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40 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blanchard v. Savannah River Lumber Co.green2 sentences1961Consequently courts, juries, and commissions, in determining the issues they are called upon to settle, may and should take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances attending the subject-matter of the inquiry." Blanchard v. Savannah River Lumber Co., 40 Ga. App. 416 (1), 424 ( 149 S. E. 793 ). 1961Consequently courts, juries, and commissions, in determining the issues they are called upon to settle, may and should take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances attending the subject-matter of the inquiry." Blanchard v. Savannah River Lumber Co., 40 Ga. App. 416 (1), 424 ( 149 S. E. 793 ). | 2 | 3 |
Griffin v. Stategreen2 sentences2016An expert is one whose habits and profession endow that person with the particular skill needed in forming an opinion on the subject matter at inquiry.30 “Improper bolstering occurs when an expert witness is allowed to give . . . her opinion as to whether the complaining witness is telling the truth, because that is an ultimate issue of fact and the inference to be drawn is not beyond the ken of the average juror.”31 30 (Citations omitted.) Griffin v. State, 243 Ga. App. 282, 286 (5) ( 531 SE2d 175 ) (2000). 31 Maddox v. State, 275 Ga. App. 869, 871 (2) ( 622 SE2d 80 ) (2005). 19 Here, Whitmor 2016An expert is one whose habits and profession endow that person with the particular skill needed in forming an opinion on the subject matter at inquiry.30 “Improper bolstering occurs when an expert witness is allowed to give . . . her opinion as to whether the complaining witness is telling the truth, because that is an ultimate issue of fact and the inference to be drawn is not beyond the ken of the average juror.”31 30 (Citations omitted.) Griffin v. State, 243 Ga. App. 282, 286 (5) ( 531 SE2d 175 ) (2000). 31 Maddox v. State, 275 Ga. App. 869, 871 (2) ( 622 SE2d 80 ) (2005). 19 Here, Whitmor | 2 | 2 |
Murrell v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The qualification of a witness as an expert is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Murrell v. State, 273 Ga. App. 735, 739 (3) ( 615 SE2d 780 ) (2005). 2009The qualification of a witness as an expert is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Murrell v. State, 273 Ga. App. 735, 739 (3) ( 615 SE2d 780 ) (2005). | 2 | 2 |
Dual S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbgreen2 sentences1996In Dual S. Enterprises v. Webb, 138 Ga. App. 810 (2) ( 227 SE2d 418 ) (1976), we observed “that when the subject matter of an inquiry relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses, to a series of instances passing under the observation of a witness, or to a variety of circumstances and a combination of appearances, which, under the limitations of language, cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury with the same force and clearness as they appeared to the witness, the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions baséd upon, the facts and circumstances observed b 1996In Dual S. Enterprises v. Webb, 138 Ga. App. 810 (2) ( 227 SE2d 418 ) (1976), we observed “that when the subject matter of an inquiry relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses, to a series of instances passing under the observation of a witness, or to a variety of circumstances and a combination of appearances, which, under the limitations of language, cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury with the same force and clearness as they appeared to the witness, the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions baséd upon, the facts and circumstances observed b | 1 | 2 |
Maddox v. Stategreen2 sentences2016An expert is one whose habits and profession endow that person with the particular skill needed in forming an opinion on the subject matter at inquiry.30 “Improper bolstering occurs when an expert witness is allowed to give . . . her opinion as to whether the complaining witness is telling the truth, because that is an ultimate issue of fact and the inference to be drawn is not beyond the ken of the average juror.”31 30 (Citations omitted.) Griffin v. State, 243 Ga. App. 282, 286 (5) ( 531 SE2d 175 ) (2000). 31 Maddox v. State, 275 Ga. App. 869, 871 (2) ( 622 SE2d 80 ) (2005). 19 Here, Whitmor 2016An expert is one whose habits and profession endow that person with the particular skill needed in forming an opinion on the subject matter at inquiry.30 “Improper bolstering occurs when an expert witness is allowed to give . . . her opinion as to whether the complaining witness is telling the truth, because that is an ultimate issue of fact and the inference to be drawn is not beyond the ken of the average juror.”31 30 (Citations omitted.) Griffin v. State, 243 Ga. App. 282, 286 (5) ( 531 SE2d 175 ) (2000). 31 Maddox v. State, 275 Ga. App. 869, 871 (2) ( 622 SE2d 80 ) (2005). 