78 Pennsylvania opinions name it 12 courts 1893–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Storm v. Goldengreen2 sentences2021“Expert testimony becomes necessary when the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training not common to the ordinary lay person.” Storm v. Golden, 538 A.2d 61, 64 (Pa. Super. 1988). 2021“Expert testimony becomes necessary when the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training not common to the ordinary lay person.” Storm v. Golden, 538 A.2d 61, 64 (Pa. Super. 1988). | 16 | 21 |
Reardon v. Meehangreen2 sentences2018It is well established as a general matter that expert testimony is necessary when the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman Reardon v. Meehan, 227 A.2d 667, 670 (Pa. 1967). 2000The requirement for expert testimony “rises from necessity, a necessity bom of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Reardon v. Meehan, 424 Pa. 460, 465 , 227 A.2d 667 (1967). | 8 | 10 |
Young v. Commonwealth Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2026See also Young v. DOT, 744 A.2d 1276, 1278 (Pa. 2000) (“[T]he employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skill and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.”); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. 1978) (reiterating well-established precedent that, in personal injury matters, it may be “possible for a jury reasonably to infer causation from the circumstances of an accident or occurrence, [but] it is generally acknowledged - 14 - J-A30008-25 that the complexities of the huma 2025It is well-established that “[t]he employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skill and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Young v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 744 A.2d 1276, 1278 (Pa. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 702 (governing testimony by expert witnesses). | 5 | 7 |
Brandon v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.green2 sentences2021We have stated that, [t]he employment of testimony of an expert rises from … a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skill and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Brandon v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 34 A.3d 104, 108 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Young v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 560 Pa. 373, 376-77 , 744 A.2d 1276, 1278 (2000)). 2016Expert testimony is not needed in every general negligence case, as it is in medical malpractice cases, however, “[e]xpert testimony becomes necessary when the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training not common to the ordinary lay person.” Brandon v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 34 A.3d 104, 108 (Pa. Super. 2011). | 4 | 4 |
Tennis v. Fedorwiczgreen2 sentences1998Id. 592 A.2d at 117 . 1998Id. 592 A.2d at 117 . | 1 | 2 |
Hamil v. Bashlinegreen1 sentence2026See also Young v. DOT, 744 A.2d 1276, 1278 (Pa. 2000) (“[T]he employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skill and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.”); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. 1978) (reiterating well-established precedent that, in personal injury matters, it may be “possible for a jury reasonably to infer causation from the circumstances of an accident or occurrence, [but] it is generally acknowledged - 14 - J-A30008-25 that the complexities of the huma | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2021The failure of either of these tests renders a proposed amendment void under the separate vote requirement set forth in Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution. 1Appellants in this matter are Shameekah Moore, Martin Vickless, Kristin June Irwin, and Kelly Williams. [J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 3 The first test articulated in Grimaud is a “subject matter test.” The subject matter test requires us to examine whether the changes in a proposed amendment “are sufficiently interrelated to justify their presentation to the electorate in a single [ballot] question.” Id. at 841 (quoting Pa. Prison So 2021See id. (citing Pa. Prison Soc, 776 A.2d at 984 n.1 (discussing authority from other jurisdictions that apply a subject matter test)). | 1 | 1 |
