provision exception in Michigan

2017Jackson , 201 Mich.App. at 177 , 506 N.W.2d 251 ; Valentine v. Redford Twp.

2017Jackson , 201 Mich.App. at 177 , 506 N.W.2d 251 ; Valentine v. Redford Twp.

1975"The words 'reserving’ and 'excepting’ are often used indiscriminately, and whether a particular provision is an exception or a reservation does not depend upon the use of either term, but upon the nature and effect of the provision itself.” 102 Mich at 272 .

1929Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich. 267 .

1928Turner v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 123 Mich. 617 ; McWilliams v. Lenawee Circuit Judge, supra. And it has been held that this provision of the rule does not apply at all where the default of a plaintiff is taken by a defendant.

1905Before this amendment it was held in Petley v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 14 , in a case in which. the circuit judge vacated a judgment and set aside a default, that he had exceeded his authority, distinguishing the case from Turner v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 123 Mich. 617 , in which case a default was improperly entered; and in Carpenter v. Judge of Superior Court of Grand Rapids, 126 Mich. 8 , it was-held that the entry of a judgment is the taking of a proceeding within the meaning of Cir. Ct. Rule 12, and the default should not be set aside unless application was made within six months af

2026Pezzani, 202 Mich App at 280 .

2026In Dunn v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 254 Mich App 256, 267 ; 657 NW2d 153 (2002), this Court stated that “[a] no-fault insurer cannot seek reimbursement for medical benefits paid from an insured’s third-party tort recovery except under the limited circumstances set forth in § 3116 of the no-fault act, MCL § 500.3116.” Further, in Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, 507 Mich 498 , 506 n 9; 968 NW2d 482 (2021), our Supreme Court noted that MCL 500.3116 “provid[es] rights of reimbursement and indemnity to no-fault insurers for cases in which a claimant recovers on a tort cla

2026In Dunn v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 254 Mich App 256, 267 ; 657 NW2d 153 (2002), this Court stated that “[a] no-fault insurer cannot seek reimbursement for medical benefits paid from an insured’s third-party tort recovery except under the limited circumstances set forth in § 3116 of the no-fault act, MCL § 500.3116.” Further, in Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, 507 Mich 498 , 506 n 9; 968 NW2d 482 (2021), our Supreme Court noted that MCL 500.3116 “provid[es] rights of reimbursement and indemnity to no-fault insurers for cases in which a claimant recovers on a tort cla

2025We also reasoned that “the Legislature’s provision of an exception to the preclusive effect of MCL 211.78t(2) in MCL 211.78l(1) necessarily prohibits the application of any other exceptions, including the death-saving provision.” Id.

2025Furthermore, we explained that “the death-saving provision applies only to claims that survive the decedent’s death by operation of law,” and “[a]ny claim to surplus proceeds accrued after foreclosure of the property, so the claim was not in existence when [the decedent] died.” Id. at ___; slip op at 7.

2024This Court concluded that application of MCL 600.5852 was precluded by “the Legislature’s provision of an exception to the preclusive effect of MCL 211.78t(2) in MCL 211.78l(1) . . . .” Id. at ___; slip op at 6, citing Burton v Macha, 303 Mich App 750, 756 ; 846 NW2d 419 (2014).

2024Second, this Court concluded that application of MCL 600.5852 was precluded by “the Legislature’s provision of an exception to the preclusive effect of MCL 211.78t(2) in MCL 211.78l(1).” Id. at ___; slip op at 6.