19 Here, Whitmor | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. Fullergreen2 sentences2012Finally, wife argues the trial court erred in its denial of her motion to set aside the final judgment because the property and custody awards exceed the amount prayed for in husband’s counterclaim for divorce. (a) With regard to the property award, husband sought as part of his counterclaim an “equitable division of all real and personal property, assets, and indebtedness of the parties.” Because “an equitable division of marital property does not necessarily mean an equal division,” (punctuation omitted) Fuller v. Fuller, 279 Ga. 805, 808 (3) ( 621 SE2d 419 ) (2005), the property award does 2012Finally, wife argues the trial court erred in its denial of her motion to set aside the final judgment because the property and custody awards exceed the amount prayed for in husband’s counterclaim for divorce. (a) With regard to the property award, husband sought as part of his counterclaim an “equitable division of all real and personal property, assets, and indebtedness of the parties.” Because “an equitable division of marital property does not necessarily mean an equal division,” (punctuation omitted) Fuller v. Fuller, 279 Ga. 805, 808 (3) ( 621 SE2d 419 ) (2005), the property award does | 1 | 1 |
Bass v. Pearsongreen2 sentences2009See Bass v. Pearson, 219 Ga. App. 487, 488 ( 466 SE2d 17 ) (1995). 2009See Bass v. Pearson, 219 Ga. App. 487, 488 ( 466 SE2d 17 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
McMichen v. Moattargreen2 sentences2008The Court of Appeals found that the admission of Harvey’s testimony was proper, relying on the rule set forth in McMichen v. Moattar, 221 Ga. App. 230 (2) ( 470 SE2d 800 ) (1996) and In the Interest of Smith, 143 Ga. App. 358 (2) ( 238 SE2d 725 ) (1977), that when the subject matter of an inquiry “ ‘relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses’ ” that cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury, “ ‘the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by him or the effect which they produced upon his mind.’ ” (Emphasis 2008The Court of Appeals found that the admission of Harvey’s testimony was proper, relying on the rule set forth in McMichen v. Moattar, 221 Ga. App. 230 (2) ( 470 SE2d 800 ) (1996) and In the Interest of Smith, 143 Ga. App. 358 (2) ( 238 SE2d 725 ) (1977), that when the subject matter of an inquiry “ ‘relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses’ ” that cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury, “ ‘the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by him or the effect which they produced upon his mind.’ ” (Emphasis | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Compare Sapp v. Johnson, 184 Ga. App. 603, 606 (3) ( 362 SE2d 82 ) (1987). 4 See OCGA § 24-9-67; Smith v. State, 210 Ga. App. 451, 452 (3) ( 436 SE2d 562 ) (1993) (“one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a particular skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry”); Goodman v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631, 633 (2) ( 399 SE2d 255 ) (1990) (“education, training or experience in the pertinent field of stud/’); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627 (2) ( 469 SE2d 152 ) (1996) (expert’s testimony must be relevant to an issue in the case). 2000Compare Sapp v. Johnson, 184 Ga. App. 603, 606 (3) ( 362 SE2d 82 ) (1987). 4 See OCGA § 24-9-67; Smith v. State, 210 Ga. App. 451, 452 (3) ( 436 SE2d 562 ) (1993) (“one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a particular skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry”); Goodman v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631, 633 (2) ( 399 SE2d 255 ) (1990) (“education, training or experience in the pertinent field of stud/’); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627 (2) ( 469 SE2d 152 ) (1996) (expert’s testimony must be relevant to an issue in the case). | 1 | 1 |
Sapp v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2000Compare Sapp v. Johnson, 184 Ga. App. 603, 606 (3) ( 362 SE2d 82 ) (1987). 4 See OCGA § 24-9-67; Smith v. State, 210 Ga. App. 451, 452 (3) ( 436 SE2d 562 ) (1993) (“one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a particular skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry”); Goodman v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631, 633 (2) ( 399 SE2d 255 ) (1990) (“education, training or experience in the pertinent field of stud/’); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627 (2) ( 469 SE2d 152 ) (1996) (expert’s testimony must be relevant to an issue in the case). 2000Compare Sapp v. Johnson, 184 Ga. App. 603, 606 (3) ( 362 SE2d 82 ) (1987). 4 See OCGA § 24-9-67; Smith v. State, 210 Ga. App. 451, 452 (3) ( 436 SE2d 562 ) (1993) (“one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a particular skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry”); Goodman v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631, 633 (2) ( 399 SE2d 255 ) (1990) (“education, training or experience in the pertinent field of stud/’); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627 (2) ( 469 SE2d 152 ) (1996) (expert’s testimony must be relevant to an issue in the case). | 1 | 1 |
