provision immunity in Tennessee

2016Instead, due process requires the provision of a hearing “at a meaningful time.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547 .

1998The Due Process Clause requires the provision of a hearing “at a meaningful time.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547 , 105 S.Ct. at 1496 .

1986Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Insurance Company, 162 Tenn. 427 , 37 S.W.(2d) 119 , the Court followed what it termed the majority rule that a policy provision limiting the time for bringing suit must be construed along with a provision for immunity from suit and said: “The limitation begins to be effective from the time the right of action accrues, notwithstanding the expression ‘after the fire.' ” Under the authorities cited we think the court correctly held the suit not barred.... (at pp. 243-245, 381 S.W.2d 573 ) The policy in the present case provides: Loss will be payable 60 days after we rec

1986Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Insurance Company, 162 Tenn. 427 , 37 S.W.(2d) 119 , the Court followed what it termed the majority rule that a policy provision limiting the time for bringing suit must be construed along with a provision for immunity from suit and said: “The limitation begins to be effective from the time the right of action accrues, notwithstanding the expression ‘after the fire.' ” Under the authorities cited we think the court correctly held the suit not barred.... (at pp. 243-245, 381 S.W.2d 573 ) The policy in the present case provides: Loss will be payable 60 days after we rec

2016Walker, 1986 WL 11250 , at *2 (quoting King v. Dalton Motors, Inc., 109 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1961)).

2007Id.

1999The language in the “fatal” clause concerning the failure to “endorse ... the name of the officer to whom issued” relates to the requirement to “endorse ... [the] name of the officer to whom the warrant was delivered for execution.” The state’s reliance upon State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn.1993), State v. Pigford, 572 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn.1978), and State v. Robinson, 622 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn.Crim.App.1980), is misplaced.

1999The language in the “fatal” clause concerning the failure to “endorse ... the name of the officer to whom issued” relates to the requirement to “endorse ... [the] name of the officer to whom the warrant was delivered for execution.” The state’s reliance upon State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn.1993), State v. Pigford, 572 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn.1978), and State v. Robinson, 622 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn.Crim.App.1980), is misplaced.

1999The language in the “fatal” clause concerning the failure to “endorse ... the name of the officer to whom issued” relates to the requirement to “endorse ... [the] name of the officer to whom the warrant was delivered for execution.” The state’s reliance upon State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn.1993), State v. Pigford, 572 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn.1978), and State v. Robinson, 622 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn.Crim.App.1980), is misplaced.

1986Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Insurance Company, 162 Tenn. 427 , 37 S.W.(2d) 119 , the Court followed what it termed the majority rule that a policy provision limiting the time for bringing suit must be construed along with a provision for immunity from suit and said: “The limitation begins to be effective from the time the right of action accrues, notwithstanding the expression ‘after the fire.' ” Under the authorities cited we think the court correctly held the suit not barred.... (at pp. 243-245, 381 S.W.2d 573 ) The policy in the present case provides: Loss will be payable 60 days after we rec

1940“And it was held in Ward v. Sharpe, supra, 139 Tenn., 347 [ 200 S. W., 974 ], that, although the ‘sale’ might be waived by agreement after default made, ‘the Act does not permit the waiving of the advertisement alone,’ *641 Ollier wise stated, it was there held that an agreement made after default that the conditional seller might take the property hack and. sell it at private sale, without advertisement as provided in the statute, was not permissible, and would not relieve the seller of liability to the original purchaser for ‘that part of the consideration paid. ’ “The Code of 1932 (Section

1902Thus the building of a railroad near a city, when calculated to promote the interest of the city, was held such a purpose (McCallie v. Chattanooga, 3 Head, 318 ; Adams v. Railroad Co., 2 Cold., 645 ), and in Shelby County v. Exposition Co., 96 Tenn., 653 , that an appropriation to defray the expense of an exhibition of the resources of the county at a point outside the limits of the county, was a county purpose.