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70 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fort James Corporation v. Solo Cup Companygreen2 sentences2020Ill. 2007), quoting Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). ¶ 234 But here, our task is simple enough. 2012Ill. 2007). “ ‘[T]here is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.’ ” Rowe, 241 F.R.D. at 301 (quoting Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Schladweilergreen2 sentences2025It contends that a prosecutor may direct a witness’s attention to the subject matter of inquiry (see Schladweiler, 315 Ill. at 556 ) and that a question is not leading unless it suggests an answer (see Betts v. Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 225 Ill. 2020First, the State questioned Jennifer saying “Did [the defendant] happen to show you anything when you were there?” Jennifer responded that the defendant showed her “a lot of things.” The State then sought to narrow Jennifer’s response by asking, “Did he show you anything like a bladed weapon?” “Questions merely directing the attention of a witness to the subject-matter of the inquiry are not suggestive or leading in any proper sense.” People v. Schladweiler, 315 Ill. 553, 556 (1925). | 1 | 3 |
Rowe International Corp. v. Ecast, Inc.green2 sentences2020(We are not suggesting that O’Dea could have waived his client’s privilege, but State Farm would have been waiving it by affirmatively submitting O’Dea’s affidavit.) ¶ 233 What is left is defining the scope of that waiver of the attorney-client privilege. “ ‘ “[T]here is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.” ’ ” Center Partners, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 67 (quoting Rowe Internat 2012Ill. 2007). “ ‘[T]here is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.’ ” Rowe, 241 F.R.D. at 301 (quoting Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed. | 1 | 2 |
Bio-Scientific Clinical Laboratory, Inc. v. Toddgreen2 sentences1991Although counterclaims directed against original parties need not be germane to matters brought in the complaint, where additional parties are brought in the subject matter of the claim against them must arise out of the same transaction as that pleaded in the complaint. ( Bio-Scientific Clinical Laboratory, Inc. v. Todd (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 845, 848 , 103 Ill.Dec. 171 , 501 N.E.2d 192 .) Section 2-406(b) precludes the bringing in of new parties, if the third party complaint is unrelated to the original complaint and if the cause of action against the third party is not one for indemnity or 1991Although counterclaims directed against original parties need not be germane to matters brought in the complaint, where additional parties are brought in the subject matter of the claim against them must arise out of the same transaction as that pleaded in the complaint. ( Bio-Scientific Clinical Laboratory, Inc. v. Todd (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 845, 848 , 103 Ill.Dec. 171 , 501 N.E.2d 192 .) Section 2-406(b) precludes the bringing in of new parties, if the third party complaint is unrelated to the original complaint and if the cause of action against the third party is not one for indemnity or | 1 | 2 |
Betts v. Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trustgreen1 sentence2025It contends that a prosecutor may direct a witness’s attention to the subject matter of inquiry (see Schladweiler, 315 Ill. at 556 ) and that a question is not leading unless it suggests an answer (see Betts v. Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 225 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Fohr v. Fohrgreen1 sentence2022Fohr v. Fohr, 75 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Foutch v. O'BRYANTgreen1 sentence2021See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. McClellangreen1 sentence2020Long ago, our supreme court wrote that “[w]henever the subject- matter of inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the common experience of all men of common education, moving in the ordinary walks of life, *** the jury are supposed in all such matters to be entirely competent to draw the necessary inferences from the facts testified of by the witnesses. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hellyer v. People, 186 Ill. 550, 558 (1900), see also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal Intro. 1 (“We agree with those cases holding that ‘Courts are *** no | 1 | 1 |
Hellyer v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2020Long ago, our supreme court wrote that “[w]henever the subject- matter of inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the common experience of all men of common education, moving in the ordinary walks of life, *** the jury are supposed in all such matters to be entirely competent to draw the necessary inferences from the facts testified of by the witnesses. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hellyer v. People, 186 Ill. 550, 558 (1900), see also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal Intro. 1 (“We agree with those cases holding that ‘Courts are *** no | 1 | 1 |