Goodman v. Lipmangreen2 sentences2000Compare Sapp v. Johnson, 184 Ga. App. 603, 606 (3) ( 362 SE2d 82 ) (1987). 4 See OCGA § 24-9-67; Smith v. State, 210 Ga. App. 451, 452 (3) ( 436 SE2d 562 ) (1993) (“one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a particular skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry”); Goodman v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631, 633 (2) ( 399 SE2d 255 ) (1990) (“education, training or experience in the pertinent field of stud/’); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627 (2) ( 469 SE2d 152 ) (1996) (expert’s testimony must be relevant to an issue in the case). 2000Compare Sapp v. Johnson, 184 Ga. App. 603, 606 (3) ( 362 SE2d 82 ) (1987). 4 See OCGA § 24-9-67; Smith v. State, 210 Ga. App. 451, 452 (3) ( 436 SE2d 562 ) (1993) (“one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a particular skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry”); Goodman v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631, 633 (2) ( 399 SE2d 255 ) (1990) (“education, training or experience in the pertinent field of stud/’); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627 (2) ( 469 SE2d 152 ) (1996) (expert’s testimony must be relevant to an issue in the case). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Compare Sapp v. Johnson, 184 Ga. App. 603, 606 (3) ( 362 SE2d 82 ) (1987). 4 See OCGA § 24-9-67; Smith v. State, 210 Ga. App. 451, 452 (3) ( 436 SE2d 562 ) (1993) (“one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a particular skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry”); Goodman v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631, 633 (2) ( 399 SE2d 255 ) (1990) (“education, training or experience in the pertinent field of stud/’); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627 (2) ( 469 SE2d 152 ) (1996) (expert’s testimony must be relevant to an issue in the case). 2000Compare Sapp v. Johnson, 184 Ga. App. 603, 606 (3) ( 362 SE2d 82 ) (1987). 4 See OCGA § 24-9-67; Smith v. State, 210 Ga. App. 451, 452 (3) ( 436 SE2d 562 ) (1993) (“one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a particular skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry”); Goodman v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631, 633 (2) ( 399 SE2d 255 ) (1990) (“education, training or experience in the pertinent field of stud/’); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627 (2) ( 469 SE2d 152 ) (1996) (expert’s testimony must be relevant to an issue in the case). | 1 | 1 |
Pride v. Stategreen2 sentences1996The true test is that “[i]f the circumstances are such as to render the inference superfluous, it is excluded; if not, it is admitted.” Pride v. State, 133 Ga. 438, 440 (1) ( 66 SE 259 ) (1909). 1996The true test is that “[i]f the circumstances are such as to render the inference superfluous, it is excluded; if not, it is admitted.” Pride v. State, 133 Ga. 438, 440 (1) ( 66 SE 259 ) (1909). | 1 | 1 |
Morrison v. Stategreen2 sentences1991“An expert is one whose habits and profession endow him [or her] with a peculiar skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry. [Cit.]” Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 411 (1) ( 249 SE2d 131 ) (1978). 1991“An expert is one whose habits and profession endow him [or her] with a peculiar skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry. [Cit.]” Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 411 (1) ( 249 SE2d 131 ) (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences1987“A criminal defendant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the witnesses against him, providing that the subject matter of the inquiry is relevant to the issues at trial. [Cit.]” Harris v. State, 173 Ga. App. 787, 788 (1) ( 328 SE2d 370 ) (1985). 1987“A criminal defendant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the witnesses against him, providing that the subject matter of the inquiry is relevant to the issues at trial. [Cit.]” Harris v. State, 173 Ga. App. 787, 788 (1) ( 328 SE2d 370 ) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Peacock v. Stategreen2 sentences1985See Peacock v. State, 170 Ga. App. 309 (3) ( 316 SE2d 864 ) (1984). 1985See Peacock v. State, 170 Ga. App. 309 (3) ( 316 SE2d 864 ) (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meiselgreen2 sentences1979Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 74 ( 68 SE2d 384 ) (1951); Smith v. White Lift of Dalton, 145 Ga. App. 596 ( 244 SE2d 117 ) (1978). 1979Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 74 ( 68 SE2d 384 ) (1951); Smith v. White Lift of Dalton, 145 Ga. App. 596 ( 244 SE2d 117 ) (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Wall v. Board of Electionsgreen2 sentences1979See Wall v. Bd. of Elections of Chatham County, 242 Ga. 566 (3) ( 250 SE2d 408 ) (1978). 2. 1979See Wall v. Bd. of Elections of Chatham County, 242 Ga. 566 (3) ( 250 SE2d 408 ) (1978). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Manley v. Stategreen2 sentences1943Consequently courts, juries, and commissions, in determining the *689 issues they are called upon to settle, may and should take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances attending' the subject-matter of the inquiry." The Supreme Court states the rule in Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 566 (19) ( 144 S. E. 170 ). 