provision rule in Massachusetts

2017Co., 466 Mass. 156, 159-160 (2013) ("We interpret the words of the standard policy in light of their plain meaning, . . . giving full effect to the document as a whole[,] . . . consider[ing] what an objectively reasonable insured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered . . . [and] interpret[ing] the provision of the standard policy in a manner consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme that governs such policies" [quotation omitted]).

2014Co., 466 Mass. 156, 159 (2013). ‘We interpret the words of the standard policy in light of their plain meaning,... giving full effect to the document as a whole [,] ... considering] ‘what an objectively reasonable insured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered’ ... [and] interpreting] the provision of the standard policy in a manner consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme that governs such policies.” Id. at 159-160 , quoting Golchin v. Liberty Mut.

2013Co., 440 Mass. 207, 209 (2003). “[B]ecause the approved wording of the standard policy is controlled by the Commissioner of Insurance and not by any insurer (see G.

2011Co., 440 Mass. 207, 209 (2003), quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar.

2019Second, in Bogertman v. Attorney General, 474 Mass. 607, 620 (2016), the Supreme Judicial Court considered the meaning of the provision in art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution prohibiting the certification of initiative petitions that are "substantially the same as any measure which has been qualified for submission or submitted to the people at either of the two preceding biennial state elections." The court construed this provision to bar any measure that "affirms or negates essentially the same provisions [as a previous measure], with little or no substantive differen

2019Second, in Bogertman v. Attorney General, 474 Mass. 607, 620 (2016), the Supreme Judicial Court considered the meaning of the provision in art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution prohibiting the certification of initiative petitions that are "substantially the same as any measure which has been qualified for submission or submitted to the people at either of the two preceding biennial state elections." The court construed this provision to bar any measure that "affirms or negates essentially the same provisions [as a previous measure], with little or no substantive differen

2010L. c. 152, § 1 (7A) (§ 1 [7A]), provides, in relevant part: “If a compensable injury or disease combines with a preexisting [non-compensable condition] to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant condition shall be compensable only to the extent such compensable injury or disease remains a major but not necessarily predominant cause of disability or need for treatment.” We shall refer to this particular provision as the defense under § 1 (7A) or the “combination injury” defense, see Cornetta’s Case, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 117 (2007).

2008Allowing the appeal to proceed is consonant with our policy that errors by a court clerk “will generally be resolved in favor of preserving rights of appeal where this result is technically possible and does not work unfair prejudice to other parties.” Standard Register Co. v. Bolton-Emerson, Inc., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 574 (1993), quoting from Krupp v. Gulf Oil Corp., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 116, 121 (1990).

2008Allowing the appeal to proceed is consonant with our policy that errors by a court clerk “will generally be resolved in favor of preserving rights of appeal where this result is technically possible and does not work unfair prejudice to other parties.” Standard Register Co. v. Bolton-Emerson, Inc., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 574 (1993), quoting from Krupp v. Gulf Oil Corp., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 116, 121 (1990).

2005In support of their argument, the defendants rely on Sullivan v. Iantosca, 409 Mass. 796, 800-801 (1991) (motion to amend complaint should have been allowed; rule 15 and not Superior Court standing order should guide judge’s decision).

2001Underwriting Assn., 399 Mass. 886, 894 (1987), wherein the court stated as follows: “In a motion under subsection (1) of rule 60(b), the moving party bears the burden of justifying the motion, and ‘must make some showing of why he was justified in failing to avoid mistake or inadvertence.’ . . .

1998See Mason v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mass. 183, 192 (1986) (failure to test not relevant absent a showing that useful information would have been derived from test).

1992Reported questions need not be answered in this circumstance except to the extent that it is necessary to do so in resolving the basic issue.” McStowe v. Bornstein, ill Mass. 804, 805 n.2 (1979), citing, inter alia, Scandura v. Trombly Motor Coach Serv., Inc., 370 Mass. 612, 615-616 (1976).

1990See, e.g., Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1976); Blair v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 104 F.R.D. 21 (W.D.

1989See Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871, 878-879 (D.C.

1989Commonwealth v. Campbell, supra at 702 , citing Commonwealth v. Farris, 390 Mass. 300, 305 (1983), and Barry v. Commonwealth, supra at 295.

1985It was recognized in Errico v. Mayor of Revere, 352 Mass. 527, 528-529 (1967), that a provision in a standard form charter relating to assessors could determine the method of their selection.

1985Accord Groves v. Cox, 559 F. Supp. 772, 775-777 (E.D.

1985In other words, under Parratt the requirements of due process are satisfied by the provision of a hearing before a tribunal with the power to grant a remedy.” Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797 (4th Cir. 1983).

1981See Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v. Chilton Club, 318 Mass. 285, 288 (1945) (statutory language is principal source of insight into legislative purpose); cf. Dane, Taxation of Corporations and Banks — 1966 Legislation, 52 Mass. L.Q. 41, 52-55 (1967).

1979Nor is it questioned that the board of public works is comprehended in the by-law words "board... of the Town.” Compare the remarks in Commonwealth v. Oliver, 342 Mass. 82, 83-84 (1961).

1979The Selectmen may, whenever they deem necessary, employ special counsel to assist or act in place of Town Counsel.” (The parties agree that the 1977 changes did not alter the provision in principle and that the decision herein should be based on the current text just quoted.) 6 Municipal enactments centering legal activities in a counsel officially appointed are common (as noted in O’Reilly v. Scituate, 328 Mass. 154, 155 [1951]); their purpose to control expense and improve management is evident; and it is not disputed that the town acted within its acknowledged general powers in enacting the

1968See Oliver Ditson Co. v. Testa, 216 Mass. 123 — “A rule of the court has the force of law, and is binding upon a judge, and he has no authority to dispense with it.” Rule 43A of this court, which is the basis of this review, was enacted and approved by all the Justices of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston on June 27, 1967 with a provision that the rule would be effective October 1, 1967.