2024See Bruton v Macha, 3 Arguing that if the notice requirement of MCL 211.78t(2) is mandatory, then the Treasurer should be required to show prejudice before taking surplus proceeds, the Estate asserts that this Court should revive and apply the holding in Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96, 100 ; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), affirmed in Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354, 364 ; 550 NW2d 215 (1996), which provided that the failure to give a statutorily required notice barred a plaintiff’s claim against a governmental entity only if the governmental entity could show it was actually prejudiced by the f

2024See Bruton v Macha, 3 Arguing that if the notice requirement of MCL 211.78t(2) is mandatory, then the Treasurer should be required to show prejudice before taking surplus proceeds, the Estate asserts that this Court should revive and apply the holding in Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96, 100 ; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), affirmed in Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354, 364 ; 550 NW2d 215 (1996), which provided that the failure to give a statutorily required notice barred a plaintiff’s claim against a governmental entity only if the governmental entity could show it was actually prejudiced by the f

2019Third, a causal connection exists between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the discharge. [Id. at 368-369 (citation omitted).] -4- In Piasecki v Hamtramck, 249 Mich App 37, 43 ; 640 NW2d 885 (2001), this Court held that the defendants were entitled to summary disposition of the plaintiff’s claim that she was discharged because she refused to violate the law because the statute cited by plaintiff contained a provision or exception that did not render the release of information a violation of the cited statutory provision relied on by plaintiff for a public policy argument.

2019Third, a causal connection exists between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the discharge. [Id. at 368-369 (citation omitted).] -4- In Piasecki v Hamtramck, 249 Mich App 37, 43 ; 640 NW2d 885 (2001), this Court held that the defendants were entitled to summary disposition of the plaintiff’s claim that she was discharged because she refused to violate the law because the statute cited by plaintiff contained a provision or exception that did not render the release of information a violation of the cited statutory provision relied on by plaintiff for a public policy argument.

2017Jackson, 201 Mich App at 177 ; Valentine v McDonald, 371 Mich 138, 147 ; 123 NW2d 227 (1963).

2017Jackson, 201 Mich App at 177 ; Valentine v McDonald, 371 Mich 138, 147 ; 123 NW2d 227 (1963).

2014People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 493-494 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).

2014People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 493-494 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).

2010In the instant case, plaintiff advances the theory that Frank Mandeville is liable for contribution to the decedent’s estate on the basis of a theory of unjust enrichment. 23 See In re Appeal of Lewis, 85 Mich 340 ; 48 NW 580 (1891). 10 Unjust enrichment is defined as the unjust retention of “‘money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.’”24 The Restatement provides that “[e]ven where a person has received a benefit from another, he is liable to pay therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him

2010In the instant case, plaintiff advances the theory that Frank Mandeville is liable for contribution to the decedent’s estate on the basis of a theory of unjust enrichment. 23 See In re Appeal of Lewis, 85 Mich 340 ; 48 NW 580 (1891). 10 Unjust enrichment is defined as the unjust retention of “‘money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.’”24 The Restatement provides that “[e]ven where a person has received a benefit from another, he is liable to pay therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him

2007The court recited the rule now contained in 52 CJS, Landlord and Tenant, § 130, p 200, 3 which provides: “Ordinarily the consideration for the privilege of purchasing is not separate from the consideration for the lease as a whole, and where the lease is sufficiently supported by a consideration the provision for the privilege of purchasing the property is adequately supported.” See Henderson, supra at 414 .

2007Our Supreme Court recognized a similar principle in Wright v Kaynor, 150 Mich *290 7, 11; 113 NW 779 (1907).

1986Although not decided under the ucc, the inquiries used in Allen v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 18 Mich App 632, 637 ; 171 NW2d 689 (1969), lv den 383 Mich 804 (1970), to determine unconscionability are instructive: (1) What is the relative bargaining power of the parties, their relative economic strength, the alternative sources of supply? (2) Is the challenged term substantively reasonable?

1986Although not decided under the ucc, the inquiries used in Allen v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 18 Mich App 632, 637 ; 171 NW2d 689 (1969), lv den 383 Mich 804 (1970), to determine unconscionability are instructive: (1) What is the relative bargaining power of the parties, their relative economic strength, the alternative sources of supply? (2) Is the challenged term substantively reasonable?

