46 California opinions name it 2 courts 1878–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1996Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 465 P.2d 854 ], it was stated: ‘. . . the relevance of the subject matter standard must be reasonably applied; in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery [citation].’ (Fns. omitted.)" (Id. at pp. 289-290.) The right to privacy in disclosure of financial information affects the scope of discovery. 1996Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 465 P.2d 854 ], it was stated: ‘. . . the relevance of the subject matter standard must be reasonably applied; in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery [citation].’ (Fns. omitted.)" (Id. at pp. 289-290.) The right to privacy in disclosure of financial information affects the scope of discovery. | 5 | 10 |
Tice v. Kaiser Co.green2 sentences1957The presumption has been held not to be available when a fact proved by a party or his witness is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption, (see Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Co. (1922), 190 Cal. 1, 9 [ 210 P. 269 ]); or when a litigant relying upon the presumption, introduced evidence contrary to the fact presumed, (see Tice v. Kaiser Co. (1951), 102 Cal.App.2d 44 [ 226 P.2d 624 ]); or to establish a conflict in the evidence, (see Mundy v. Marshall (1937), 8 Cal.2d 294 [ 65 P.2d 65 ]); or when the litigant invoking the presumption has introduced evidence encompassing the subject matter of 1957The presumption has been held not to be available when a fact proved by a party or his witness is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption, (see Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Co. (1922), 190 Cal. 1, 9 [ 210 P. 269 ]); or when a litigant relying upon the presumption, introduced evidence contrary to the fact presumed, (see Tice v. Kaiser Co. (1951), 102 Cal.App.2d 44 [ 226 P.2d 624 ]); or to establish a conflict in the evidence, (see Mundy v. Marshall (1937), 8 Cal.2d 294 [ 65 P.2d 65 ]); or when the litigant invoking the presumption has introduced evidence encompassing the subject matter of | 2 | 3 |
Mundy v. Marshallgreen2 sentences1957The presumption has been held not to be available when a fact proved by a party or his witness is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption, (see Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Co. (1922), 190 Cal. 1, 9 [ 210 P. 269 ]); or when a litigant relying upon the presumption, introduced evidence contrary to the fact presumed, (see Tice v. Kaiser Co. (1951), 102 Cal.App.2d 44 [ 226 P.2d 624 ]); or to establish a conflict in the evidence, (see Mundy v. Marshall (1937), 8 Cal.2d 294 [ 65 P.2d 65 ]); or when the litigant invoking the presumption has introduced evidence encompassing the subject matter of 1957The presumption has been held not to be available when a fact proved by a party or his witness is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption, (see Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Co. (1922), 190 Cal. 1, 9 [ 210 P. 269 ]); or when a litigant relying upon the presumption, introduced evidence contrary to the fact presumed, (see Tice v. Kaiser Co. (1951), 102 Cal.App.2d 44 [ 226 P.2d 624 ]); or to establish a conflict in the evidence, (see Mundy v. Marshall (1937), 8 Cal.2d 294 [ 65 P.2d 65 ]); or when the litigant invoking the presumption has introduced evidence encompassing the subject matter of | 2 | 3 |
Durell v. Sharp Healthcaregreen2 sentences2014The appellate court affirmed, explaining that plaintiff could ‘not proceed on its quasi-contract claim because the subject matter of such claim . . . was governed by express contracts . . . as specifically alleged in [plaintiff’s] second amended complaint . . . .” (California Medical, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 173–174; see also Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370 (Durell) [affirming demurrer to unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff ‘allege[d] the parties entered into express contracts’].) (Id. at p. 1389; see generally 55 Cal.Jur.3d, Restitution, § 22, p. 465 [“ 2012The appellate court affirmed, explaining that plaintiff could “not proceed on its quasi-contract claim because the subject matter of such claim . . . was governed by express contracts ... as specifically alleged in [plaintiff’s] second amended complaint . . . .” (California Medical, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 172-173; see also Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 ] (Durell) [affirming demurrer to unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff “allege[d] the parties entered into express contracts”].) In this case, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that con | 2 | 2 |
Heiser v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1985As section 851.5 provides in relevant part: “If a civil action is pending in respect to the subject matter of a claim filed pursuant to this section and jurisdiction has been obtained in the court where the civil action is pending prior to the filing of such claim the court shall abate the petition until the conclusion of the civil action.” (Italics added.) (Accord Heiser v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 276, 278 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 745 ].) In the case at bar, the Estate filed a civil action entitled “Alice Holguin, as Executrix of the Estate of Albert R. 1985As section 851.5 provides in relevant part: “If a civil action is pending in respect to the subject matter of a claim filed pursuant to this section and jurisdiction has been obtained in the court where the civil action is pending prior to the filing of such claim the court shall abate the petition until the conclusion of the civil action.” (Italics added.) (Accord Heiser v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 276, 278 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 745 ].) In the case at bar, the Estate filed a civil action entitled “Alice Holguin, as Executrix of the Estate of Albert R. | 2 | 2 |