1943Consequently courts, juries, and commissions, in determining the *689 issues they are called upon to settle, may and should take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances attending' the subject-matter of the inquiry." The Supreme Court states the rule in Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 566 (19) ( 144 S. E. 170 ). | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wallisgreen2 sentences1943“The opinion of an expert witness is not conclusive upon the jury: Such testimony is intended to aid them in coming to a correct conclusion upon the subject; but the jury is not bound by such opinion, and can disregard it." “Negative evidence is only a species of circumstantial evidence.” Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wallis, 29 Ga. App. 706, 714 ( 116 S. E. 883 ). 1943“The opinion of an expert witness is not conclusive upon the jury: Such testimony is intended to aid them in coming to a correct conclusion upon the subject; but the jury is not bound by such opinion, and can disregard it." “Negative evidence is only a species of circumstantial evidence.” Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wallis, 29 Ga. App. 706, 714 ( 116 S. E. 883 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Brannan v. Cheekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hirsch v. Olivergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sales v. State
green
2 sentences2001“An expert is one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a [particular] skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry.” (Punctuation omitted.) Sales v. State, 199 Ga. App. 791 (1) ( 406 SE2d 131 ) (1991). 2001“An expert is one whose habits and profession endow him or her with a [particular] skill in forming an opinion on the subject matter in inquiry.” (Punctuation omitted.) Sales v. State, 199 Ga. App. 791 (1) ( 406 SE2d 131 ) (1991). | 5 | 1993–2002 |
Patterson v. Curtis Publishing Co.
neutral
2 sentences1979"It is likewise well settled that the compensation act covers the entire subject-matter of a claim for injuries by an employee against his employer, and that the remedy given by the act is in lieu of any remedy formerly afforded by an action at common law.” Patterson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 58 Ga. App. 211 ( 198 SE 102 ) (1938), and see also Williams Bros. 1979"It is likewise well settled that the compensation act covers the entire subject-matter of a claim for injuries by an employee against his employer, and that the remedy given by the act is in lieu of any remedy formerly afforded by an action at common law.” Patterson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 58 Ga. App. 211 ( 198 SE 102 ) (1938), and see also Williams Bros. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
Pryor v. Ludden & Bates Southern Music House
green
2 sentences1919Hirsch v. Oliver, 91 Ga. 554, 560 ( 18 S. E. 354 ); Dinkler v. Baer, 92 Ga. 432 (3) ( 17 S. E. 953 ) ; Byrd v. Marietta Fertilizer Co., 127 Ga. 30 ( 56 S. E. 86 ) ; Pryor v. Ludden, 134 Ga. 288 ( 67 S. E. 654 , 28 L. 1919Hirsch v. Oliver, 91 Ga. 554, 560 ( 18 S. E. 354 ); Dinkler v. Baer, 92 Ga. 432 (3) ( 17 S. E. 953 ) ; Byrd v. Marietta Fertilizer Co., 127 Ga. 30 ( 56 S. E. 86 ) ; Pryor v. Ludden, 134 Ga. 288 ( 67 S. E. 654 , 28 L. | 2 | 1915–1919 |
In the Interest Of: Gwen Smith
green
2 sentences2008The Court of Appeals found that the admission of Harvey’s testimony was proper, relying on the rule set forth in McMichen v. Moattar, 221 Ga. App. 230 (2) ( 470 SE2d 800 ) (1996) and In the Interest of Smith, 143 Ga. App. 358 (2) ( 238 SE2d 725 ) (1977), that when the subject matter of an inquiry “ ‘relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses’ ” that cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury, “ ‘the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by him or the effect which they produced upon his mind.’ ” (Emphasis 2008The Court of Appeals found that the admission of Harvey’s testimony was proper, relying on the rule set forth in McMichen v. Moattar, 221 Ga. App. 230 (2) ( 470 SE2d 800 ) (1996) and In the Interest of Smith, 143 Ga. App. 358 (2) ( 238 SE2d 725 ) (1977), that when the subject matter of an inquiry “ ‘relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses’ ” that cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury, “ ‘the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by him or the effect which they produced upon his mind.’ ” (Emphasis | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Smith v. White Lift of Dalton, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1979Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 74 ( 68 SE2d 384 ) (1951); Smith v. White Lift of Dalton, 145 Ga. App. 596 ( 244 SE2d 117 ) (1978). 1979Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 74 ( 68 SE2d 384 ) (1951); Smith v. White Lift of Dalton, 145 Ga. App. 596 ( 244 SE2d 117 ) (1978). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Sims v. State
green
