, this court did not err in refusing defendant's requested diminished capacity instruction because the facts did not warrant the provision of such instruction.

2009In [Commonwealth by Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 485-486 , 329 A.2d 812, 830 (1974) ], the [Supreme] Court concluded that a party who seeks to enforce a provision in a standard form lease has the burden of showing that the provision was in fact explained to the tenant by the landlord, that it came to the tenant’s knowledge, and that there was in fact a “real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting.” Id. at 830.

2009In [Commonwealth by Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 485-486 , 329 A.2d 812, 830 (1974) ], the [Supreme] Court concluded that a party who seeks to enforce a provision in a standard form lease has the burden of showing that the provision was in fact explained to the tenant by the landlord, that it came to the tenant’s knowledge, and that there was in fact a “real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting.” Id. at 830.

2008See McKinley v. PennDOT, 564 Pa. 565 , 578 n. 10, 769 A.2d 1153 , 1160 n. 10 (2001). 10 The rule is not absolute, but the United States Supreme Court has noted that it is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar,” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376, 381 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003), and the approach generally may be applied in absence of evidence of some contrary purpose.

2008See McKinley v. PennDOT, 564 Pa. 565 , 578 n. 10, 769 A.2d 1153 , 1160 n. 10 (2001). 10 The rule is not absolute, but the United States Supreme Court has noted that it is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar,” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376, 381 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003), and the approach generally may be applied in absence of evidence of some contrary purpose.

2008See McKinley v. PennDOT, 564 Pa. 565 , 578 n. 10, 769 A.2d 1153 , 1160 n. 10 (2001). 10 The rule is not absolute, but the United States Supreme Court has noted that it is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar,” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376, 381 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003), and the approach generally may be applied in absence of evidence of some contrary purpose.

2008See McKinley v. PennDOT, 564 Pa. 565 , 578 n. 10, 769 A.2d 1153 , 1160 n. 10 (2001). 10 The rule is not absolute, but the United States Supreme Court has noted that it is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar,” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376, 381 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003), and the approach generally may be applied in absence of evidence of some contrary purpose.

2008See AmeriPro Search, Inc. v. Fleming Steel Co., 787 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa.Super.2001) (citation omitted) (explaining that quasi-contract imposes a duty, despite the absence of an agreement, “where one party receives unjust enrichment at the expense of another” and applies where the plaintiff confers benefits on a defendant, and the defendant appreciates, accepts,' and retains those benefits “under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value”).

1996In support of its decision, the trial court cited Zito v. Merit Outlet Stores, 436 Pa. Superior Ct. 213, 221 , 647 A.2d 573, 577 (1994), in which the superior court noted that "[cjourts are under tremendous pressure to dispose of ever increasing caseloads in the face of shrinking resources.” Thus, the superior court held in Zito that “[t]o protect the public’s resources by requiring reimbursement is not unreasonable.” .

1996In support of its decision, the trial court cited Zito v. Merit Outlet Stores, 436 Pa. Superior Ct. 213, 221 , 647 A.2d 573, 577 (1994), in which the superior court noted that "[cjourts are under tremendous pressure to dispose of ever increasing caseloads in the face of shrinking resources.” Thus, the superior court held in Zito that “[t]o protect the public’s resources by requiring reimbursement is not unreasonable.” .

1986See Hamilton v. Means, 155 Pa.Super. 245, 250 (1944) [sic], 38 A.2d 528 .

1986See Hamilton v. Means, 155 Pa.Super. 245, 250 (1944) [sic], 38 A.2d 528 .

1985See Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Contrisciane, 504 Pa. 328 , 473 A.2d 1005 (1984); Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389 , 241 A.2d 112 (1968); Flamini v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 328 Pa.Super. 406 , 477 A.2d 508 (1984); Marchese v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 284 Pa.Super. 579 , 426 A.2d 646 (1981).

1985See Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Contrisciane, 504 Pa. 328 , 473 A.2d 1005 (1984); Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389 , 241 A.2d 112 (1968); Flamini v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 328 Pa.Super. 406 , 477 A.2d 508 (1984); Marchese v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 284 Pa.Super. 579 , 426 A.2d 646 (1981).