Chapin v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1976Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d 161 , 173: “... the relevance of the subject matter standard must be reasonably applied; in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discoveiy procedures, doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery (cf. Chapin v. Superior Court (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 851, 855-859 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]). 1976Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d 161 , 173: “... the relevance of the subject matter standard must be reasonably applied; in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discoveiy procedures, doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery (cf. Chapin v. Superior Court (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 851, 855-859 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 199 ]). | 2 | 2 |
Speck v. Sarvergreen2 sentences1964(Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 587-588 [ 128 P.2d 16 ] ; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294, 296 [ 65 P.2d 65 ]; Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [ 135 P.2d 573 ]; Tice v. Kaiser Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 44, 51-52 [ 226 P.2d 624 ].) In this case the pretrial order, in consonance with the pleadings, stated the issues to be tried. 1964(Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 587-588 [ 128 P.2d 16 ] ; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294, 296 [ 65 P.2d 65 ]; Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [ 135 P.2d 573 ]; Tice v. Kaiser Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 44, 51-52 [ 226 P.2d 624 ].) In this case the pretrial order, in consonance with the pleadings, stated the issues to be tried. | 2 | 2 |
Stout v. Southern Pacific Railroadgreen2 sentences1964Co., 127 Cal.App.2d 491, 496 [ 274 P.2d 194 ] : “It is now firmly established that the presumption that a person has exercised due care is dispelled from the case and is entitled to no probative value when the litigant invoking the presumption has introduced evidence encompassing the subject matter of the presumption. 1964Co., 127 Cal.App.2d 491, 496 [ 274 P.2d 194 ] : “It is now firmly established that the presumption that a person has exercised due care is dispelled from the case and is entitled to no probative value when the litigant invoking the presumption has introduced evidence encompassing the subject matter of the presumption. | 2 | 2 |
Barker v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1964(Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 587-588 [ 128 P.2d 16 ] ; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294, 296 [ 65 P.2d 65 ]; Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [ 135 P.2d 573 ]; Tice v. Kaiser Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 44, 51-52 [ 226 P.2d 624 ].) In this case the pretrial order, in consonance with the pleadings, stated the issues to be tried. 1964(Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 587-588 [ 128 P.2d 16 ] ; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294, 296 [ 65 P.2d 65 ]; Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [ 135 P.2d 573 ]; Tice v. Kaiser Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 44, 51-52 [ 226 P.2d 624 ].) In this case the pretrial order, in consonance with the pleadings, stated the issues to be tried. | 2 | 2 |
ELSENBERG v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc.green2 sentences2001(Cf. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 ]; 25 Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 203 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ] ; 26 Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1419-1420 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ]. 27 ) “When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.” (Hedging Concepts, Inc., 2001(Cf. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 ]; 25 Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 203 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ] ; 26 Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1419-1420 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ]. 27 ) “When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.” (Hedging Concepts, Inc., | 1 | 1 |
Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2001(Cf. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 ]; 25 Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 203 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ] ; 26 Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1419-1420 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ]. 27 ) “When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.” (Hedging Concepts, Inc., 2001(Cf. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 ]; 25 Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 203 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ] ; 26 Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1419-1420 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ]. 27 ) “When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.” (Hedging Concepts, Inc., | 1 | 1 |
Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co.green2 sentences2001(Cf. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 ]; 25 Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 203 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ] ; 26 Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1419-1420 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ]. 27 ) “When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.” (Hedging Concepts, Inc., 2001(Cf. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 ]; 25 Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 203 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ] ; 26 Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1419-1420 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ]. 27 ) “When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.” (Hedging Concepts, Inc., | 1 | 1 |
