provision rule in Florida

2024See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 780 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 2000); Fascetti v. Fascetti, 795 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (dismissing an appeal of a nonfinal order denying the appellant’s motion to vacate a clerk’s default because the provision under rule 9.130 that had permitted such an appeal was deleted, effective January 1, 2001).

2024See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 780 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 2000); Fascetti v. Fascetti, 795 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (dismissing an appeal of a nonfinal order denying the appellant’s motion to vacate a clerk’s default because the provision under rule 9.130 that had permitted such an appeal was deleted, effective January 1, 2001).

2024See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 780 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 2000); Fascetti v. Fascetti, 795 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (dismissing an appeal of a nonfinal order denying the appellant’s motion to vacate a clerk’s default because the provision under rule 9.130 that had permitted such an appeal was deleted, effective January 1, 2001).

2024See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 780 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 2000); Fascetti v. Fascetti, 795 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (dismissing an appeal of a nonfinal order denying the appellant’s motion to vacate a clerk’s default because the provision under rule 9.130 that had permitted such an appeal was deleted, effective January 1, 2001).

2005See McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948 (Fla.2002); Anderson v. State, 627 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla.1993).

1997As interpreted, in order to support a summary denial without a hearing, this provision of the rule requires that "a trial court must either state its rationale in its decision or attach those specific parts of the record that refute each claim presented in the motion." Anderson v. State, 627 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla.1993) (emphasis added).

2018"Implicit in this provision is the requirement that the proposed amendment be accurately represented on the ballot; otherwise, voter approval would be a nullity." Armstrong v. Harris , 773 So.2d 7 , 12 (Fla. 2000).

2010XI, § 5(a), Fla. Const. “Implicit in this provision is the requirement that the proposed amendment be accurately represented on the ballot; otherwise, voter approval would be a nullity.” Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 12 (Fla.2000).

2004Robinson v. Moore, 773 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla.2000), receded from by Mann v. Moore, 794 So.2d 595, 598 (Fla. 2001) (receding from Robinson (specifically footnote 1) and holding that "the simultaneous filing requirement in rule 9.140(b)(6)(E) and 3.851(b)(2) does apply to defendants whose convictions and sentences were finalized prior to January 1, 1994, notwithstanding the provision of rule 3.851(b)(6)").

2001By this holding, we recede on this sole point from our contrary holding in Robinson v. Moore, 773 So.2d 1 , 2 n. 1 (Fla.2000).

2024See also Nelson v. State, 414 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1982) (interpreting a different provision of rule 3.191 providing that a speedy trial period may be extended for exceptional circumstances, including “for appeals by the state,” and construing that phrase to “include all appellate applications made by the state.”) In any event, we need not reach the question of whether a petition for writ of prohibition filed by a defendant constitutes an “appeal” for purposes of rule 3.191(m)’s 90-day speedy trial period, since, as explained, it is undisputed that Patino’s trial was not delayed by the earlier pro

2022See Nelson v. State, 669 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

2021The provision of rule 1.440(c) that trial “shall” be set not less than thirty days from service of notice is “mandatory.” Genuine Parts Co. v. Parsons, 917 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

2016See, e.g., Moss, 687 So.2d 70 ; Bardino, 670 So.2d 183 ; Acapulco Constr., 645 So.2d 182 .

2016See Jones v. State, 143 So.3d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that because Jones’ motion was compliant in all respects save an oath, he was entitled to an opportunity to amend pursuant to rule 3.801(e), which incorporates the provision in rule 3.850(f)(2) that if a motion is facially insufficient, the trial *1054 court must give the defendant 60 days to amend).

2010When a scoresheet error is challenged on direct, appeal, via a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) or via a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, the error “is harmless if the record conclusively shows that the trial court would have imposed the same sen *871 tence using a correct seoresheet.” Brooks v. State, 969 So.2d 238, 241 (Fla.2007) (citing State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111, 118 (Fla.2005)).

2010When a scoresheet error is challenged on direct, appeal, via a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) or via a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, the error “is harmless if the record conclusively shows that the trial court would have imposed the same sen *871 tence using a correct seoresheet.” Brooks v. State, 969 So.2d 238, 241 (Fla.2007) (citing State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111, 118 (Fla.2005)).

2009See id. at 306 .

2007Cf. City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So.2d 143, 148 (Fla.2002) (recognizing that a legislative enactment that has uniform applicability within a permissible class is a general law).

2005See McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948 (Fla.2002); Anderson v. State, 627 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla.1993).

2004Robinson v. Moore, 773 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla.2000), receded from by Mann v. Moore, 794 So.2d 595, 598 (Fla. 2001) (receding from Robinson (specifically footnote 1) and holding that "the simultaneous filing requirement in rule 9.140(b)(6)(E) and 3.851(b)(2) does apply to defendants whose convictions and sentences were finalized prior to January 1, 1994, notwithstanding the provision of rule 3.851(b)(6)").

2001See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) and 3.800 and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.140, and 9.600, 761 So.2d 1015, 1017-18, 1021-22 (Fla.1999)(" Amendments II "). [2] In adding this new procedure for correcting sentencing errors in the trial court prior to the filing of the initial brief in an appeal, the supreme court noted that its intent was to "provide an effective, and hopefully more `failsafe' procedural mechanism through which defendants may present their sentencing errors to the trial court and thereby preserve them for appellate review." Id.

2001See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) and 3.800 and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.140, and 9.600, 761 So.2d 1015, 1017-18, 1021-22 (Fla.1999)(" Amendments II "). [2] In adding this new procedure for correcting sentencing errors in the trial court prior to the filing of the initial brief in an appeal, the supreme court noted that its intent was to "provide an effective, and hopefully more `failsafe' procedural mechanism through which defendants may present their sentencing errors to the trial court and thereby preserve them for appellate review." Id.

2001See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) and 3.800 and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.140, and 9.600, 761 So.2d 1015, 1017-18, 1021-22 (Fla.1999)(" Amendments II "). [2] In adding this new procedure for correcting sentencing errors in the trial court prior to the filing of the initial brief in an appeal, the supreme court noted that its intent was to "provide an effective, and hopefully more `failsafe' procedural mechanism through which defendants may present their sentencing errors to the trial court and thereby preserve them for appellate review." Id.