subject matter claim in Texas

2015The subject matter test expands the reach of the privilege beyond executives or supervisors to other employees in the corporation and is met where (1) the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superior and (2) the subject matter upon which the attorney’s advice is sought and dealt with in the communication is the performance of the employee’s duties.” Id. (citing Nat’l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex. 1993)).

2004The subject matter test is met where "the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney’s advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment.” Nat’l Tank, 851 S.W.2d at 198 .

2023But under those circumstances, the claimant must show that the owner of the land accepted and retained “benefits arising as a direct result of the contractor’s partial performance.” Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1988).

2013“There are instances when recovery in quantum meruit is permitted despite the existence of an express contract that covers the subject matter of the claim.” Id. [Emphasis added].

2025Exam’rs, 867 S.W.2d 911, 917-18 (Tex. App. Austin 1993, no writ) (finding that Board complaint was sufficient to satisfy requirements in section 2001.054 as long as it adequately informs the licensee of the subject matter of the hearing).

2010Exam’rs, 867 S.W.2d 911, 917-18 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ) (finding that Board complaint was sufficient to satisfy requirements in section 2001.054 as long as it adequately informs the licensee of the subject matter of the hearing).

2023Auth. v. Duru, 387 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. App.— Austin 2006, pet. denied)).

2021Auth. v. Duru, 387 –12– S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied)).

2020Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. May, 889 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex. 1994)).

1995It is undisputed that a “party is entitled to discovery that is relevant to the subject matter of the claim, and which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Monsanto Co. v. May, 889 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex.1994) (Opinion on denial of leave to file petition for writ of mandamus) (Gonzalez, J., joined by Hecht, J., dissenting) (citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(1), (2)(a)).

2007Flores, 915 S.W.2d at 478 ; In re Wolf, 65 S.W.3d at 806 ; Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).

2007Flores, 915 S.W.2d at 478 ; In re Wolf, 65 S.W.3d at 806 ; Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).

2024And earlier authority made the same point: “[I]f the subject-matter of the defense be of an intrinsically defensive nature, which, if given effect, will operate merely as a negation of the plaintiff’s asserted right to recover, or in abatement, either wholly or partially, of the amount claimed, the statute of limitation does not apply.” Morriss-Buick Co. v. Davis, 91 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1936); Browne v. Ortiz, 657 S.W.3d 704 , 709 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (same).

1995In Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41 , 91 S.W.2d 313 (1936) the Texas Supreme Court held: The rule in this state is that where the subject matter of a defense interposed by the defendant constitutes an independent cause of action which does not go to the foundation of the plaintiffs demand, it cannot effect a reduction of the amount of the plaintiffs recovery except by way of setoff, and the statutes of limitation are available to the plaintiff in respect to such a defense.

2023The Crown Central guidelines seek to strike a balance between a party’s right to discovery “that is relevant to the subject matter of the claim, and which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and the right of a person whose deposition is noticed to protection “from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment or annoyance, or invasion of personal, constitutional, or property rights.” Id. at 127 (quoting former Tex. R.

2020Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. May, 889 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex. 1994)).

2026A trial court does not “abuse its discretion in disallowing the defense witness’ direct testimony when the witness[, invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege,] 4 refused to answer questions on cross-examination which were relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry or which related to the witness’ direct testimony.” Keller v. State, 662 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. Crim.

2026A trial court does not “abuse its discretion in disallowing the defense witness’ direct testimony when the witness[, invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege,] 4 refused to answer questions on cross-examination which were relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry or which related to the witness’ direct testimony.” Keller v. State, 662 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. Crim.

2020City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi, 469 S.W.3d 589 , 590 4 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam); Bailey v. Smith, 581 S.W.3d 374 , 385 (Tex. App.— Austin 2019, pet. filed).

2019City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi, 469 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).

1992The subject matter test first appeared in Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 , 91 S.Ct. 479 , 27 L.Ed.2d 433 (1971).

1992The subject matter test first appeared in Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 , 91 S.Ct. 479 , 27 L.Ed.2d 433 (1971).

1994Hennigan, 576 S.W.2d at 130 .

1985The court, in Hennigan v. Heights Savings Association, 576 S.W.2d 126, 130 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.), considering the application of the statute of limitations as to defensive matters, stated: The rule in this state is that where the subject matter of a defense interposed by the defendant constitutes an independent cause of action which does not go to the foundation of the plaintiff’s demand, it cannot effect a reduction of the amount of the plaintiff’s recovery except by way of setoff, and the statutes of limitation are available to the plaintiff in respect

2026App. 1984); Decker v. State, 734 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d).