Palay v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CTY.green2 sentences1996“Our right to privacy is guaranteed and protected by state and federal Constitutions.” (Palay v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 919, 931 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 ].) A 1974 amendment to the California Constitution added article I, section 1, which states: “ ‘All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 1996“Our right to privacy is guaranteed and protected by state and federal Constitutions.” (Palay v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 919, 931 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 ].) A 1974 amendment to the California Constitution added article I, section 1, which states: “ ‘All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. | 1 | 1 |
Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1985(See Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465, 477 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 90 , 551 P.2d 410 ].) [5] We reject SBCERA's assertion that we need not reach this issue because the trial court heard and denied Hittle's petition for writ of mandate on its merits, not on the basis of timeliness. 1985(See Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465, 477 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 90 , 551 P.2d 410 ].) [5] We reject SBCERA's assertion that we need not reach this issue because the trial court heard and denied Hittle's petition for writ of mandate on its merits, not on the basis of timeliness. | 1 | 1 |
Blau v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982The constitutional measure of that which incriminates is broadly cast. “[T]he privilege forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense . . . .” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ]; see also Blau v. United States (1950) 340 U.S. 159 [ 95 L.Ed. 170 , 71 S.Ct. 223 ]; Kronick v. United States (9th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 436 .) The privilege is therefore not limited to the subject matter of the inquiry concerning which the testimony is compelled. 1982The constitutional measure of that which incriminates is broadly cast. “[T]he privilege forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense . . . .” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ]; see also Blau v. United States (1950) 340 U.S. 159 [ 95 L.Ed. 170 , 71 S.Ct. 223 ]; Kronick v. United States (9th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 436 .) The privilege is therefore not limited to the subject matter of the inquiry concerning which the testimony is compelled. | 1 | 1 |
Prudhomme v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1982The constitutional measure of that which incriminates is broadly cast. “[T]he privilege forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense . . . .” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ]; see also Blau v. United States (1950) 340 U.S. 159 [ 95 L.Ed. 170 , 71 S.Ct. 223 ]; Kronick v. United States (9th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 436 .) The privilege is therefore not limited to the subject matter of the inquiry concerning which the testimony is compelled. 1982The constitutional measure of that which incriminates is broadly cast. “[T]he privilege forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense . . . .” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ]; see also Blau v. United States (1950) 340 U.S. 159 [ 95 L.Ed. 170 , 71 S.Ct. 223 ]; Kronick v. United States (9th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 436 .) The privilege is therefore not limited to the subject matter of the inquiry concerning which the testimony is compelled. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Critchlowgreen2 sentences1982As was said with respect to an early California immunity statute: “If, in giving . . . testimony, the testimony has reference to another offense committed by [the witness], he is within the protection of the statute, and upon any prosecution for such offense is authorized to plead ... in bar thereof that... he gave testimony with reference to such offense.” (Ex parte Cohen (1894) 104 Cal. 524, 531-532 [ 38 P. 364 ]; see also In re Critchlow (1938) 11 Cal.2d 751, 758-759 [ 81 P.2d 966 ].) 4 Although both immunities give protection against punishment for incriminating disclosures they do so in s 1982As was said with respect to an early California immunity statute: “If, in giving . . . testimony, the testimony has reference to another offense committed by [the witness], he is within the protection of the statute, and upon any prosecution for such offense is authorized to plead ... in bar thereof that... he gave testimony with reference to such offense.” (Ex parte Cohen (1894) 104 Cal. 524, 531-532 [ 38 P. 364 ]; see also In re Critchlow (1938) 11 Cal.2d 751, 758-759 [ 81 P.2d 966 ].) 4 Although both immunities give protection against punishment for incriminating disclosures they do so in s | 1 | 1 |
Ex parte Cohengreen2 sentences1982As was said with respect to an early California immunity statute: “If, in giving . . . testimony, the testimony has reference to another offense committed by [the witness], he is within the protection of the statute, and upon any prosecution for such offense is authorized to plead ... in bar thereof that... he gave testimony with reference to such offense.” (Ex parte Cohen (1894) 104 Cal. 524, 531-532 [ 38 P. 364 ]; see also In re Critchlow (1938) 11 Cal.2d 751, 758-759 [ 81 P.2d 966 ].) 4 Although both immunities give protection against punishment for incriminating disclosures they do so in s 1982As was said with respect to an early California immunity statute: “If, in giving . . . testimony, the testimony has reference to another offense committed by [the witness], he is within the protection of the statute, and upon any prosecution for such offense is authorized to plead ... in bar thereof that... he gave testimony with reference to such offense.” (Ex parte Cohen (1894) 104 Cal. 524, 531-532 [ 38 P. 364 ]; see also In re Critchlow (1938) 11 Cal.2d 751, 758-759 [ 81 P.2d 966 ].) 4 Although both immunities give protection against punishment for incriminating disclosures they do so in s | 1 | 1 |
