subject matter inquiry in Michigan

1973Moreover, we would go further, and commit this Court anew to the established rule that opinions of causation in negligence cases, 'where the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the ordinary experience of all men of common education’ (quotation from American Jurisprudence, as quoted in Kelso v Independent Tank Co, 348 P2d 855 [Okla, 1960], more fully quoted and cited post), whether offered by experts or lay witnesses, are uniformly excluded as invasive of the province of the jury.” In the case of Padgett v Buxton-Smith Mercantile Co, 262 F2

1973Moreover, we would go further, and commit this Court anew to the established rule that opinions of causation in negligence cases, `where the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the ordinary experience of all men of common education' (quotation from American Jurisprudence, as quoted in Kelso v Independent Tank Co, 348 P2d 855 [Okla, 1960], more fully quoted and cited post), whether offered by experts or lay witnesses, are uniformly excluded as invasive of the province of the jury." In the case of Padgett v Buxton-Smith Mercantile Co, 262 F2

2010Their absence from the court rules does indicate that they are not mandated and that the physician cannot be forced to comply, but there is nothing in the court rules precluding an interview if the physician chooses to coöperate. [ Domako, 438 Mich. at 361-362 , 475 N.W.2d 30 .] After we decided Domako , the Legislature enacted MCL 600.2912f, [3] which provides *104 that a defendant in a medical malpractice action or the defendant's attorney or representative "may communicate" with persons or entities with respect to whom the plaintiff has waived the physician-patient privilege "in order to ob

2010Their absence from the court rules does indicate that they are not mandated and that the physician cannot be forced to comply, but there is nothing in the court rules precluding an interview if the physician chooses to cooperate. [Domako, 438 Mich at 361-362 .] After we decided Domako , the Legislature enacted MCL 600.2912f, 3 which provides that a defendant in a medical malpractice action or the defendant’s attorney or representative “may communicate” with persons or entities with respect to whom the plaintiff has waived the physician-patient privilege “in order to obtain all information rele

2023Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 585-586 ; 751 NW2d 493 (2008); In re Quinney’s Estate, 287 Mich 329, 338-339 ; 283 NW 559 (1939) (“While a dismissal on the ground the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter is a conclusive determination of want of jurisdiction, it is no adjudication of the merits and will not bar another action for the same cause.”); MCR 2.504(B)(3) (“Unless the court otherwise specifies in its order for dismissal, a dismissal under this subrule or a dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to join a party und

2023Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 585-586 ; 751 NW2d 493 (2008); In re Quinney’s Estate, 287 Mich 329, 338-339 ; 283 NW 559 (1939) (“While a dismissal on the ground the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter is a conclusive determination of want of jurisdiction, it is no adjudication of the merits and will not bar another action for the same cause.”); MCR 2.504(B)(3) (“Unless the court otherwise specifies in its order for dismissal, a dismissal under this subrule or a dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to join a party und

2023Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 585-586 ; 751 NW2d 493 (2008); In re Quinney’s Estate, 287 Mich 329, 338-339 ; 283 NW 559 (1939) (“While a dismissal on the ground the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter is a conclusive determination of want of jurisdiction, it is no adjudication of the merits and will not bar another action for the same cause.”); MCR 2.504(B)(3) (“Unless the court otherwise specifies in its order for dismissal, a dismissal under this subrule or a dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to join a party und

2023Adair, 470 Mich at 124 . 2 MCL 487.11101 et seq. -3- jurisdiction.3 A court that has decided that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is prevented from reaching the merits of the claim, and that outcome does not preclude subsequent litigation of that claim in a competent forum.

2020Daystar Seller Fin, LLC v Hundley, 326 Mich App 31, 34 ; 931 NW2d 15 (2018).

2020Daystar Seller Fin, LLC v Hundley, 326 Mich App 31, 34 ; 931 NW2d 15 (2018).

2020Mich State AFL-CIO, 230 Mich App at 15 .13 A rule can also be characterized as procedurally invalid if it was not properly promulgated, e,g., when a required hearing was not conducted.

1997The reasonableness of attorney fees should be viewed “in context with the complexity of the subject matter of the hearing and the need for multiple counsel to be in attendance.” Michigan Consolidated Gas Co v Muzeck, 15 Mich App 193, 197 ; 166 NW2d 273 (1968).

1997The reasonableness of attorney fees should be viewed “in context with the complexity of the subject matter of the hearing and the need for multiple counsel to be in attendance.” Michigan Consolidated Gas Co v Muzeck, 15 Mich App 193, 197 ; 166 NW2d 273 (1968).

1983The judge found that the subject matter of the instruction was adequately covered by the first instruction. * Except as limited by the rules governing requests for Standard Jury Instructions, see Javis; supra; Socha, supra, where the charge to the jury otherwise covers the substance of an instruction as requested by a party, the court need not follow the "precise form” requested by that party.

1983Ferries; supra; Berlin v Snyder, 89 Mich App 38, 41 ; 279 NW2d 322 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 867 (1979).

1983Ferries; supra; Berlin v Snyder, 89 Mich App 38, 41 ; 279 NW2d 322 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 867 (1979).