Matthews v. Clarion Hospitalgreen1 sentence2018Moreover, he points out that expert testimony as to causation is not required “where there is an obvious causal relationship between the injury complained of and the alleged negligent act.” Mr. Correa’s Brief at 11 (quoting Matthews v. Clarion Hospital, 742 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Pa. Super. 1999) (emphasis in original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Griffithgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Griffith , 613 Pa. 171 , 32 A.3d 1231 , 1239 (2011) ("Pursuant to our general *487 standard, a need for expert testimony arises when the jury is confronted with factual issues whose resolution requires knowledge beyond the ken of the ordinary layman ." (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Young v. Com., Dep't of Transp. , 560 Pa. 373 , 744 A.2d 1276 , 1278 (2000) ("[T]he employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skill and train 2018See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Griffith , 613 Pa. 171 , 32 A.3d 1231 , 1239 (2011) ("Pursuant to our general *487 standard, a need for expert testimony arises when the jury is confronted with factual issues whose resolution requires knowledge beyond the ken of the ordinary layman ." (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Young v. Com., Dep't of Transp. , 560 Pa. 373 , 744 A.2d 1276 , 1278 (2000) ("[T]he employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skill and train | 1 | 1 |
Bagwell v. Pennsylvania Department of Educationgreen1 sentence2016See Bagwell v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 103 A.3d 409, 419 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014). | 1 | 1 |
Fredericks v. Castoragreen1 sentence2015While the standard of care for motorists is to exercise the ordinary care required in the circumstances presented, see, e.g., Fredericks v. Castora, 360 A.2d 696, 698 (Pa. Super. 1976), “[e]xpert testimony becomes necessary when the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training not common to the ordinary lay person.”5 See, e.g., Storm v. Golden, 538 A.2d 61, 64 (Pa. Super. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Fleminggreen2 sentences2014Nevertheless, it is not clear to me how the Majority is applying our Supreme Court’s affirmance in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fleming, 605 Pa. 468 , 992 A.2d 65 (2010) (op. in support of affir-mance; equally divided court), to “conclude the circumstances here do not warrant waiver of the privileges.” (op. at 420.) In Fleming , both the opinion in support of affirmance and the opinion in support of reversal applied the subject matter waiver doctrine to the attorney-client privilege, but reached opposite conclusions. 2014Nevertheless, it is not clear to me how the Majority is applying our Supreme Court’s affirmance in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fleming, 605 Pa. 468 , 992 A.2d 65 (2010) (op. in support of affir-mance; equally divided court), to “conclude the circumstances here do not warrant waiver of the privileges.” (op. at 420.) In Fleming , both the opinion in support of affirmance and the opinion in support of reversal applied the subject matter waiver doctrine to the attorney-client privilege, but reached opposite conclusions. | 1 | 1 |
Minatronics Corp. v. Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C.green2 sentences2010The Minatronics court also noted significant support for the position that such disclosure does not waive the privilege “where there is no apparent prejudice to the party seeking further disclosure[,]” because “where it is clear that the limited disclosure is not being used [as a sword and a shield], there is no justification for applying a subject matter waiver.” Minatronics , at 19-20. 2010The court held the inadvertent disclosures at issue did not waive the attorney-client privilege, and further opined, “the law should not discourage parties from voluntarily disclosing confidential communications (unless made for the purpose of achieving a tactical advantage) by adopting a rule of law that causes voluntary disclosures to operate as a waiver of other confidential communications involving the same subject matter.” Id., at 20-21 . | 1 | 1 |
Fort James Corporation v. Solo Cup Companygreen1 sentence2010See, e.g., Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“There is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought[,] and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
| Bennett v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Davenportgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stevenson v. East Deer Townshipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cooper v. Metropolitan Life Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Claus Von Bulow, Martha Von Bulow, by Her Next Friends Alexander Auersperg, and Annie Laurie Auersperg-Kneissl v. Claus Von Bulowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Laura Lanes, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kardos v. Morrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Canfield v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Masse v. Quartuccigreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Al Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Carol Verickergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weisman v. Sauder Chevrolet Co.