| Tatkin v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CTY.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of MacHinists, Local 1304green | 1 | 1 |
| Van Slyke v. Arrowhead Reservoir & Power Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnston v. Orlandogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wallacegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
California Medical Ass'n v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026(De Havilland, supra, at p. 870 .) Nor can plaintiff avoid this roadblock by recasting his unjust enrichment claim as a quasi-contract claim. “[A]s a matter of law, a quasi- contract action for unjust enrichment does not lie where, as here, express binding agreements exist and define the parties’ rights. [Citations.] ‘When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.’ 27 [Citation.]” (California Medical Assn. v. Aet 2015In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the court of appeal explained, “‘When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.’ [Citation.] Thus, CMA may not proceed on its quasi-contract claim because the subject matter of such claim, to wit, whether Physicians were entitled to compensation from defendants, was governed by express contracts including the Defendant-Intermediary Agreements and Defendant-Enrollee Agreement | 3 | 2014–2026 |
Richards v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1984In support of this contention petitioner cites Richards v. Superior Court [supra\, 86 Cal.App.3d 265 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 77 ], wherein this court held: ‘[W]here a party is compelled in civil discovery to reveal financial information because the information is relevant to the subject matter of a claim for punitive damages, that party is, upon his motion, presumptively entitled to a protective order that the information need be revealed only to counsel for the discovering party or to counsel’s representative, and that once so revealed, the information may be used only for the purposes of the lawsuit 1984In support of this contention petitioner cites Richards v. Superior Court [supra\, 86 Cal.App.3d 265 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 77 ], wherein this court held: ‘[W]here a party is compelled in civil discovery to reveal financial information because the information is relevant to the subject matter of a claim for punitive damages, that party is, upon his motion, presumptively entitled to a protective order that the information need be revealed only to counsel for the discovering party or to counsel’s representative, and that once so revealed, the information may be used only for the purposes of the lawsuit | 3 | 1980–1984 |
Panama Commercial Co. v. Tingey
neutral
2 sentences1928(Garcia v. Gunn, 119 Cal. 315 [ 51 Pac. 684 ]; Fredericks v. Tracy, 98 Cal. 658 [ 33 Pac. 750 ].)” In Sidney v. Wilson, 67 Cal. App. 282 [ 227 Pac. 672 ], which was a replevin case concerning an automobile, the court says: “As set forth in the case of Beggs v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 532 [ 147 Pac. 585 ], where many authorities are cited, mere possession of the subject matter of a claim and delivery action will not suffice. 1924As set forth in the case of Beggs v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 532 [ 147 Pac. 585 ], where many authorities are cited, mere possession of the subject matter of a claim and delivery action will not suffice. | 2 | 1924–1928 |
Beggs v. Smith
green
2 sentences1928(Garcia v. Gunn, 119 Cal. 315 [ 51 Pac. 684 ]; Fredericks v. Tracy, 98 Cal. 658 [ 33 Pac. 750 ].)” In Sidney v. Wilson, 67 Cal. App. 282 [ 227 Pac. 672 ], which was a replevin case concerning an automobile, the court says: “As set forth in the case of Beggs v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 532 [ 147 Pac. 585 ], where many authorities are cited, mere possession of the subject matter of a claim and delivery action will not suffice. 1924As set forth in the case of Beggs v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 532 [ 147 Pac. 585 ], where many authorities are cited, mere possession of the subject matter of a claim and delivery action will not suffice. | 2 | 1924–1928 |
De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC
green
1 sentence2026(De Havilland, supra, at p. 870 .) Nor can plaintiff avoid this roadblock by recasting his unjust enrichment claim as a quasi-contract claim. “[A]s a matter of law, a quasi- contract action for unjust enrichment does not lie where, as here, express binding agreements exist and define the parties’ rights. [Citations.] ‘When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court’s own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties’ own contract.’ 27 [Citation.]” (California Medical Assn. v. Aet | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences2006Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 ] (Ameri-Medical Corp.), the court discussed the scope of allowable financial discovery when privacy issues are raised concerning an artificial entity defendant: “ ‘ “[T]he relevance of the subject matter standard must be reasonably applied; in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery [citation].” [Citation.]’ The right to privacy in disclosure of financial information affects the scope of discovery, [f] ‘Our *594 righ 2006Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 ] (Ameri-Medical Corp.), the court discussed the scope of allowable financial discovery when privacy issues are raised concerning an artificial entity defendant: “ ‘ “[T]he relevance of the subject matter standard must be reasonably applied; in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery [citation].” [Citation.]’ The right to privacy in disclosure of financial information affects the scope of discovery, [f] ‘Our *594 righ | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences1990(People v. Williams, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1479 .) In contrast, here the court gave CALJIC No. 4.17 and no instruction at all regarding the effect of medication. 