9 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barenbaum v. Richardsongreen2 sentences1979In Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 90-91 , 328 A.2d 731, 733 (1974), we explicated the relevant considerations: “The use of expert testimony arises from a need which comes in turn from the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the average layman. 1979In Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 90-91 , 328 A.2d 731, 733 (1974), we explicated the relevant considerations: “The use of expert testimony arises from a need which comes in turn from the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training beyond the ken of the average layman. | 4 | 4 |
Goldberg v. Kellygreen2 sentences2002Justice Fortunato explained that "the seminal case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), . . . taught [us] that `the fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' Goldberg draws for its teaching of this basic tenet of American jurisprudence . . . that a hearing must be `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' It is elementary that for the opportunity to be heard to be meaningful, one should be forewarned as to the subject matter of the hearing with sufficient detail regarding official concerns so that an intelligent 2002Justice Fortunato explained that "the seminal case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), . . . taught [us] that `the fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' Goldberg draws for its teaching of this basic tenet of American jurisprudence . . . that a hearing must be `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' It is elementary that for the opportunity to be heard to be meaningful, one should be forewarned as to the subject matter of the hearing with sufficient detail regarding official concerns so that an intelligent | 1 | 2 |
Avanzo v. Rhode Island Department of Human Servicesgreen1 sentence2012See Avanzo v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 625 A.2d 208, 210-11 (R.I.1993) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Castoregreen1 sentence1992If all the facts and circumstances can be accurately described to a jury and if the jury is as capable of comprehending and understanding such facts and drawing correct conclusions from them as is the expert, there is no necessity for the expert testimony.’ ” State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321, 326 (R.I.1981) (quoting Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 90-91 , 328 A.2d 731, 733 (1974)). *880 In the case at bar all the facts and the circumstances of the pipe’s alleged condition were accurately described by defendant, plaintiff, and plaintiff’s two witnesses. | 1 | 1 |
Zawatsky v. Cohengreen1 sentence1986Zawatsky v. Cohen, 463 A.2d 210, 212 (R.I.1983); Allen v. State, 420 A.2d 70, 73 (R.I.1980); Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 93 , 328 A.2d 731, 734 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Stategreen1 sentence1986Zawatsky v. Cohen, 463 A.2d 210, 212 (R.I.1983); Allen v. State, 420 A.2d 70, 73 (R.I.1980); Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 93 , 328 A.2d 731, 734 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Porrarogreen1 sentence1981If all the facts and circumstances can be accurately described to a jury and if the jury is as capable of comprehending and understanding such facts and drawing correct conclusions from them as is the expert, there is no necessity for the expert testimony.” Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 90-91 , 328 A.2d 731, 733 (1974); see also State v. Porraro, R.I. 404 A.2d 465 (1979); State v. Vargus, 118 R.I. 113 , 373 A.2d 150 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Honorable Bernard M. Decker, United States District Judgegreen2 sentences2009Harper Row Publishers, Inc. , 423 F.2d at 492 . 2009See Harper Row Publishers, Inc. , 423 F.2d at 491 (declining to express an opinion with respect to "communications about matters to which they are virtually indistinguishable from bystander witnesses; employees who, almost fortuitously, observe events, which may generate liability on the part of the corporation"). 22 Indeed, pursuant to Super. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb
green
1 sentence2009It will capture statements by employees who, because of their duties, are witnesses to the conduct of others." Id. 21 Accordingly, courts have applied a functional approach whereby the focus is on the nature, purpose, and context within which the communication occurs — thus fundamentally returning to the core elements of the attorney-client communications privilege. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Vargus
green
2 sentences1981If all the facts and circumstances can be accurately described to a jury and if the jury is as capable of comprehending and understanding such facts and drawing correct conclusions from them as is the expert, there is no necessity for the expert testimony.” Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 90-91 , 328 A.2d 731, 733 (1974); see also State v. Porraro, R.I. 404 A.2d 465 (1979); State v. Vargus, 118 R.I. 113 , 373 A.2d 150 (1977). 1981If all the facts and circumstances can be accurately described to a jury and if the jury is as capable of comprehending and understanding such facts and drawing correct conclusions from them as is the expert, there is no necessity for the expert testimony.” Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 90-91 , 328 A.2d 731, 733 (1974); see also State v. Porraro, R.I. 404 A.2d 465 (1979); State v. Vargus, 118 R.I. 113 , 373 A.2d 150 (1977). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
McCarthy v. McAloon
green
2 sentences1980For this proposition they cite Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.I. 55 , 83 A.2d 75 (1951). 1980For this proposition they cite Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.I. 55 , 83 A.2d 75 (1951). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Baker v. Carr
green
2 sentences1980For this proposition they cite Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.I. 55 , 83 A.2d 75 (1951). 1980For this proposition they cite Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.I. 55 , 83 A.2d 75 (1951). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Bunnell v. Butler
neutral
1 sentence1909To the law this is a tangible thing; it is property in the highest sense; and we are not aware that in actions for injuries to property courts have assumed the right, either to prevent the plaintiff from establishing the value thereof at the highest possible point to which he could carry it by the power of testimony, or the defendant from diminishing it by the same means; and actions for injuries to character are not exceptions. “ It is true that in Bunnell v. Butler, 23 Conn. 65 , this court sanctioned a limitation upon the number of witnesses to be heard in the matter of the impeachment of t | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.