2 sentences1978Sims v. State, 40 Ga. App. 10 ( 148 SE 769 ). 1978Sims v. State, 40 Ga. App. 10 ( 148 SE 769 ). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Johnson v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1978Justice Gunter, writing for a full court in the case of *720 Johnson v. Johnson, 230 Ga. 204 ( 196 SE2d 394 ) (1973), stated that: "[RJegardless of what the law may have been prior to the passage of the Civil Practice Act, since the effective date of that statute we hold that in a divorce case, though the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court, where the record shows that the parties affirmatively conceded and confirmed the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the person and the subject matter, and the court rendered a divorce decree in the case, neither party can thereafter atta 1978Justice Gunter, writing for a full court in the case of *720 Johnson v. Johnson, 230 Ga. 204 ( 196 SE2d 394 ) (1973), stated that: "[RJegardless of what the law may have been prior to the passage of the Civil Practice Act, since the effective date of that statute we hold that in a divorce case, though the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court, where the record shows that the parties affirmatively conceded and confirmed the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the person and the subject matter, and the court rendered a divorce decree in the case, neither party can thereafter atta | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Straub v. Sanders
neutral
2 sentences1976In Straub v. Sanders, 231 Ga. 674 ( 203 SE2d 862 ) (1974), the habeas petitioner, who was sought to be extradited by the State of Pennsylvania, contended that "the burden of proof should be on the demanding state to prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused was in the demanding state at the alleged time of the commission of the crime.” In answer to that contention, Chief Justice Mobley, writing for a unanimous court, said: "The question of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive from justice is not a proper subject matter of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding 1976In Straub v. Sanders, 231 Ga. 674 ( 203 SE2d 862 ) (1974), the habeas petitioner, who was sought to be extradited by the State of Pennsylvania, contended that "the burden of proof should be on the demanding state to prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused was in the demanding state at the alleged time of the commission of the crime.” In answer to that contention, Chief Justice Mobley, writing for a unanimous court, said: "The question of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive from justice is not a proper subject matter of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Smithwick v. Olson
neutral
2 sentences1974Code Ann. § 44-420 (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 726, 733); DeBusschere v. Rutledge, 229 Ga. 128 ( 189 SE2d 397 ); Smithwick v. Olson, 229 Ga. 494 ( 192 SE2d 337 ). 1974Code Ann. § 44-420 (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 726, 733); DeBusschere v. Rutledge, 229 Ga. 128 ( 189 SE2d 397 ); Smithwick v. Olson, 229 Ga. 494 ( 192 SE2d 337 ). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
DeBusschere v. Rutledge
neutral
2 sentences1974Code Ann. § 44-420 (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 726, 733); DeBusschere v. Rutledge, 229 Ga. 128 ( 189 SE2d 397 ); Smithwick v. Olson, 229 Ga. 494 ( 192 SE2d 337 ). 1974Code Ann. § 44-420 (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 726, 733); DeBusschere v. Rutledge, 229 Ga. 128 ( 189 SE2d 397 ); Smithwick v. Olson, 229 Ga. 494 ( 192 SE2d 337 ). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Greene v. Almand green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Shumway v. Warrick neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Thomas v. Calhoun National Bank neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Pendergrass v. Hardman neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| American Bakeries Co. v. City of Griffin neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Livsey v. County of Walton green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Dix v. Dix green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Garraux v. Ross green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Moore v. State green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Chandler v. Baggett green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Johnson v. State neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Wise v. Mohawk Rubber Co. green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Gainesville Buggy & Wagon Co. v. Morrow neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Culver v. Tappan & Merritt neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| White v. Columbus Iron Works Co. green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Dinkler v. Baer green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Byrd & Co. v. Marietta Fertilizer Co. green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Taylor v. State green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Central Railroad v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Lawson v. State neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Griffith v. Finger neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.