8 Citing People v. Brown (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1247 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 756 P.2d 204 ], the People contend this distinction, coupled with the arguments of counsel, adequately presented to the jury the theory which Bolden claims should have been the subject matter of the instruction. 1990(People v. Williams, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1479 .) In contrast, here the court gave CALJIC No. 4.17 and no instruction at all regarding the effect of medication. 8 Citing People v. Brown (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1247 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 756 P.2d 204 ], the People contend this distinction, coupled with the arguments of counsel, adequately presented to the jury the theory which Bolden claims should have been the subject matter of the instruction. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence1990(People v. Williams, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1479 .) In contrast, here the court gave CALJIC No. 4.17 and no instruction at all regarding the effect of medication. 8 Citing People v. Brown (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1247 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 756 P.2d 204 ], the People contend this distinction, coupled with the arguments of counsel, adequately presented to the jury the theory which Bolden claims should have been the subject matter of the instruction. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Elam v. College Park Hospital
green
1 sentence1984(See Elam v. College Park Hospital, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d 332 .) Petitioner asserts the information sought is relevant because “Whether a hospital requires its staff physicians to carry malpractice coverage is part and parcel of its duty of care.” In our view, the question of whether a hospital is negligent in investigating a physician’s background and competence, and in maintaining adequate evaluation procedures, is, at best, only tenuously connected to the question of whether it requires its physicians to carry malpractice insurance. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Norman Kronick v. United States
green
1 sentence1982The constitutional measure of that which incriminates is broadly cast. “[T]he privilege forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense . . . .” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ]; see also Blau v. United States (1950) 340 U.S. 159 [ 95 L.Ed. 170 , 71 S.Ct. 223 ]; Kronick v. United States (9th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 436 .) The privilege is therefore not limited to the subject matter of the inquiry concerning which the testimony is compelled. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Ley v. Boron Oil Co. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Britt v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Hansen v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1978(Gardner v. Investigators, Inc. (M.D.Fla. 1976) 413 F.Supp. 780, 781-782 .) In Hansen v. Morgan, supra, 405 F.Supp. 1318 , a candidate, successful in securing election to Congress, found that a credit report secured by the defendant jewelers and delivered to his primary election opponent, had found its way into the hands of a House Committee investigating the congressman’s campaign financing. 1978(Gardner v. Investigators, Inc. (M.D.Fla. 1976) 413 F.Supp. 780, 781-782 .) In Hansen v. Morgan, supra, 405 F.Supp. 1318 , a candidate, successful in securing election to Congress, found that a credit report secured by the defendant jewelers and delivered to his primary election opponent, had found its way into the hands of a House Committee investigating the congressman’s campaign financing. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| In Re Lifschutz green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Gardner v. Investigators, Inc.
green
1 sentence1978(Gardner v. Investigators, Inc. (M.D.Fla. 1976) 413 F.Supp. 780, 781-782 .) In Hansen v. Morgan, supra, 405 F.Supp. 1318 , a candidate, successful in securing election to Congress, found that a credit report secured by the defendant jewelers and delivered to his primary election opponent, had found its way into the hands of a House Committee investigating the congressman’s campaign financing. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. St. Peter green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Carrier Manufacturing Co. v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Alvarez v. Felker Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Butler v. Gosling green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Thorn green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Howe v. Board of Supervisors neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Burrell v. Capt. H. A. Crow Post No. 884 neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Irwin v. Newby green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Darcy v. Mayor of San Jose green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Ex Parte Sohncke green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Fredericks v. Tracy green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Garcia v. Gunn green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Normart v. Safer green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Sidney v. Wilson green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Green v. Superior Court neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| People v. Wilson green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Velázquez v. De Choudens neutral | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Kauffman v. Maier green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Hastings v. Lusk green | 1 | 1906–1906 |
| People ex rel. S.F. Gas Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors of S.F. neutral | 1 | 1878–1878 |
| Tilden v. Board of Supervisors neutral | 1 | 1878–1878 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.