neutral
2 sentences2013“The employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Ld. (citing Weisman v. Sauder Chevrolet Co., 402 Pa. 272 , 167 A.2d 308 (1961); Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81 , 152 A.2d 697 (1959); Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392 , 188 A. 181 (1936)). 2013“The employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Ld. (citing Weisman v. Sauder Chevrolet Co., 402 Pa. 272 , 167 A.2d 308 (1961); Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81 , 152 A.2d 697 (1959); Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392 , 188 A. 181 (1936)). | 4 | 1967–2013 |
Jemison v. Pfeifer
green
2 sentences2013“The employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Ld. (citing Weisman v. Sauder Chevrolet Co., 402 Pa. 272 , 167 A.2d 308 (1961); Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81 , 152 A.2d 697 (1959); Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392 , 188 A. 181 (1936)). 2013“The employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Ld. (citing Weisman v. Sauder Chevrolet Co., 402 Pa. 272 , 167 A.2d 308 (1961); Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81 , 152 A.2d 697 (1959); Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392 , 188 A. 181 (1936)). | 3 | 1967–2013 |
Delair v. McAdoo
green
2 sentences2013“The employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Ld. (citing Weisman v. Sauder Chevrolet Co., 402 Pa. 272 , 167 A.2d 308 (1961); Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81 , 152 A.2d 697 (1959); Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392 , 188 A. 181 (1936)). 2013“The employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.” Ld. (citing Weisman v. Sauder Chevrolet Co., 402 Pa. 272 , 167 A.2d 308 (1961); Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81 , 152 A.2d 697 (1959); Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392 , 188 A. 181 (1936)). | 3 | 1967–2013 |
Stroud's Appeal
green
2 sentences1978One judgment may be set-off against another, through the equitable powers of the court, but to a judgment ripe for execution, there can be but one answer to wit: Payment pure and simple’: Thorp v. Wegfarth [Wegefarth] 56 Pa. 82 ; Rishel v. Crouse, 162 Pa. 3 , [ 29 A. 123 ] This broad statement, however, must be qualified in this respect that when the subject-matter of defense is attached to the judgment or to the consideration on which it rests, the court under its equitable powers will entertain such a petition and if the facts warrant will open the judgment: Beaty v. Bordwell, 91 Pa. 438 ; S 1971However, when it appears that the subject matter of the defense is attached to the judgment or to the consideration on which it rests, the court, under its equitable powers, will, if the facts warrant, open the judgment; petitioner may be permitted to attack the validity of the claim on which the judgment is founded: Stroud’s Appeal, 109 Pa. 326 (1885); Pollard & Brant, Inc. v. Stein, 81 Pa, Superior Ct. 374 (1923). | 3 | 1923–1978 |
Pittsburgh, Virginia & Charleston Railway Co. v. Vance
green
2 sentences1903The rule is clearly laid down in Michael v. Pipe Line Company, supra, that in establishing the competency of witnesses called to give an opinion as to the market value of land, it must affirmatively appear that they have the requisite personal knowledge of the subject-matter of the inquiry, and the source, extent and character of that knowledge must be satisfactorily shown. 1896In Michael v. Crescent Pipe Line Co., 159 Pa. 104 , it was said: “ An essential test of the competency of witnesses, called to give an opinion in respect of the market value of land, is that they should affirmatively appear to have actual personal knowledge of the facts affecting the subject-matter of the inquiry: Railway Co. v. Vance, 115 Pa. 325 . | 3 | 1893–1903 |
Pollard & Brant, Inc. v. Stein
green
2 sentences1984Bell Federal Savings & Loan Association of Bellevue v. Laura Lanes, Inc., supra ; Pollard & Brant, Inc. v. Stein, 81 Pa.Super. 374 (1923). 1984Bell Federal Savings & Loan Association of Bellevue v. Laura Lanes, Inc., supra; Pollard & Brant, Inc. v. Stein, 81 Pa.Super. 374 (1923). | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Beaty v. Bordwell
neutral
2 sentences1978One judgment may be set-off against another, through the equitable powers of the court, but to a judgment ripe for execution, there can be but one answer to wit: Payment pure and simple’: Thorp v. Wegfarth [Wegefarth] 56 Pa. 82 ; Rishel v. Crouse, 162 Pa. 3 , [ 29 A. 123 ] This broad statement, however, must be qualified in this respect that when the subject-matter of defense is attached to the judgment or to the consideration on which it rests, the court under its equitable powers will entertain such a petition and if the facts warrant will open the judgment: Beaty v. Bordwell, 91 Pa. 438 ; S 1923This broad statement, however, must be qualified in this respect that when the subject-matter of defense is attached to the judgment or to the consideration on which it rests, the court under its equitable powers will entertain such a petition and if the facts warrant will open the judgment: Beaty v. Bordwell, 91 Pa. 438 ; Stroud’s App., 109 Pa. 326 . | 2 | 1923–1978 |
Knowles's Estate
green
2 sentences1939It need not embody all the distinct provisions of the bill in detail nor serve as a digest of its contents: Knowles’ Estate, 295 Pa. 571 . 1934We are of the opinion that the title of the act is sufficient to put any one having an interest in the subject-matter on inquiry, which is all that is necessary: Knowles’ Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 580 , 145 A. 797 . | 2 | 1934–1939 |
Com., Office of the Governor v. P. Engelkemier
green
1 sentence2025“If terms on a list are too general or too broad, a requester runs the risk that the request will be rejected for lack of specificity[.]” Engelkemier, 148 A.3d at 531 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Thomas Estate