Center Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLCgreen1 sentence2020(We are not suggesting that O’Dea could have waived his client’s privilege, but State Farm would have been waiving it by affirmatively submitting O’Dea’s affidavit.) ¶ 233 What is left is defining the scope of that waiver of the attorney-client privilege. “ ‘ “[T]here is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.” ’ ” Center Partners, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 67 (quoting Rowe Internat | 1 | 1 |
Monheim v. Union Railroadgreen1 sentence2019Co., 788 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401 (W.D. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Leahygreen1 sentence2019However, “[e]xpert testimony is proper when the subject matter of the inquiry is such that only a person with skill or experience in that area is capable of forming a judgment.” People v. Leahy, 168 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Norskog v. Pfielgreen1 sentence2012Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 71 (2001) (“In this appeal, we are deciding whether disclosure of mental health information is prohibited by a statutory discovery privilege and whether any exception to the privilege applies. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Grand Jury January 246green2 sentences2012Our appellate court has refined and elaborated on subject matter waiver: “Although voluntary disclosure of confidential information does not effectively waive an attorney-client privilege as to all other non-disclosed communications that may have taken place [citation], where a client reveals portions of her conversation with her attorney, those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter.” In re Grand Jury January 246, 272 Ill. 2012Our appellate court has refined and elaborated on subject matter waiver: “Although voluntary disclosure of confidential information does not effectively waive an attorney-client privilege as to all other non-disclosed communications that may have taken place [citation], where a client reveals portions of her conversation with her attorney, those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter.” In re Grand Jury January 246, 272 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Geroldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Unknown case namegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jennings
green
2 sentences1974In People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534 , it is said that the general rule is that whatever tends to prove any material fact is relevant and competent, and that expert testimony is admissible when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of sldH and experience in it are capable of forming a correct judgment as to any facts connected therewith. 1968Expert testimony is proper when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of skill or experience in it are capable of forming a correct judgment as to any fact connected therewith.” As to the qualifications of an expert, in Bonato v. Peabody Coal Co., 248 Ill 422, at page 426, 94 NE 69 , the court said: “Whether a witness is competent to give an expert opinion is a question of fact for the trial judge and can only be reviewed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” In People v. Jennings, 252 Ill 534, at page 550, 96 NE 1077 , the court said: “The ques | 5 | 1915–1993 |
Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co.
green
2 sentences1979Co. (1971), 49 Ill.2d 118, 122 , 273 N.E.2d 809, 811 .) Expert testimony is proper when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of special skill or experience in that area are capable of forming a correct judgment with respect to the applicable facts. ( Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co. (1915), 271 Ill. 154 , 110 N.E. 795 .) On the other hand, if the jury is competent to determine the facts in issue, then the expert opinion is of no special assistance to the jury and should not be admitted. 1979Co. (1971), 49 Ill.2d 118, 122 , 273 N.E.2d 809, 811 .) Expert testimony is proper when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of special skill or experience in that area are capable of forming a correct judgment with respect to the applicable facts. ( Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co. (1915), 271 Ill. 154 , 110 N.E. 795 .) On the other hand, if the jury is competent to determine the facts in issue, then the expert opinion is of no special assistance to the jury and should not be admitted. | 4 | 1971–1979 |
People Ex Rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission
green
2 sentences2021Madigan, 231 Ill. 2d at 387 , which provides that a party “may appeal to the appellate court of the judicial district in which the subject matter of the hearing is situated.” 220 ILCS 5/10-201(a) (West 2018); see also 5 ILCS 315/11(e) (West 2018) (judicial review of unfair labor practice decisions under Illinois Public Labor Relations Act are governed by the Administrative Review Law “except that such judicial review shall be afforded directly in the appellate court for the district in which the aggrieved party resides or transacts business”). 2019Section 10-201 goes on to state that, in such cases, the appellate court “shall reverse a Commission rule, regulation, order or decision, in whole or in part, if it finds that *** [t]he proceedings or manner by which the Commission considered and decided its rule, regulation, order or decision were in violation of the State or federal constitution or laws, to the prejudice of the appellant.” Id. § 10-201(e)(iv)(D). | 3 | 2018–2021 |