1983Ferries v Copco Steel & Engineering Co, 344 Mich 345, 350 ; 73 NW2d 850 (1955); Bank of Lansing v Stein, Hinkle, Dawe & Assoc Architects, Inc, 100 Mich App 719, 727 ; 300 NW2d 383 (1980).

1983Ferries v Copco Steel & Engineering Co, 344 Mich 345, 350 ; 73 NW2d 850 (1955); Bank of Lansing v Stein, Hinkle, Dawe & Assoc Architects, Inc, 100 Mich App 719, 727 ; 300 NW2d 383 (1980).

1983Ferries v Copco Steel & Engineering Co, 344 Mich 345, 350 ; 73 NW2d 850 (1955); Bank of Lansing v Stein, Hinkle, Dawe & Assoc Architects, Inc, 100 Mich App 719, 727 ; 300 NW2d 383 (1980).

1983Ferries v Copco Steel & Engineering Co, 344 Mich 345, 350 ; 73 NW2d 850 (1955); Bank of Lansing v Stein, Hinkle, Dawe & Assoc Architects, Inc, 100 Mich App 719, 727 ; 300 NW2d 383 (1980).

1964Co. v. Banning (CCA 6), 173 F2d 752, 756, certiorari denied 338 US 815 ( 70 S Ct 54 , 57, 94 L ed 493), is: "The general rule permits a witness who is experienced in technical matters and qualified to do so, to give his opinion in a matter which is not one of common knowledge, although it involves an ultimate fact to be finally decided by the jury." To the same effect see Sykes v. Village of Portland, 193 Mich 86 ; Winchester v. Chabut, 321 Mich 114 ; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich 692 .

1964Washita Valley Grain Co. v. McElroy (Okla), 262 P2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf (Okla), 312 P2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant; and Maben v. Lee (Okla), 260 P2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant.” Kelso v. Independent Tank Co. (Okla), 348 P2d 855, 857 .

1964Washita Valley Grain Co. v. McElroy (Okla), 262 P2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf (Okla), 312 P2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant; and Maben v. Lee (Okla), 260 P2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant." Kelso v. Independent Tank Co. (Okla), 348 P2d 855, 857 .

1964Washita Valley Grain Co. v. McElroy (Okla), 262 P2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf (Okla), 312 P2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant; and Maben v. Lee (Okla), 260 P2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant.” Kelso v. Independent Tank Co. (Okla), 348 P2d 855, 857 .

1964Washita Valley Grain Co. v. McElroy (Okla), 262 P2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf (Okla), 312 P2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant; and Maben v. Lee (Okla), 260 P2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant." Kelso v. Independent Tank Co. (Okla), 348 P2d 855, 857 .

1964Co. v. Banning (CCA 6), 173 F2d 752, 756, certiorari denied 338 US 815 ( 70 S Ct 54 , 57, 94 L ed 493), is: "The general rule permits a witness who is experienced in technical matters and qualified to do so, to give his opinion in a matter which is not one of common knowledge, although it involves an ultimate fact to be finally decided by the jury." To the same effect see Sykes v. Village of Portland, 193 Mich 86 ; Winchester v. Chabut, 321 Mich 114 ; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich 692 .

1964Washita Valley Grain Co. v. McElroy (Okla), 262 P2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf (Okla), 312 P2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant; and Maben v. Lee (Okla), 260 P2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant.” Kelso v. Independent Tank Co. (Okla), 348 P2d 855, 857 .

1964Washita Valley Grain Co. v. McElroy (Okla), 262 P2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf (Okla), 312 P2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant; and Maben v. Lee (Okla), 260 P2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant." Kelso v. Independent Tank Co. (Okla), 348 P2d 855, 857 .

1964Co. v. Banning (CCA 6), 173 F2d 752, 756, certiorari denied 338 US 815 ( 70 S Ct 54 , 57, 94 L ed 493), is: "The general rule permits a witness who is experienced in technical matters and qualified to do so, to give his opinion in a matter which is not one of common knowledge, although it involves an ultimate fact to be finally decided by the jury." To the same effect see Sykes v. Village of Portland, 193 Mich 86 ; Winchester v. Chabut, 321 Mich 114 ; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich 692 .

1964Co. v. Banning (CCA 6), 173 F2d 752, 756, certiorari denied 338 US 815 ( 70 S Ct 54 , 57, 94 L ed 493), is: "The general rule permits a witness who is experienced in technical matters and qualified to do so, to give his opinion in a matter which is not one of common knowledge, although it involves an ultimate fact to be finally decided by the jury." To the same effect see Sykes v. Village of Portland, 193 Mich 86 ; Winchester v. Chabut, 321 Mich 114 ; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich 692 .

1964Co. v. Banning (CCA 6), 173 F2d 752, 756, certiorari denied 338 US 815 ( 70 S Ct 54 , 57, 94 L ed 493), is: "The general rule permits a witness who is experienced in technical matters and qualified to do so, to give his opinion in a matter which is not one of common knowledge, although it involves an ultimate fact to be finally decided by the jury." To the same effect see Sykes v. Village of Portland, 193 Mich 86 ; Winchester v. Chabut, 321 Mich 114 ; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich 692 .

1949Freedman v. Freedman, 303 Mich 647 .