green
2 sentences2022See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(1); Estate of Ciuccarelli, supra. See also In re Thomas’ Estate, 457 Pa. 546 , 327 A.2d 31 (1974) (explaining jurisdiction of Orphans’ Court is entirely of statutory origin vesting it with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of personal property registered in name of decedent or alleged by personal representative to have been in possession of decedent at time of death). 2022See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(1); Estate of Ciuccarelli, supra. See also In re Thomas’ Estate, 457 Pa. 546 , 327 A.2d 31 (1974) (explaining jurisdiction of Orphans’ Court is entirely of statutory origin vesting it with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of personal property registered in name of decedent or alleged by personal representative to have been in possession of decedent at time of death). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Estate of Ciuccarelli
green
1 sentence2022See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(1); Estate of Ciuccarelli, supra. See also In re Thomas’ Estate, 457 Pa. 546 , 327 A.2d 31 (1974) (explaining jurisdiction of Orphans’ Court is entirely of statutory origin vesting it with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of personal property registered in name of decedent or alleged by personal representative to have been in possession of decedent at time of death). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Grimaud v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2021The failure of either of these tests renders a proposed amendment void under the separate vote requirement set forth in Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution. 1Appellants in this matter are Shameekah Moore, Martin Vickless, Kristin June Irwin, and Kelly Williams. [J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 3 The first test articulated in Grimaud is a “subject matter test.” The subject matter test requires us to examine whether the changes in a proposed amendment “are sufficiently interrelated to justify their presentation to the electorate in a single [ballot] question.” Id. at 841 (quoting Pa. Prison So | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Easton Area School District v. Baxter
green
1 sentence2021As we stated in Baxter, “the request was obviously sufficiently specific because the [s]chool [d]istrict has already identified potential records included within the request.” Baxter, 35 A.3d at 1264 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Pa. Pub. Util. Com'n v. Proc. Gas Consum.
green
1 sentence2019The flat seven day period for answer of former Supreme Court Rule 62 (which presumably was principally directed at allocatur practice) has been omitted in favor of the more flexible provisions of Pa.R.A.P. 123(b).] See generally Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Process Gas Consumers Group, 467 A.2d 805 (Pa. 1983), for the criteria for the issuance of a stay pending appeal. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
1726 Cherry Street Partnership v. Bell Atlantic Properties, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Id. at unnumbered 6. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Joe v. Prison Health Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010The court held the inadvertent disclosures at issue did not waive the attorney-client privilege, and further opined, "the law should not discourage parties from voluntarily disclosing confidential communications (unless made for the purpose of achieving a tactical advantage) by adopting a rule of law that causes voluntary disclosures to operate as a waiver of other confidential communications involving the same subject matter." Id. , at 20-21. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Anderson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| cluster 372798 green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Sprague v. Walter green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Stratagem Development Corp. v. Heron International N.V. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| TIMES PUB. CO., INC. v. Michel green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Pirches v. General Accident Insurance green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hayes Creek Country Club, Inc. v. Central Penn Quarry Stripping & Construction Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Bernard M. Decker, United States District Judge v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Honorable Bernard M. Decker, United States District Judge green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Kosek v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Robachinski v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Saunders v. Creamer green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Maine v. Thiboutot green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Martinez v. California green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Lebesco v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Thorp v. Wegefarth green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Rishel v. Crouse neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Harris v. United States green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Dopkin v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Gosser v. Ohio Valley Water Co. neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Roosa v. Boston Loan Co. green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Boyd v. Kirch neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Morris v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. green | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Michael v. Crescent Pipe Line Co. neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.