subject matter inquiry in Florida

1986Mills v. Redwing Carrier, Inc., 127 So.2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).

1978Mills v. Redwing Carrier, Inc., 127 So.2d 453 (Fla.2d DCA 1961).

2016“A party may voluntarily dismiss any claim, and such a dismissal, if accepted by the trial court, deprives the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim dismissed.” Cutler v. Cutler, 84 So.3d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

2016“A party may voluntarily dismiss any claim, and such a dismissal, if accepted by the trial court, deprives the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim dismissed.” Cutler v. Cutler, 84 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

2015The trial court—without an in camera inspection of the documents, which Petitioners had brought to the hearing for that purpose—rejected that argument and found the privilege was waived because the two individuals were not “employees” of the association within the meaning of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1994) [hereinafter Deason] (adopting a subject-matter test to determine whether corporate communications with counsel are privileged).

2015The trial court — without an in camera inspection of the documents, which Petitioners had brought to the hearing for that purpose — rejected that argument and found the privilege was waived bécause the two individuals were not “employees” of the association within the meaning of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Deason, 632 So.2d 1377 (Fla.1994) [hereinafter Dea son ] (adopting a subject-matter test to determine whether corporate communications with counsel are privileged).

1978In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Hill, 250 So.2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), the court, by a split decision, approved the admission of a psychologist's testimony that the deceptive quality of various factors in the environment affected the visibility of the defendant's standing train to the extent that the average driver in the shoes of the decedent would not have been able to react properly to avoid it.

1975We are not unaware of the train and car collision case of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Hill, 250 So.2d 311 (4th DCA Fla. 1971), in which this court approved the opinion evidence of psychologist to the effect that an average driver would not have seen a train standing in the crossing at night, when the accident occurred.

1949Tison v. Tison, 14 Ga. 167 ; Bullock v. Brown, 20 Ga. 472 ; Weed v. Smull, 3 Sandf.Ch. [N.Y.], 273; Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 .' Sanderson's Adm'rs v. Sanderson, 17 Fla. 820 , 834." Schupler v. Eastern Mortgage Co., Fla., 33 So.2d 586 , 591.

1948“This is subject matter of defense to the original suit, and not the proper subject for a cross-bill. 14 Ga. 167 ; 20 Ga. 472 ; 3 Sand.

1949Tison v. Tison, 14 Ga. 167 ; Bullock v. Brown, 20 Ga. 472 ; Weed v. Smull, 3 Sandf.Ch. [N.Y.], 273; Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 .' Sanderson's Adm'rs v. Sanderson, 17 Fla. 820 , 834." Schupler v. Eastern Mortgage Co., Fla., 33 So.2d 586 , 591.

1948“This is subject matter of defense to the original suit, and not the proper subject for a cross-bill. 14 Ga. 167 ; 20 Ga. 472 ; 3 Sand.

1949Tison v. Tison, 14 Ga. 167 ; Bullock v. Brown, 20 Ga. 472 ; Weed v. Smull, 3 Sandf.Ch. [N.Y.], 273; Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 .' Sanderson's Adm'rs v. Sanderson, 17 Fla. 820 , 834." Schupler v. Eastern Mortgage Co., Fla., 33 So.2d 586 , 591.

1948Chy. 273; 34 Ala. 15 .” — Sanderson’s Adm’rs. v. Sanderson, 17 Fla. 820, 834 . *81 Our statute provides that: “The defendant in his answer shall in short and simple terms set out his defenses to each claim asserted by the bill____Sec. 63.34, F.S., 1941, F.S.A.

1949Sanderson's Adm'rs v. Sanderson, 17 Fla. 820 , 834; 16 Cyc. 327.' Herrin v. Abbe, 55 Fla. 769 , 772, 46 So. 183 , 184, 18 L.R.A., N.S., 907. "`This is subject matter of defense to the original suit, and not the proper subject for a cross-bill.

