provision rule in South Carolina

2007This provision of the rule allows a party to join an action where "he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest." Id.

2007This provision of the rule allows a party to join an action where “he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.” Id.

2021See Rule 25(c) ("In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party."); Bryant, 342 S.C. at 164 n.2, 536 S.E.2d at 382 n.2 ("Rule 25(c) is applicable whe[n] there is a transfer of interest during the pendency of an action . . . ."); Rule 25(e) ("Substitution of parties under the provision of this rule may be made by the trial court either before or after judgment, or pending appeal, by the appellate

2021See Rule 25(c) ("In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party."); Bryant, 342 S.C. at 164 n.2, 536 S.E.2d at 382 n.2 ("Rule 25(c) is applicable whe[n] there is a transfer of interest during the pendency of an action . . . ."); Rule 25(e) ("Substitution of parties under the provision of this rule may be made by the trial court either before or after judgment, or pending appeal, by the appellate

2000In the later case of Pinheiro, et al. v. The Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc., 406 Mass. 288 , 547 N.E.2d 49 (1989), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explicated: In Bilodeau , we were called on to determine whether a loss of consortium claimant was entitled to a separate “per person” limit of recovery under the provision of the standard Massachusetts automobile liability insurance policy, [which provided “The most we will pay for injuries to any one person as a result of any one accident is [$10,000].” Pinheiro, 547 N.E.2d at 53 n. 10.] We reasoned in Bilodeau that, “fo

2000In the later case of Pinheiro, et al. v. The Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc., 406 Mass. 288 , 547 N.E.2d 49 (1989), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explicated: In Bilodeau , we were called on to determine whether a loss of consortium claimant was entitled to a separate “per person” limit of recovery under the provision of the standard Massachusetts automobile liability insurance policy, [which provided “The most we will pay for injuries to any one person as a result of any one accident is [$10,000].” Pinheiro, 547 N.E.2d at 53 n. 10.] We reasoned in Bilodeau that, “fo

1975McDonald v. Welborn, 220 S. C. 10, 66 S. E. (2d) 327 ; Maxwell v. Smith, 228 S. C. 182, 89 S. E. (2d) 280 ; Cothran v. Stroman, 246 S. C. 42, 142 S. E. (2d) 368 ; Baltz, Inc. v. R.

1975McDonald v. Welborn, 220 S. C. 10, 66 S. E. (2d) 327 ; Maxwell v. Smith, 228 S. C. 182, 89 S. E. (2d) 280 ; Cothran v. Stroman, 246 S. C. 42, 142 S. E. (2d) 368 ; Baltz, Inc. v. R.

1975McDonald v. Welborn, 220 S. C. 10, 66 S. E. (2d) 327 ; Maxwell v. Smith, 228 S. C. 182, 89 S. E. (2d) 280 ; Cothran v. Stroman, 246 S. C. 42, 142 S. E. (2d) 368 ; Baltz, Inc. v. R.

1935The complaint alleges that insured “had a right, under the terms of the policy, to change the beneficiary at any time.” The answer alleges that the policy “contained a provision and clause to- the effect that the beneficiary could only be changed by written request to the office of the company together with said policy of insurance, so that such change might be endorsed on said policy.” As was said in the case of Henry Mercantile Co. v. Railway Co., 104 S. C., 478, 89 S. E., 480, 481 , the essential fact “was not a disputed question.” The *236 second objection to this testimony, to the effect

1928L., at page 483, it is said: “A decided majority of the cases hold that the constitutional provision which imposes equality and uniformity of taxation has no application to an occupation or license tax, but is limited to- a direct property tax, which is assessed and collected in the usual way, although the license fee may be regulated by the amount of business done, with a provision for the privilege of paying a maximum fixed amount instead.” See State v. Applegarth, 81 Md., 293 ; 31 A., 961 ; 28 L.

1928L., at page 483, it is said: “A decided majority of the cases hold that the constitutional provision which imposes equality and uniformity of taxation has no application to an occupation or license tax, but is limited to- a direct property tax, which is assessed and collected in the usual way, although the license fee may be regulated by the amount of business done, with a provision for the privilege of paying a maximum fixed amount instead.” See State v. Applegarth, 81 Md., 293 ; 31 A., 961 ; 28 L.

1905We think the act of 1898 has no application to this case because it is expressly provided in that act that it shall “not apply to contracts made before it goes into effect.” Because of this provision the rule stated in Hardin v. Trimmier, 27 S. C., 110, 3 S. E., 46 , cannot apply.