2026App. 1984); Decker v. State, 734 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d).

2023Auth. v. Duru, 387 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. App.— Austin 2006, pet. denied)).

2013Auth. v. Duru, 387 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).

2015See AIC *784 Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex.2008) (“Section 25.1032(c)(1) thus bases the county civil courts' jurisdiction on the type of claim, not the amount of money in dispute.”); see also Haas v. Ashford Hollow Comty.

2014See AIC *784 Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex.2008) (“Section 25.1032(c)(1) thus bases the county civil courts’ jurisdiction on the type of claim, not the amount of money in dispute.”); see also Haas v. Ashford Hollow Comty.

2010See, e.g. , Taylor v. Hill , 249 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (holding that district court had jurisdiction over partition action and rejecting argument that claim requiring determination of heirs’ interest must be heard only in probate court); Trevino v. Lerma , 486 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. Civ.

2010See, e.g., Taylor v. Hill, 249 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. denied) (holding that district court had jurisdiction over partition action and rejecting argument that claim requiring determination of heirs’ interest must be heard only in probate court); Trevino v. Lerma, 486 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1972, no writ) (holding that district court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear suit to set aside deed and that claimants “could procure no relief in the probate court under the provisions of § 48 of the Probate Code”). 3.

2010See, e.g. , Taylor v. Hill , 249 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (holding that district court had jurisdiction over partition action and rejecting argument that claim requiring determination of heirs’ interest must be heard only in probate court); Trevino v. Lerma , 486 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. Civ.

2010See, e.g., Taylor v. Hill, 249 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. denied) (holding that district court had jurisdiction over partition action and rejecting argument that claim requiring determination of heirs’ interest must be heard only in probate court); Trevino v. Lerma, 486 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1972, no writ) (holding that district court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear suit to set aside deed and that claimants “could procure no relief in the probate court under the provisions of § 48 of the Probate Code”). 3.

2009Standard of Review and Applicable Law "A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court's authority to consider the subject matter of a claim." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Garcia , 243 S.W.3d 759, 761 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, pet. filed) (citing Bland Indep.

2009Standard of Review and Applicable Law "A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court's authority to consider the subject matter of a claim." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Garcia, 243 S.W.3d 759, 761 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2007, pet. filed) (citing Bland Indep.

2008Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d 741, 746-47 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2008Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d 741, 746-7 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2019See In re Wolf, 65 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, orig. proceeding) and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard, 240 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied). 7 seeking to establish equitable ownership in real property through a constructive trust, as in Moss and Flores, and Plaintiff seeking legal ownership through unjust enrichment, as in this case.

2007Flores, 915 S.W.2d at 478 ; In re Wolf, 65 S.W.3d at 806 ; Moss v. Tennant, 722 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding).

1992The subject matter test first appeared in Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 , 91 S.Ct. 479 , 27 L.Ed.2d 433 (1971).

1992The subject matter test first appeared in Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 , 91 S.Ct. 479 , 27 L.Ed.2d 433 (1971).

2018Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621-22 (emphasis added); see also Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., 429 S.W.3d at 746 (“[A] UDJA declaratory claim asserted directly against a state agency or official . . . will ordinarily be barred by sovereign immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction, unless the Legislature has waived immunity as to the subject matter of the claim.”) (emphasis added).

2015As recently recognized by this Court, a UDJA case against a governmental entity is not barred by immunity where “the Legislature has waived immunity as to the subject matter of the claim.” City of New Braunfels v. Carowest Land, Ltd., 432 S.W.3d 501, 530 (Tex. App. – Austin 2014, no pet.) (citing Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622 ).

2015Upjohn’s general counsel conducted interviews and sent out questionnaires to numerous employees as part of an internal investigation to gather facts and render advice to Upjohn. 3 Cf. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383 (rejecting “control group” as the standard for attorney-client privilege in the corporate context and allowing for communications with lower- and middle- level employees to be privileged where they are conducted at the request of supervisors and concern the subject matter of their employment) with DuPont, 136 S.W.3d at 226 n.3 (explaining that amended Texas Rule of Evidence 503 replaced the c

1995See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-97 , 101 S.Ct. 677, 684-86 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (rejecting control group test in case arising out of Western District of Michigan); National Tank Co., 851 S.W.2d at 197-98 (explaining differences between the tests); Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HofstRA L.Rev. 279, 288-94, 306 (1984) (explaining differences between the tests and proposing a new test covering all communications made for the purpose of securing legal advice for the corporation and made in confidence to corporate co