1949Tison v. Tison, 14 Ga. 167 ; Bullock v. Brown, 20 Ga. 472 ; Weed v. Smull, 3 Sandf.Ch. [N.Y.], 273; Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 .' Sanderson's Adm'rs v. Sanderson, 17 Fla. 820 , 834." Schupler v. Eastern Mortgage Co., Fla., 33 So.2d 586 , 591.

2022Ass’n, 603 So. 2d 587 , 589 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (quoting Fla. Home Builders Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor & Emp.

2008Id. (citing Fla. Home Builders, 412 So.2d at 353-54 .) Pursuant to this test, the supreme court found that the NAACP had standing to challenge the proposed rules as the proposed rules would drastically change the state university admission standards that applied to African-Americans and other minority students.

1995This is known as the divisible divorce concept. [2] See Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1986); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), pet. denied, 47 So.2d 546 (Fla.); cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 , 71 S.Ct. 90 , 95 L.Ed. 632 (1950).

1995But if the court has personal jurisdiction over only one spouse, it can still dissolve the marital relationship of the parties, provided the subject matter requirement for jurisdiction is met (six months residency of that spouse in Florida prior to filing the petition). § 61.021, Fla. Stat. (1993); Perez v. Perez, 519 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Arnstein v. Arnstein, 422 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).

1995But if the court has personal jurisdiction over only one spouse, it can still dissolve the marital relationship of the parties, provided the subject matter requirement for jurisdiction is met (six months residency of that spouse in Florida prior to filing the petition). § 61.021, Fla. Stat. (1993); Perez v. Perez, 519 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Arnstein v. Arnstein, 422 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).

1995But if the court has personal jurisdiction over only one spouse, it can still dissolve the marital relationship of the parties, provided the subject matter requirement for jurisdiction is met (six months residency of that spouse in Florida prior to filing the petition). § 61.021, Fla. Stat. (1993); Perez v. Perez, 519 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Arnstein v. Arnstein, 422 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).

1995This is known as the divisible divorce concept. [2] See Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1986); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), pet. denied, 47 So.2d 546 (Fla.); cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 , 71 S.Ct. 90 , 95 L.Ed. 632 (1950).

1995This is known as the divisible divorce concept. [2] See Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1986); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), pet. denied, 47 So.2d 546 (Fla.); cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 , 71 S.Ct. 90 , 95 L.Ed. 632 (1950).

1995This is known as the divisible divorce concept. [2] See Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1986); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), pet. denied, 47 So.2d 546 (Fla.); cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 , 71 S.Ct. 90 , 95 L.Ed. 632 (1950).

1995This is known as the divisible divorce concept. [2] See Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1986); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), pet. denied, 47 So.2d 546 (Fla.); cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 , 71 S.Ct. 90 , 95 L.Ed. 632 (1950).

1994In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 , 91 S.Ct. 479 , 27 L.Ed.2d 433 (1971), the court articulated the subject matter test to determine the scope of the attorney-client privilege: *1383 [A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter up

1994We find Upjohn as persuasive authority and disagree with the PSC's factual distinction between Upjohn and the instant case. [10] In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.1977), the court modified the subject matter test in an effort to focus on why the attorney was consulted and to prevent the routine channeling of information through the attorney to prevent subsequent disclosure.

1990Accordingly, taking into account the broad discretion afforded trial judges in ordering discovery, see, for example, Dickinson v. Wells, 454 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), I cannot find that petitioner has made any showing which would suggest that the judge below departed from the essential requirements of law in ordering discovery of the items which petitioner now seeks to have protected from disclosure.

1989Compare Hoag v. Moeller, 82 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1955); General Development Corporation v. Doles, 309 So.2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).

1988COMMENTS: 1984 Committee Note: This new rule affords parties a rehearing process in response to such First District Court of Appeal pronouncements as are found in Acosta Rroofing Co. v. Gillyard, 402 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Dade American Hospital Supply v. Perez, 417 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

1988COMMENTS: 1984 Committee Note: This new rule affords parties a rehearing process in response to such First District Court of Appeal pronouncements as are found in Acosta Rroofing Co. v. Gillyard, 402 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Dade American Hospital Supply v. Perez, 417 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).