1981In Whiteman, supra, the Court held that this provision does not bar a third-party indemnity claim against a principal plaintiff’s employer so long as the basis of liability between the third-party defendant-employer and the third-party plaintiff is not derivative from the principal plaintiff’s claim.

1980However, in People v Belanger, 73 Mich App 438, 447 ; 252 NW2d 472 (1977), this Court cited the test for competency to stand trial announced in Dusky v United States, 362 US 402 ; 80 S Ct 788, 789 ; 4 L Ed 2d 824, 825 (1960), as the appropriate interpretation of our own incompetency statute.

1980However, in People v Belanger, 73 Mich App 438, 447 ; 252 NW2d 472 (1977), this Court cited the test for competency to stand trial announced in Dusky v United States, 362 US 402 ; 80 S Ct 788, 789 ; 4 L Ed 2d 824, 825 (1960), as the appropriate interpretation of our own incompetency statute.

1975A powerful example is People v Fields, 388 Mich 66 ; 199 NW2d 217 (1972), where the provision for waiver by the probate courts of 16-year-olds to the circuit courts for acts the nature of which constitutes felonies was held invalid for lack of sufficient standards.

1975A powerful example is People v Fields, 388 Mich 66 ; 199 NW2d 217 (1972), where the provision for waiver by the probate courts of 16-year-olds to the circuit courts for acts the nature of which constitutes felonies was held invalid for lack of sufficient standards.

1968Unfortunately, however, the 'trial judge not only failed to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation made against him but he also failed to follow the requirements of the court rule that he, in examining the accused, “as a condition of accepting the plea of guilty and imposing sentence shall ascertain that the plea was freely, understanding^ and voluntarily made.” The purpose of this provision in the rule was stated in People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267, 272 , where it was said: “It is plain, however, that in this case the mandatory provisions of Rule No 35Á were not complied w

1968Unfortunately, however, the trial judge not only failed to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation made against him but he also failed to follow the requirements of the court rule that he, in examining the accused, "as a condition of accepting the plea of guilty and imposing sentence shall ascertain that the plea was freely, understandingly and voluntarily made." The purpose of this provision in the rule was stated in People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267, 272 , where it was said: "It is plain, however, that in this case the mandatory provisions of Rule No 35A were not complied w

1942Under a Wisconsin statute (Wisconsin Statutes 1933, § 325.21) authorizing waiver of the privilege by a “personal representative or other person authorized to sue for personal injury,” the court held in Estate of Gallun, 215 Wis. 314 ( 254 N. W. 542 ), that the provision for waiver was not exclusive and the privilege could be waived by an executor or administrator under other circumstances, such as inheritance tax matter, citing among other authorities, Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 .

1942Under a Wisconsin statute (Wisconsin Statutes 1933, § 325.21) authorizing waiver of the privilege by a “personal representative or other person authorized to sue for personal injury,” the court held in Estate of Gallun, 215 Wis. 314 ( 254 N. W. 542 ), that the provision for waiver was not exclusive and the privilege could be waived by an executor or administrator under other circumstances, such as inheritance tax matter, citing among other authorities, Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 .

1942Under a Wisconsin statute (Wisconsin Statutes 1933, § 325.21) authorizing waiver of the privilege by a “personal representative or other person authorized to sue for personal injury,” the court held in Estate of Gallun, 215 Wis. 314 ( 254 N. W. 542 ), that the provision for waiver was not exclusive and the privilege could be waived by an executor or administrator under other circumstances, such as inheritance tax matter, citing among other authorities, Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 .

1940Co., 269 Mich. 477 .

1940R. 308: “ 'An insurer which denies its liability under the provisions of its policy under consideration, before judgment, and while the insured.has sufficient time to protect its interest at the trial of the cause by providing its own counsel, or otherwise, is not estopped, in an action against it on the policy, to plead this provision as a defense in an *233 action, upon the policy, although it may have assumed the defense of an action against the employer by an employee. ’ ’' See, also, Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Schoolcraft Board of County Road Com’rs, 267 Mich. 193 ; Beals v. C