Milwaukee & Saint Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg
green
2 sentences1904Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 .) ‘Whenever the subject matter of inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the common experience of all men of common education moving in the, ordinary walks of life, the rule is that the opinions of experts are inadmissible, as the jury are supposed, in all such matters, to be entirely competent to draw the necessary inferences from the facts testified of by the witnesses.’ (Rogers on Expert Testimony, sec. 8; Ohio and Mississippi Railway Co. v. Webb, 142 Ill. 404 .) As a general rule, the opinions of witnesses are not to 1901Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 .) Whenever the subject matter of inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the common experience of all men of common education moving in the ordinary walks of life, the rule is that the opinions of experts are inadmissible, as the jury are supposed in all such matters to be entirely competent to draw the necessary inferences from the facts testified of by the witnesses. ’. | 3 | 1900–1904 |
Ohio & Mississippi Railway Co. v. Webb
neutral
2 sentences1904Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 .) ‘Whenever the subject matter of inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the common experience of all men of common education moving in the, ordinary walks of life, the rule is that the opinions of experts are inadmissible, as the jury are supposed, in all such matters, to be entirely competent to draw the necessary inferences from the facts testified of by the witnesses.’ (Rogers on Expert Testimony, sec. 8; Ohio and Mississippi Railway Co. v. Webb, 142 Ill. 404 .) As a general rule, the opinions of witnesses are not to 1900Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 .)' “Whenever the subject matter of inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the common experience of all men of common education moving in the ordinary walks of life, the rule is that the opinions of experts are inadmissible, as the jury are supposed in all such matters to be entirely competent to draw the necessary inferences from the facts testified of by the witnesses.” (Rogers on Expert Testimony, sec. 8; Ohio and Mississippi Railway Co. v. Webb, 142 Ill. 404 .) As a general rule, the opinions of witnesses aré not to be | 3 | 1900–1904 |
Cox v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences2011Cox, 61 Ill.2d at 419-20 , 337 N.E.2d 15 . 2011Cox, 61 Ill.2d at 419-20 , 337 N.E.2d 15 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Harvey v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1992App. 3d 74 , 390 N.E.2d 1384 , wherein the court stated: “Expert testimony is proper when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of special skill or experience in that area are capable of forming a correct judgment with respect to the applicable facts. [Citation.] On the other hand, if the jury is competent to determine the facts in issue, then the expert opinion is of no special assistance to the jury and should not be admitted. [Citations.]” Harvey, 73 Ill. 1992App. 3d 74 , 390 N.E.2d 1384 , wherein the court stated: “Expert testimony is proper when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of special skill or experience in that area are capable of forming a correct judgment with respect to the applicable facts. [Citation.] On the other hand, if the jury is competent to determine the facts in issue, then the expert opinion is of no special assistance to the jury and should not be admitted. [Citations.]” Harvey, 73 Ill. | 2 | 1986–1992 |
People v. Dixon
green
2 sentences1986App. 3d 814, 818 , 410 N.E.2d 252 .) Generally the “admissibility of expert testimony is to be determined by the trial judge and a wide latitude of discretion is given to the court in the determination of such admissibility, unless it is clearly and prejudicially erroneous.” People v. Oberlander (1969), 109 Ill. 1986Additionally, we note that “expert testimony is admissible at trial when the subject matter of the inquiry is sufficiently beyond common experience that only persons of skill and experience in the matter are capable of forming a correct judgment as to any connected fact.” (People v. Dixon (1980), 87 Ill. | 2 | 1981–1986 |
People v. Stapelton
green
2 sentences1979App. 3d 477, 480 , 281 N.E.2d 76, 78-79 , the court said: “Expert testimony is admissible when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of skill and experience in it are capable of forming a correct judgment as to any facts connected therewith.” In the instant case, Officer Braswell testified he had used small arms for approximately 9% years in the course of his police work. 1976Expert testimony has generally been admissible “when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such character that only persons of skill and experience in it are capable of forming a correct judgment as to any facts connected therewith.” (People v. Stapelton (3d Dist. 1972), 4 Ill. | 2 | 1976–1979 |
Miller v. Pillsbury Co.
green
2 sentences1976App. 3d 477, 480 , 281 N.E.2d 76 ; Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co. (1915), 271 Ill. 154, 171 .) In Miller v. Pillsbury Co. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 514, 516 , 211 N.E.2d 733 , the court said: “[T]he trend is to permit expert testimony in matters which are complicated and outside the knowledge or understanding of the average person, and even as to matters of common knowledge and understanding where difficult of comprehension and explanation.” See also Carlson v. Hudson (3d Dist. 1974), 19 Ill. 1976App. 3d 477, 480 , 281 N.E.2d 76 ; Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co. (1915), 271 Ill. 154, 171 .) In Miller v. Pillsbury Co. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 514, 516 , 211 N.E.2d 733 , the court said: “[T]he trend is to permit expert testimony in matters which are complicated and outside the knowledge or understanding of the average person, and even as to matters of common knowledge and understanding where difficult of comprehension and explanation.” See also Carlson v. Hudson (3d Dist. 1974), 19 Ill. | 2 | 1968–1976 |
People v. Elliott
green
2 sentences1973People v. Elliott (1916), 272 Ill. 592 , 112 N.E. 300 . 1925People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592 . | 2 | 1925–1973 |
Bonato v. Peabody Coal Co.
neutral
2 sentences1968Expert testimony is proper when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of skill or experience in it are capable of forming a correct judgment as to any fact connected therewith.” As to the qualifications of an expert, in Bonato v. Peabody Coal Co., 248 Ill 422, 94 NE 69 , at page 426, the court said: “Whether a witness is competent to give an expert opinion is a question of fact for the trial judge and can only be reviewed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” In People v. Jennings, 252 Ill 534, 96 NE2d 1077 , at page 550, the court said: “The qu 1968Expert testimony is proper when the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of skill or experience in it are capable of forming a correct judgment as to any fact connected therewith.” As to the qualifications of an expert, in Bonato v. Peabody Coal Co., 248 Ill 422, at page 426, 94 NE 69 , the court said: “Whether a witness is competent to give an expert opinion is a question of fact for the trial judge and can only be reviewed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” In People v. Jennings, 252 Ill 534, at page 550, 96 NE 1077 , the court said: “The ques | 2 | 1968–1968 |
Yarber v. Chicago & Alton Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1915(Yarber v. Chicago and Alton Railway Co. 235 Ill. 589 ; Taylor v. Town of Monroe, 43 Conn. 36 ; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, — Lewis’ ed.— sec. 280; People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534 .) Manifestly, it required peculiar skill and judgment by those who had experience in such matters to state how the gasoline might get into the cellar. 1911(Yarber v. Chicago and Alton Railway Co. 235 Ill. 589 .) It is an elementary rule .that where the court or jury can make their own deductions they shall not be made by those testifying. | 2 | 1911–1915 |
Slepicka v. Illinois Department of Public Health
green
1 sentence2021This suggests that the specification as to the appellate district is intended to apply to a venue analysis and is not intended to limit jurisdiction to a particular appellate court district. ¶ 20 In interpreting the Administrative Review Law, our supreme court has held that filing an action for administrative review in an improper venue does not deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 Slepicka v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 36 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Joseph J. Waymire v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 776 . ¶ 56 As Union Pacific observes, other courts have reached similar conclusions as the Seventh Circuit in Waymire in holding that “the FRSA precludes a FELA claim when [a Federal Railroad Administration] regulation covers the subject matter of that claim and the claim would impose additional duties on the railroad beyond those contemplated by the applicable regulation.” Monheim v. Union R.R. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Claus Von Bulow, Martha Von Bulow, by Her Next Friends Alexander Auersperg, and Annie Laurie Auersperg-Kneissl v. Claus Von Bulow
green
1 sentence2012See In re Keeper of the Records, 348 F.3d at 24-26 ; Von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101-03 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. O'BANNER green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Stotlar Drug Co., Inc. v. Marlow green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. White green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People Ex Rel. Anderson v. Villiage of Bradley green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Bloomgren v. Fire Insurance Exchange green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Grissom v. Board of Education green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Wilson v. Chicago Transit Authority green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Oberlander green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Emery v. Kimball Hill, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Diversified Industries, Inc. v. The Honorable James H. Meredith, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Lamprey green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Stuart-Dean Co. v. Lurie green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. French neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Moretti green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Merchants Nat. Bk. v. EJ & E. RY. CO. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Blair v. United States green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| ILL. TELEPHONE ASS'N v. Commerce Com. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| McDonald's Corp. v. Smargon green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Carlson v. Hudson neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Clark v. Village of Milan green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Faris v. Faris green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Davis v. Davis green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| First Galesburg National Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.